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The 2010 Gulf of Mexico oil spill was one of the worst environmental disasters
of all time. Using the concept of state-corporate environmental crime, this project
applies a case study analysis of secondary data sources including publicly available
government reports, corporate documents, academic sources and journalistic accounts
to examine the causes of the blowout and the response to the spill. Building on
Michalowski and Kramer’s Integrated Theoretical Model of State-Corporate Crime,
this study introduces an additional level of analysis- that of the industry- between the
organizational and institutional levels.
The causes of the Deepwater Horizon explosion are rooted both in the history
of federal development of the offshore oil industry, and the organizational actions of
the corporations most directly involved: BP, Transocean and Halliburton. Undertaken
in close coordination between the federal government and BP, alongside privately
contracted oil spill response organizations, the response to the spill can be classified as
a state-facilitated corporate cover up of the environmental crimes in the Gulf. This was
accomplished through scientific propaganda and censorship of images and information.

Working together, BP and the Obama administration sought to downplay the size of
the spill and its effects. An unprecedented amount of toxic chemical dispersants were
applied at the surface and directly at the wellhead in an effort to conceal the amount of
oil. Federal restrictions blocked access to cleanup operations, beaches and airspace,
thereby limiting public visibility of the spill. Policing the media blackout was an
intricate matrix of federal and local law enforcement, and private security companies
hired by BP. Suppression of images and information helped to contain public outrage
while allowing BP and the federal government to carry out dangerous response
measures with little oversight. As this study demonstrates, the most recent spill is not
an isolated instance of state-corporate environmental crime, but rather is the result of
the criminogenic structure of the deepwater oil industry.
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SECTION I: INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
Introduction
In the wake of the blowout of Union Oil’s Platform A off the coast of Santa
Barbara in 1969, sociologist Harvey Molotch (1970) used the event to examine the
current power relations between government, the oil industry and the people in the
article “Oil in Santa Barbara and Power in America.” He argued that all technological
“accidents” provide a basis for insight into the true nature of the structure of power
relations in society that would otherwise be unobservable to an outsider. The insights
and conclusions provided by Molotch (1970) into the power arrangements between
the oil industry, government and the knowledge production industry (including
universities and the media) are invaluable for contextualizing the focus of this study,
the 2010 Gulf of Mexico oil spill and the ensuing response. A brief examination of
government and industry interactions surrounding the Santa Barbara spill forty years
prior to the Deepwater Horizon catastrophe can offer a useful starting point for
assessing whether these structures of power have changed over time, and if so, in what
ways.
Oil in Santa Barbara and Power in America
Not long after federal leasing was opened along the Pacific Coast in 1966 and
1968, Union Oil’s Platform A exploded on January 28, 1969 off the coast of Santa
Barbara. The well continued to gush for ten days until it was stopped. However, a
second explosion occurred on February 12 causing oil to leak until March 3, yet the
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well continued to seep oil for more than seven months. In total, three million gallons of
oil eventually spilled into the Santa Barbara Channel, defiling 150 miles of coastline
and causing increased air pollution. Following the initial explosions, the U.S. Coast
Guard, who patrolled the Santa Barbara Channel regularly, was slow to respond and
did not notify nearby citizens of the spill.
The response from the federal government through multiple agencies was
consistently in support of the oil companies at every stage. Molotch (1970:134) argues
that:
In the end, it was not simply Interior, its U.S. Geological Survey and
the President which either supported or tacitly accepted Oil’s public
relations tactics. The regulatory agencies at both national and state
level, by action, inaction and implication had the consequences of
defending Oil at virtually every turn.
Although the spill had the effect of organizing public resistance to California offshore
drilling, the close and powerful Interior-oil industry relationship trumped the concerns
of the people. Through a series of media and public relations campaigns, the oil
companies consistently minimized the damage to the beaches while applauding the
success of Union Oil’s cleanup efforts (1970:133). Both government and corporate
officials implied that the spill response and the beach cleanup operations were effective
even though citizens knew otherwise. Rather, oil persisted in coming ashore and
restoration efforts were necessary for years to come.
Members of the Santa Barbara community were outraged at the oil companies,
but were initially confident that justice would be served by government officials. As
their elected representatives at the local, state and federal level remained inactive, the
close connections between the oil industry and the government soon became apparent.
Following the spill, Congress decided to do little to halt offshore drilling. While the
Department of Interior announced it would enact stricter regulation to control the
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offshore industry, high ranking engineers at the agency confided to Congressional
investigators that all the safeguards in the world could not prevent another such
disaster (1970:136). Caving to pressure from the oil industry, the Department of
Interior rescinded its restrictions and permitted continued offshore leasing.
Furthermore, government and corporate officials also worked to suppress the
damage done to wildlife as a result of the spill. Funded by money from the oil
companies, the two centers for cleaning birds and other marine life provided both
government and corporate officials with authoritative statistics of dead and injured
wildlife resulting from the spill. However, the number of fatalities of wildlife only
included deaths that occurred at the centers themselves. Over the duration of the spill,
there was continued debate surrounding the true extent of the harm to wildlife. Large
fish kills and scores of dead whales washed ashore and while they were publicly
acknowledged, no connection was made to the oil pollution (1970:134).
As the crisis continued, it was revealed that the Department of Interior,
particularly the U.S. Geological Survey, had severely underestimated the size of the
spill despite independent calculations that suggested the spill was ten times larger
(1970:133). At the time, people were struck by the contrast of the sophisticated
technology used to discover and extract the oil compared to the primitive cleanup
technology which included skimming and collecting the oil, chemical dispersants, and
injecting massive amounts of cement and debris to plug the well (1970:135).
As Union Oil’s attempts to seal the well were proving unsuccessful, a
presidential commission of “distinguished” scientists was appointed to oversee efforts
at the wellhead. Known as the “DuBridge Panel,” the commission had clear ties to the
oil industry and Union Oil specifically, especially through the chair of the panel Dr.
DuBridge. As a former Cal Tech President, Dr. DuBridge not only accepted donations
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from Union Oil on behalf of the university, but Union’s president Fred Hartley was
also a Cal Tech trustee. Provided in a brief document lacking any substantive
research, the solution proposed by the Panel was to drill up to fifty relief wells to suck
the reservoir dry, a process that could take ten to twenty years. Furthermore,
government officials were dependent on the oil industry for their data, and struggled to
force Union Oil to release what it classified as “proprietary information” (1970:137).
The close relationship between science and the oil industry stood as a barrier to
community members seeking to decipher the effects of the spill and decide how to
respond. Dependent on grants from the oil industry, many university petroleum
experts were hesitant to provide assistance to government officials for fear of losing
their funding (1970:137). At the University of Santa Barbara where Molotch worked
at the time, “…it is a fact that Oil interests did contact several Santa Barbara faculty
members with offers of funds for studies of the ecological effects of the oil spill, with
publication rights stipulated by Oil” (1970: 137). Moreover, while the local and
national media provided reporting of particularly sensational aspects of the spill, there
was little in depth coverage to adequately inform the public (1970:140).
Even in spite of scientific misconduct and insufficient media coverage that
obscured the extent of the spill, the event nevertheless played a role in galvanizing
public support for the environmental movement. Alongside the growing environmental
movement, public pressure from the residents of Santa Barbara and played a role in
mobilizing the support necessary to achieve these changes. Making the concern for the
environment a national priority, President Nixon established the Environmental
Protection Agency in 1970. Moreover, key pieces of environmental legislation were
also put in place the same year including the National Environmental Protection Act,
the Clean Water and Clean Air Acts and the Endangered Species Act. Furthermore,
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after witnessing the environmental devastation caused by the Santa Barbara spill,
Wisconsin Senator Gaylord Nelson proposed the creation of the first Earth Day on
April 22, 1970. While the ongoing environmental movement as a whole achieved
these changes, the Santa Barbara spill helped mobilize public support leading to
significant milestones in federal environmental regulation.
Molotch (1970:144) concludes that, “The relationship described between Oil,
government, and the knowledge industry does not constitute a unique pattern of
power in America. All major sectors of the industrial economy lend themselves to the
same kind of analysis as Oil in Santa Barbara.” In closing, Molotch stresses the
importance of accident research at the local and national levels for revealing the
arrangements of power in society and urges sociologists to be ready to spring into
action when an accident occurs to investigate the underlying power arrangements,
especially at the nexus of government and corporations.
Commemorating the fortieth anniversary of Earth Day, on April 22, 2010
nearly thirty-six hours after the initial explosion, the Deepwater Horizon buckled and
sank into the Gulf of Mexico. With the collapse of the rig came the world’s largest
offshore oil spill: the Macondo well was unleashed with full force. Over the course of
the next five months, a massive response effort involving government officials in
coordination with privately contracted oil spill response organizations fought to bring
the well under control and contain the oil. Just like the 1969 Santa Barbara spill, the
response to the 2010 Gulf of Mexico disaster provides an opportunity to gain insights
about the structure of contemporary government and oil industry relations. Utilizing
the concept of environmental state-corporate crime, this project will examine the
causes of the Deepwater Horizon explosion and the response to the blowout of the
Macondo well. A detailed analysis of the causes and consequences of the Gulf of
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Mexico spill will provide a better understanding of the criminogenic state-corporate
power relations that comprise the offshore oil industry.
Literature Review
The literatures on state-corporate crime and environmental crime share a
number of commonalities. Debates surrounding the most appropriate definition of
crime and criminality are a centerpiece of the research in both fields. Similarly, both
fields trace their intellectual lineage back to Edwin Sutherland’s concept of white
collar crime. Despite their definitional and conceptual overlaps, past research on statecorporate crime and environmental crime has rarely explicitly brought the two
together. An overview of the literature in both fields demonstrates just how compatible
the two really are, and how absolutely necessary it is to combine the understandings of
both bodies of research.
A definitional debate over what constitutes crime has persisted since
Sutherland’s introduction of white-collar crime and need not be fully reiterated in this
project. Nonetheless, a brief review of the standards of harm to be utilized is
necessary. While some scholars argue that crime is that which is prohibited by the
criminal law (Tappan 1947), Sutherland proposed expanding the definition to include
socially injurious behavior such as violations of regulatory law. Just like most of the
research on state and corporate crime, environmental crime research also follows in
this trend by examining violations of environmental law in addition to criminal law.
Since governments define what is criminal, the harmful actions of state actors are most
often not defined as such under the law. Therefore, some scholars have further
proposed expanding the definition of crime to be based on violations of human rights
(Schwendinger and Schwendinger 1970). Within this vein, many state-corporate
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crime scholars have approached criminality as a violation of human rights as enshrined
by international law under the United Nation’s Universal Declaration of Human
Rights.
Offering an anarchist alternative to legalistic definitions of crime and justice,
Tifft and Sullivan’s (1980) approach to crime highlights the significant social harms
that flow from state and legal structures. The study of social harm, they argue, cannot
be constrained by legal institutions but instead must be built on a needs-based
approach to justice. Along these same lines, Hillyard et al. (2004) have worked to
develop a theory of social harms (also known as “zemiology”) that encompasses
physical and financial harms, including those caused by states and corporations. Based
on an anarchist perspective, the proceeding inquiry is not limited to legal definitions of
crime but rather embraces a social harms approach which includes social, physical, and
financial harm to humans. Going beyond anthropocentric definitions of harm, damage
to the environment will also be evaluated with equal significance in this analysis. The
interconnectedness between human and ecological harm can no longer be seen as
separate and distinct, but must be considered on par with one another.
Definitional Debate
The concept of state-corporate crime developed as part of the broader study of
white-collar crime. First introduced by Edwin Sutherland in 1939, the concept of
white-collar crime was not more fully developed until the release of White Collar
Crime (1949). According to Sutherland (1983:7), white collar crime is “…a crime
committed by a person of respectability and high social status in the course of his
occupation.” A marked departure from the street crimes being studied by other
criminologists of the time, Sutherland’s definition incorporated the requisites of both
high social status and an occupation setting. Clarifying his intentions, he states that
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the term applies “principally to business managers and executives, in the sense that it
was used by a president of General Motors who wrote ‘An Autobiography of a White
Collar Worker’” (1983:265). In this context, the significance of high socioeconomic
status is made clear in Sutherland’s conceptualization of white collar criminality.
Breaking rank with mainstream criminology, Sutherland’s concept of white
collar crime challenged the legalistic assumptions of criminology. Due to their high
status, Sutherland made clear, white collar criminals were often able to circumvent the
penalties and social stigmas experienced by offenders with lesser social status. In
order to bring the illegal, though not necessarily criminal, acts of high status offenders
into the realms of criminological inquiry, Sutherland proposed a definition of crime
emphasizing socially injurious behavior. Defining socially harmful violations of civil
law as criminal was Sutherland’s attempt to direct criminological inquiry towards the
crimes of the wealthy and powerful. Even though it marked a definitive shift in
criminology, Sutherland’s concept of white collar crime was hardly out of bounds with
many of the criminological and legalistic definitions of crime which granted the state
the power to define socially injurious behavior (Schwendinger and Schwendinger
1970:126).
Not all criminologists, however, have viewed Sutherland’s conceptualization
with such clarity. To the contrary, “The definition of white-collar crime…has always
represented something of an intellectual nightmare” (Geis 1977:25). From
Sutherland’s definition, two divergent threads of white collar crime research have
emerged: occupational crime and organizational crime. The study of occupational
crimes developed to examine crimes committed by individuals during the course of
their occupation for personal gain. On the other hand, the study of organizational
crimes interpreted Sutherland’s definition to be primarily concerned with the high
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social status of white collar offenders. It is within this latter lineage that corporate
crime, state crime and state-corporate crime have developed.
Organizational framework
Arguing that white collar crime does not sufficiently deal with the
consequences of organizational behavior, Schrager and Short (1978) attempt to
develop a sociology of organizational crime. They contend that:
Organizational crimes are illegal acts of omission or commission of an
individual or a group of individuals in a legitimate formal organization
in accordance with the operative goals of the organization, which have
a serious physical or economic impact on employees, consumers or the
general public. (1978:411-2)
Although individuals occupy organizational positions, their thoughts, actions
and behaviors are fundamentally shaped by the goals, procedures, standards and norms
of an organization. Moreover, the structure of any organization is composed of
positions occupied by replaceable people, designed to ensure its longevity. Directing
inquiry towards the goals, procedures, standards and norms of organizations draws
attention to the power and influence of organizations in society and helps to further
the understanding of the socially injurious behaviors which result from such structures.
Applying an organizational perspective to the concept of white collar crime turned the
subfield away from narrowly focusing on the role of the individual and reoriented it
towards the power of organizational structures.
Corporate crime
In contrast to occupational crimes, research on corporate crimes has
maintained Sutherland’s focus on crimes committed by people of high social status as
are found in the top positions of businesses. “An influential definition of corporate
crime, by Marshall Clinard and Richard Quinney (1973:188), characterized [corporate
crime] as ‘offenses committed by corporate officials for their corporation and the
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offenses of the corporation itself” (as quoted in Friedrichs 2007:55). Touching on a
recurring theme within white collar crime research, this definition alludes to a tension
between organizational actors and the individuals occupying the positions within the
organization.
State crime
In his 1988 presidential address to the American Society of Criminology,
Chambliss (1989) highlighted the necessity of studying crimes committed by the
government through the concept of state-organized crime. He argues that, “the most
important type of criminality organized by the state consists of acts defined by law as
criminal and committed by state officials in the pursuit of their job as representatives of
the state” (1989:184). Like many of the white collar crimes examined by Sutherland,
state-organized crimes are rooted in the need for capital accumulation by modern
nation states. In his definition of state-organized crimes, Chambliss (1989:184) notes
that:
Examples include a state’s complicity in piracy, smuggling,
assassinations, criminal conspiracies, acting as an accessory before or
after the fact, and violating laws that limit their activities. In the latter
category would be included the use of illegal methods of spying on
citizens, diverting funds in ways prohibited by law (e.g., illegal
campaign contributions, selling arms to countries prohibited by law,
and supporting terrorist activities).
Relying on an organizational approach to crime, Chambliss redirects Sutherland’s
concept by drawing attention to the crimes committed by state administrators while in
the course of their occupation.
Attempting to create a definition of state crime inclusive of human rights,
Green and Ward (2000) argue that the term “state crime” should refer to a
convergence between both violations of human rights and state organizational
deviance. Along the same lines as Schwendinger and Schwendinger (1970), Green
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and Ward adopt a definition of human rights as articulated by the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights. They assume human rights to be “…the elements of
freedom and well-being that human beings need to exert and develop their capacities
for purposive action” (2000:110).
Maintaining a more traditional approach to defining crime, Green and Ward
(2000) include state organizational deviance in their definition of state crime. By
defining state crime in such a manner, the authors are able to incorporate a definition
focused on human rights while also retaining the concept of deviance so fundamental
to traditional definitions of crime. State organizational deviance draws a distinction
between acts committed by individual state actors and organizational misconduct.
Green and Ward (2000:110) clarify that:
State organizational deviance is conduct by persons working for state
agencies, in pursuit of organizational goals, that if it were to become
known to some social audience would expose individuals or agencies
concerned to a sufficiently serious risk of formal of informal censure
and sanctions to affect their conduct significantly (for example, by
inducing them to conceal or lie about their activities).
State organizational deviance may take the form of seemingly legitimate state
operations and organizations which become entangled with illegal ones.
State-Corporate Crime
The concept of state-corporate crime will be the primary conceptual focus of
this project, therefore warranting an extended literature review. Developed by Kramer
and Michalowski, state-corporate crime directed attention towards the frequency with
which both state and corporate actors come together in the production of social harm.
As Michalowski and Kramer (2006:20) define the concept:
State-corporate crimes are illegal or socially injurious actions that result
from a mutually reinforcing interaction between (1) policies and/or
practices in pursuit of goals of one or more institutions of political
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governance and (2) policies and/or practices in pursuit of the goals of
one or more institutions of economic production and distribution.
This definition of state-corporate crime encompasses both legal criteria as well socially
injurious actions while centering on the nexus between government and business.
Further refining the concept, Michalowski and Kramer (2006) distinguish
between state-initiated and state-facilitated corporate crime and stress the importance
of closely examining the interrelationships between state and corporate actors. They
argue:
State-initiated corporate crime occurs when corporations employed by a
government engage in organizational deviance at the direction of, or with the
tacit approval of, that government. State-facilitated corporate crime occurs
when government institutions of social control are guilty of clear failure to
create regulatory institutions capable of restraining deviant business activities,
either because of direct collusion between business and government or because
they adhere to shared goals whose attainment would be hampered by
aggressive regulation. (2006:21)
Stressing the importance of a historical, relational understanding of organizational
actors, one crucial characteristic of the concept of state-corporate crime is that it
“…directs attention toward the way in which deviant organizational outcomes are not
discrete acts, but rather the outcome of relationships between different social
institutions” (Michalowski and Kramer 2006:21).
Initially, four case studies (Kramer 1992; Kauzlarich and Kramer 1993; Aulette
and Michalowski 1993; Matthews and Kauzlarich 2000) established the foundation for
understanding state-initiated corporate crime and state-facilitated corporate crime.
Illustrating the former, the case studies of the Challenger explosion (Kramer 1992) and
the US production of nuclear weapons (Kauzlarich and Kramer 1993) both draw
attention to the explicit role of the state in initiating deviant interorganizational
actions. Alternatively, state-facilitated corporate crime occurs when government
institutions of social control fail to restrain deviant business actions, either due to
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direct collusion between corporations and government or because they adhere to
common goals that would be thwarted by forceful regulation. Both the investigation of
the fire at the Imperial Food Products chicken processing plant (Aulette and
Michalowski 1993) and the crash of ValuJet 592 (Matthews and Kauzlarich 2000)
highlight the failure of the state to effectively constrain corporate criminality.
The original development of the concept of state-corporate crime stems from a
case study by Kramer (1992) of the deviant state and corporate intersections that
resulted in the 1986 Challenger space shuttle explosion that killed seven crew
members. Investigations revealed that rather than being the result of mechanical
failure, the Challenger disaster resulted from a series of organizational decisions made
by the National Aeronautics and Space Agency, a state agency, and Morton Thiokol, a
private corporation who was contracted to build the faulty solid rocket boosters. This
seeming “accident” can be viewed as a state-corporate crime since the cause of the
disaster can be traced to the decisions and actions of NASA and Morton Thiokol
(Kramer 1992).
Diane Vaughan’s (1996) work The Challenger Launch Decision: Risky
Technology, Culture and Deviance and NASA documented how budgetary
compromises and political pressure to launch led to the disaster. Vaughan (1996)
identified what she termed as the “normalization” of deviant practices within the
organizational culture at NASA that contributed to the catastrophic explosion. The
normalization of deviance occurs when actors in organizational settings come to define
deviant actions as normal since they conform to the norms and standards of the
organization in which they act. As Vaughan (2007:11) explains, “Thus, in some social
settings deviance becomes normal and acceptable: it is not a calculated decision where
the costs and benefits of doing wrong are weighed because the definitions of what is
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deviant and what is normative have been redefined within that setting.”
Also focusing on the historical, political and contextual factors contributing to
deviant state and corporate interactions is Kauzlarich and Kramer’s (1993) study of
the environmental damage caused by the US nuclear weapons manufacturing industry.
For more than 50 years, the Department of Energy (DOE) and the Atomic Energy
Commission contracted with private multinational corporations such as Westinghouse,
DuPont, General Electric and Martin Marietta to produce nuclear weapons. While
DOE owned the equipment and oversaw the production of nuclear weapons and
materials around the country, the corporations were responsible for daily
manufacturing operations. Producing nuclear weapons results in enormous amounts of
radioactive and nonradioactive hazardous waste. This waste was improperly disposed
of causing irreversible environmental damage. For example, two of the most
environmentally harmful nuclear weapons facilities, the Hanford facility and the
Savannah River plant which both produce plutonium and tritium, have released billions
of gallons of liquid waste contaminating the local air, soil, groundwater, rivers and
watersheds. Encouraged by Cold War cultural beliefs and lacking interorganizational
oversight, the nuclear weapons industry placed production of defense materials above
the environmental consequences of warhead production (Kauzlarich and Kramer
1993).
Another foundational case study of state-corporate crime by Aulette and
Michalowski (1993) details the 1991 fire at the Imperial Food Products chicken
processing plant in Hamlet, North Carolina that resulted in the deaths of twenty-five
workers and injured an additional fifty-six. Although the technical cause of the fire was
a rupture in the hydraulic line near the deep fryer that sent a wave of fire throughout
the plant, it was discovered that Imperial had deliberately locked the fire doors to
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prevent employee theft, thereby denying them access to a safe exit. Beyond the actions
of Imperial, a complex pattern of regulatory failure was revealed. Facilitated by a long
history of privileging business interests over labor, North Carolina’s neglect to fund
the state’s Occupational Safety and Health Program severely weakened regulatory
oversight designed to protect workers. In contrast to the examinations of the
Challenger explosion and the US manufacturing of nuclear weapons that demonstrate
the direct role of the state in the commission of corporate wrongdoing, the Hamlet fire
study identified a different type of relationship in which the state indirectly creates the
conditions for corporate crime to occur (Aulette and Michalowski 1993).
Matthews and Kauzlarich’s (2000) examination of the crash of ValuJet Flight
592 in the Florida Everglades on May 11, 1996 helps to further define the role of the
state in facilitating corporate crime. While the explicit cause of the crash that killed all
105 passengers and five crewmembers was the explosion of oxygen generators in a
cargo compartment that resulted in fire, government investigations also identified the
failure of both ValuJet and SabreTech (an airline maintenance company) to comply
with numerous regulations as important factors. Dually tasked with the conflicting
mandates of regulating the safety of the airline industry while simultaneously
promoting it, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) refused to implement
safeguards and guidelines that could have protected passengers in favor of the
economic interests of the airline industry. By ignoring two specific recommendations
by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) to place smoke detectors in
cargo holds (the exact area the fire started in ValuJet 592), as well as to reclassify
cargo holds to prevent the spreading of fire to the rest of the plane, the FAA indirectly
set the stage for the crash to occur (Matthews and Kauzlarich 2000).
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Recent research on state-corporate crime
In addition to these early case studies, more recent research on state-corporate
crime has emerged that examines international issues. A number of criminologists have
paid increasing attention to the changing nature of state power in the global neoliberal
economy and have begun to focus on the international arena. One theme among
numerous recent case studies of state-corporate crime concerns the organizational
deviance that has occurred due to the US invasion of Iraq. Kramer and Michalowski
(2005) argue that the 2003 invasion and occupation of Iraq were illegal under
international law and can therefore be classified as an instance of state crime. Despite
multiple attempts by the Bush administration to define their actions as justified,
Kramer and Michalowshi (2005) demonstrate how the decision to go to war in Iraq
was undertaken in clear violation of international law and paved the way for continued
state-corporate crimes as a result. Similarly, Whyte (2007) explores how the
overarching principle behind the US invasion and occupation of Iraq was the creation
of a new rule of law based on the opening up of the economy to privatization by
Western, and particularly US, corporations in breach of international law.
A second prominent theme is the relationship between private military firms
and governments and the implications for state-corporate deviance. In the course of
the occupation and invasion of Iraq, privatized security has been deployed on a scale
never before seen. Rather than abdicating its authority to private military firms
(PMFs), Welch (2009) contends that governments work in direct cooperation with
them, creating a situation of fragmented power. In one instance in May 2007,
Blackwater employees opened fire on the streets of Baghdad twice in two days,
including a standoff with Iraqi security forces. Labeled “Baghdad’s Bloody Sunday,”
another incident occurred on September 16, 2005 when Blackwater guards shot and
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killed between eight and twenty innocent civilians and wounded dozens of others in
Nisour Square. A documented repeat offender, Blackwater has also been investigated
for at least six other episodes of excessive force. Despite this pattern of criminality, the
US government has not only neglected to prosecute Blackwater employees and other
contractors, but has extended immunity from wrongdoing altogether with respect to
the reconstruction of the Iraqi economy. In this manner, the uncoupling of police and
government forces allows private contractors to escape accountability for war crimes
and human right abuses (Welch 2009).
Part of a broader trend of privatizing military functions, private military
companies (PMCs) have become a legitimate industry involved in a wide range of
activities including protecting governmental and non-governmental organizations
during humanitarian missions, in addition to protecting corporate interests such as the
extraction of oil and mining. Whyte (2003) argues that the unfolding of the PMC
market can be understood as transference of law from international prohibition treaties
and national criminal law, to civil contracts as the principal means of legal regulation.
Far from a reduction of state sovereignty in the era of neo-liberal globalization, private
military markets are dependent on the consent and support of governments for their
livelihood. Moreover, governments have also come to recognize the benefits to be
gained by forging a state-corporate alliance in the private military market. By
expanding the PMC market, the opportunity structure for state-corporate crime is
increased as states and corporations are able to engage in high risk or politically
sensitive conflicts while evading accountability for their actions. Absent any new
criminal legal controls, state-corporate crime in the PMC market is only likely to
accelerate (Whyte 2003).
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Furthermore, Rothe (2006:216) has identified war profiteering in the form of
overcharging by Halliburton in Iraq as a form of state-facilitated corporate crime due
to the government’s aggressive refusal to take regulatory action against the company.
While many of Halliburton’s actions can be and have been classified as corporate
crimes, in the case of overcharging in Iraq, evidence of state-corporate criminality is
present. Rothe (2006:218) explains, “As these examples show, Halliburton has a
history of corporate criminality and questionable organizational practices. However, it
is the recent intermingling of Halliburton and Vice President Cheney that makes its
corporate practices a case of state-initiated and/or state-facilitated corporate crime.”
Rothe and Ross (2010) analyze how anomie and social disorganization,
resulting in a lack of regulation, are significant factors in explaining the criminal
propensity of private military companies (PMCs). Private forces such as Bechtel,
Blackwater, CACI International, DynCorp, Halliburton and subsidiary Kellogg,
Brown, and Root, Logo Logistics, and Titan, provide a wide range of services
including direct tactical military assistance, military consulting (strategic advisory and
training), and logistic, intelligence and maintenance services to armed forces. Within
each of these sectors, there are variations in the types of crimes committed including
murder, fraud and war profiteering. PMCs are not held to the same rules of
engagement as the military and have an unclear legal status that is undefined by
international law. Lacking internal and external constraints at every level, PMCs
operate in anomic conditions that cultivate criminogenic behavior in which they are
free to engage in deviant behavior without consequence (Rothe and Ross 2010).
As an investigator for a 2002 Royal Commission examining fraud within the
Dutch construction industry, Van Den Heuvel (2005) helped reveal that rather than an
isolated incident of collusion, the entire sector had engaged in illegal practices
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including fraud, undercutting the market, unjustified subsidies, monopolization
resulting in higher prices, and bribery of politicians and public servants. At the core,
the Commission identified the industry-wide pandemic to be due to multiple forms of
collusion, or a secret agreement for a fraudulent purpose. The Commission concluded
that these forms of collusion within the Dutch construction industry were so
interconnected that they constituted a culture that placed contactors above the law and
in control of authorities. Because of the pervasive collusion between contractors and
authorities, Van Den Heuvel (2005) concludes that it is necessary to enact stricter
rules governing state-corporate interorganizational relationships.
Environmental Crime
Just like the definitional debates over what constitutes crime within the
literature on white-collar crime, there is widespread disagreement about how to define
environmental crime as well. Most simply, environmental crime can be defined from a
legalistic perspective as “any act that violates an environmental protection statute”
(Clifford and Edwards 1998:26). However, many scholars of environmental crime
argue that the field must move beyond legalistic definitions, be they criminal, civil or
regulatory. In consideration of broader philosophical issues, crimes against the
environment can alternatively be defined as “an act committed with the intent to harm
or with a potential to cause harm to ecological and/or biological systems and for the
purpose of securing business or personal advantage” (Clifford and Edwards 1998:26).
Whether labeled environmental, green (Lynch and Stretesky 2003; South 1998;
Lynch 1990), or conservation (Gibbs et al. 2010) criminology, the number of scholars
concerned with the intersection between environmental, human and social harm
continues to grow. One related subfield of environmental crime is the study of
environmental justice which has highlighted the connections between the location of
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environmental hazards, race and ethnicity. On the whole, research on environmental
justice indicates that minorities are more likely to be exposed to environmental risks
and harms than whites. Within this perspective, Stretesky and Lynch (1999) develop
the concept of corporate environmental violence. In contrast to the common
perception of violence as one-on-one physical contact, Stretesky and Lynch
(1999:168) state:
Consequently, we argue for a broader definition of violence. Overall,
we believe that violence is an act that results from an unjust use of
power that results in physical injury, disease or disability. When
violence is defined in these terms, it may apply to a situation where one
individual shoots and kills another or where an automobile
manufacturer knowingly disregards safety concerns, resulting in the
death of several dozen people.
In their analysis, corporate environmental violence, measured as chemical spills, was
found to be positively correlated with race and ethnicity and contributes to
institutionalized racism.
Influenced by the environmental movements of the 1980s, green criminology as
envisioned by Lynch (1990) combines environmentalism, radicalism, and humanism.
Among other topics, green criminology includes the study of crimes committed against
humanity through environmental destruction, examinations of the successes and
failures of governments and corporations to protect humans and animals from
environmental hazards, or the study of specific governmental and corporate practices
and social trends that destroy the environment and thereby threaten the survival of
humans, plants and animals (Lynch 1990:2). Green criminology must forge new paths
and expand the narrow boundaries of traditional criminology to consider
environmental harm as a form of social injustice. It is necessary, Lynch (1990:3)
argues, “…that the critical community expand its focus to deal with a wider variety of
class related injustices that maintain an inequitable distribution of power while
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destroying human life, generating hunger, uprooting and poisoning the environment of
all classes, peoples and animals. “
Arguing in favor of an environmental consciousness in the discipline as a
whole, South (1998) stresses the importance of developing a green “perspective” that
draws on established and preexisting traditions within criminology. After surveying
the wide array of research that falls under the banner of environmental crime, South
(1998:220) observes:
Evidently, criminology and related disciplines have documented a wide
range of examples of environmental damage inflicted by unregulated
power, corporate misconduct, organized crime and governmental lack
of care. My suggestion here is that the development of, and
sensitization to, a green perspective in criminology could provide a
unifying theme and rallying point for such disparate work and add
power to its accumulation as a concrete identifiable field of work within
criminology.
Building on South’s suggestion, more explicit connections must be drawn between the
fields of environmental and state-corporate crime. It is imperative that a “greening” of
the study of state-corporate crime take place.
Raising the question of whether or not thinking on environmental crime has
done more harm than good, Halsey (1997:217) argues that it has inadvertently
“…fostered a regulatory culture based around the regulation of inherently antiecological activities.” He goes on to note, “Of crucial importance here (from an ecohuman rights perspective) is the fact that the risk (however small) of an ecological
disaster occurring- the very thing that environmental statutes attempt to minimize- will
be omnipresent simply due to the nature of the activity at hand” (Halsey 1997:219).
Rather than question the implicitly destructive nature of (largely capitalist) economic
activities such as oil extraction, refinement and production, regulations are developed
that manage and thereby perpetuate an “acceptable” amount of environmental
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exploitation. It is necessary to move beyond narrow, state defined criteria for
environmental harm, as it is important to remember that “…the state itself can be
shown to be the perpetrator of the greatest ecological destruction due to its refusal (or
incapacity) to either sanction the most environmentally destructive activities or
facilitate a move toward a society that does not have at its core the greatest possible
exploitation and commodification of nature” (Halsey 1997:226).
Avoiding the tendency to urge for tougher penalties or better regulation is
necessary for environmental criminology to develop a new approach that moves
beyond legalistic and anthropocentric understandings of environmental harm. Halsey
argues that this new approach must clearly define “1) what constitutes an
environmental problem, 2) how a particular problem relates to the wider logic or
machinations of the politico-economic system in which it occurs, and 3) which
resources (criminal law, education, technology transfers) should be mobilized to
overcome environmental problems” (1997:217). On the whole, while critical
criminology has been successful in promoting a human rights based definition of social
harm, it has failed to take seriously the notion of ecological harm.
To address the inadequacies of critical criminology generally and studies of
environmental crime, Halsey (1997) furthers the work of the Schwendingers’ (1970)
by incorporating both human and non-human rights to form an “eco-human rights”
approach to environmental crime. An eco-human rights approach “…requires that
activities which pose an ongoing threat to the environment be judged as ultimately
detrimental to the long-term well-being of human and nonhuman life” (1997:218). By
proceeding in this manner, justifying the importance of non-human rights to the study
of environmental crime can help to counterbalance the tendency towards advocating
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regulation of activities which are fundamentally detrimental to humans and the
environment alike.
State-Corporate Environmental Crime
Just as the fields of corporate crime and state crime progressed in a parallel
fashion for so long without converging into the hybrid of state-corporate crime, the
study of environmental crime has also traversed a similar path with the field of statecorporate crime without explicitly intersecting. Forced to deal with the injurious
actions of organizational actors and entrenched in the same definitional debates about
what constitutes crime, environmental crime finds itself in a comparable position to
state-corporate crime within the discipline of criminology. Tracing its intellectual
linage back to Sutherland’s concept of white-collar crime, environmental crime is often
at once a corporate crime as well. Yet while the actions of state and governmental
actors are often analyzed in the study of environmental crime, seldom are these actions
identified as state or state-corporate crimes. Rothe (2009:24), for example, notes in
passing that “Environmental crimes can also be classified as either a state/corporate
crime or a crime of globalization.”
More recently however, scholars in of both state-corporate crime and green
criminology have begun to sow the common ground between them. Specifically, of
increasing significance within the literatures are the state and corporate interactions
contributing to the critical problem of global warming and climate change, largely
perpetuated by the fossil fuel industry. Often in close cooperation with government,
the central role of the oil industry in creating environmental damage has been
increasingly documented by the research on state-corporate crime.
Cruciotti and Matthews (2006) verify the Exxon Valdez oil spill as a state
facilitated corporate crime by documenting the decisions made by the Alyeska Pipeline
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Service Company, the U.S. Coast Guard, the State of Alaska and the U.S. government
that made the oil spill, and the environmental damage it caused, a likely outcome. In
contrast to Charles Perrow’s argument that accidents such as the Exxon Valdez are in
many ways a “normal” part of living with high risk technologies they argue that it was
the result of deliberate decisions. “This series of oversight and failures to reprimand
wrongdoing created an environment that, when coupled with a strong corporate profit
motive, was conducive to an accident such as the grounding of the Valdez”
(2006:162). It does not appear, however, that lessons from the Exxon Valdez spill
have been heeded by neither government nor industry. Cruciotti and Matthews
(2006:169) warn that “In spite of new legislation, environmental harm, and the large
fines levied against Exxon as a result of the Exxon Valdez oil spill, problems within the
oil industry in general have continued, ranging from oil spills to refusal to obey rules
and lax regulations.” Problems with the enforcement of regulations, they argue, are to
blame for the ineffectiveness of legislation. Absent any mechanisms for enforcement,
rules and regulations have little capacity to restrain organizational actors.
In one of the few pieces of research that explicitly acknowledges both
environmental and state-corporate crime, Smandych and Kueneman (2010) identify the
Canadian-Alberta tar sands as a type of state-corporate environmental crime. They
assert, “in our view, this definition of state-corporate crime is ideally suited to study
acts of commission and omission carried out by various levels of government in
collusion with energy corporations in the Alberta tar sands that are responsible for
causing a range of different types of harm to the ecosystem and animals, including
humans” (2010: 97).
One of the greatest social forces contributing to the pressure to produce
consumable oil from tar soaked sand in Alberta is coming from the US. However,
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while the profitability of the tar sands was no secret for years before hand, there was
not an aggressive state-corporate push for the development of the tar sands until the
1990s. The authors argue “…that since the late 1980s Canada has in effect
surrendered sovereignty over its energy resources to the USA” (2010:88). Two key
trade agreements including the Canada-USA Free Trade Agreement (FTA) and the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) obligate Canada to provide the US
with what now accounts for 18 percent of total US oil imports (2010:93).
While US oil demands and the dominance of the “Big Oil” multinational
corporations were of critical importance, Smandych and Kuenemand (2010) argue that
the decisions of Canadian officials also played a significant role in allowing for
widespread environmental degradation in the Alberta region to occur. They explain,
“Specifically, we show that this disturbing state of affairs is the deliberate result of the
efforts by the Conservative government of the Province of Alberta- and, more
recently, the closely allied Conservative federal government of Canada- working handin-hand with the oil industry- that is, mainly US based multinational energy
corporations” (2010:88).
Lynch, Burns and Stretesky (2011) have applied the concept of state-corporate
crime to global warming by examining the politicization of global warming under the
G.W. Bush administration. Although industry leaders are often selected for
governmental positions, appointing corporate leaders from the oil and mining
industries to crucial environmental policy positions was a dominant trend in the Bush
administration that strengthened state-corporate ties and deterred action on climate
change. Despite the overwhelming consensus of climate change scientists, the Bush
administration colluded with corporations in the fossil fuel industries in an effort to
discredit and suppress science on the human causes of global warming. White House
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officials deliberately sought to undermine science on global warming in a number of
ways including blocking publications, editing government reports, altering federal
policy and pressuring climate change scientists to delete references to global warming
and climate change in government sponsored research. Furthermore, the corporate
strategy for undermining information on global warming was to fund and create front
organizations to disseminate misinformation about climate change to the public. In this
manner, the policies of the Bush administration privileged the interests of the fossil fuel
industry over the interests of the public (Lynch, Burns and Stretesky 2011).
Four forms of state-corporate crime shape the social and environmental harms
caused by global warming. Kramer and Michalowski (2012) argue that state and
corporate actors produce these harms by: 1) denying that global warming is caused by
the actions of humans (anthropogenic), 2) thwarting attempts to reduce greenhouse
emissions, 3) excluding from the political arena ecologically just adaptations to climate
change, and 4) responding to the social conflicts that arise as a result of climate change
with militarism and violence. While anthropogenic global warming is the result of over
two hundred years of industrialization and fossil fuel consumption, it is possible to
identify state-corporate relationships that caused knowable and predictable harm and
that could have been avoided. Therefore, the failure of state institutions to mitigate or
reduce carbon emissions in the private and public sectors should be understood as a
state-corporate crime of omission. More than just a failure to act, however, the
orchestrated denial of climate change despite overwhelming scientific evidence to the
contrary, constitutes a state-corporate crime of commission. Designed to cast doubt
on the evidence for anthropogenic global warming, the global warming denial countermovement has been directed, organized and funded by corporations and conservative
think tanks. States and corporations have also refused to seriously consider socially
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just adaptation policies despite the increasing number of social conflicts resulting from
climate change. This too, Kramer and Michalowski (2012) argue, constitutes a statecorporate crime of omission.
Theoretical Approach
State-corporate crime has three useful characteristics as a sensitizing concept.
First, it refutes the notion that organizational deviance is a discreet act by illuminating
the relationships between social institutions. Second, by embracing the relational
character of the state, the concept of state-corporate crime demonstrates how the
horizontal interactions between political and economic institutions contain the
potential for illegal and social injurious actions to occur (Wonders and Solop 1993).
Finally, adopting a relational approach to the state not only allows for a consideration
of horizontal interactions, but also the vertical relationships between different levels of
organizational action: political-economic, organizational and interactional.
A major ontological assumption underpinning the study of state-corporate
crime is “that state and corporate organizations are real actors that can be understood
as connected to, but analytically distinct from, individual employees, owners, and
regulators” (Kauzlarich and Matthews 2006:243). These organizational actors are the
focus of this study and a strategy of “theoretical elaboration” will inform the analysis.
Rather than allowing one particular theoretical perspective to guide social research,
Vaughan (2007:3) argues in favor of theory elaboration which she describes as:
…inductive strategies for more fully developing existing theories that
explain particular research findings by merging different theoretical
perspectives in a more general way. More specifically, the means to
theory elaboration are theoretical tools in general (theory, models, and
concepts) rather than a more restricted formal meaning (a set of
interrelated propositions that are testable and explain some
phenomenon). The data define which theory (theories) or concepts
would apply.

28
She notes that two strategies towards theory elaboration have occurred in
criminology, one which brings together theories of the same level of analysis and
another which attempts to unite theories from different levels. The most crucial
consideration in merging different levels is the meso level, Vaughan argues, at which
formal and complex organizations can be found.
In line with Vaughan’s call for theory elaboration that unites the macro, meso
and micro levels of analysis, Michalowski and Kramer’s (2006) (see also Kramer and
Michalowski 1990) Integrated Theoretical Model of State-Corporate Crime devises an
analytic scheme for understanding organizational deviance. The framework is useful in
bringing together different levels of analysis including the interactional, organizational
and institutional levels based on three corresponding theoretical perspectives;
differential association theory, organizational theory and political economy.
The interactional level draws on social learning theories generally and
Sutherland’s differential association theory specifically. Basing his theory on nine
principles, Sutherland asserted that criminal behavior is learned in interpersonal
interaction with others and that delinquency results from an excess of definitions that
favor non-law abiding behavior (Sutherland and Cressey 1978:81-2). It is through
these processes that an individual learns definitions that are favorable to criminal
behavior. The organizational level incorporates the perspectives of organizational
sociology. The work of Schrager and Short (1978) and Ermann and Lundmann
(1982) directs inquiry towards the goals, procedures, standards and norms of
organizations, draws attention to the power and influence of organizations in society,
and helps to further the understanding of the socially injurious behaviors which result
from such structures. Finally, the institutional level brings together the inseparable
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relationship between politics and the economy; the intersection of state and corporate
wrongdoing.
As Kramer (2010:120) explains “This model views the organization as the key
unit of analysis, nested within an institutional and cultural environment, and engaged in
social action through the decisions of individual actors who occupied key positions
within the structure of the organization.” These three levels of analysis are linked to
three catalysts for action including motivation or performance emphases, opportunity
structure, and the operationality of control. The first catalyst for action (motivation)
concerns goal attainment. As the emphasis on goal attainment by political-economic
institutions, organizations and individuals increases, corporations and state agencies
become more susceptible to engaging in organizational deviance. The second catalyst
for action (opportunity) assumes that organizational deviance is more likely where
legitimate means are scarce relative to goals. Finally, the third catalyst for action
(operationality of control) examines the presence or absence of social control at all
three levels of analysis. Organizations subjected to a high operationality of social
controls are more likely to cultivate organizational cultures that favor compliance with
laws and regulations and those organizations that are not subject to such controls are
more likely to develop cultures of resistance. Michalowski and Kramer (2006:24)
assert that, “This framework is designed to indicate the key factors that will contribute
to or restrain organizational deviance at each intersection of a catalyst for action and a
level of analysis.” By investigating the linkages between levels of analysis and catalysts
for action a more nuanced understanding of state-corporate crime can potentially be
developed.
Kauzlarich and Matthews (2006:242) explain the benefit provided by
incorporating multiple theoretical and analytic levels into one frame work:
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One of the advantages of theoretical integration is that several levels of
social reality can be included in one analysis. Most conventional
theories of traditional and white-collar crime tend to privilege one level
of analysis over others. With integrated theoretical models, however, an
attempt is made to “cover all the bases” in order to highlight the
multiple connections between individuals, organizations, structures, and
processes vital to the genesis and persistence of high level deviance.
Taking stock of the field of state-corporate crime, Kauzlarich and Matthews
(2006:242) note that many of the empirical studies of the topic have tended to focus
on the organizational and institutional levels of analysis while neglecting to focus on
the interactional level. This is in part due to the difficulties in gaining access to people
in positions of power and their ability to deflect public scrutiny and criticism of their
actions. “Still, it is important that criminologists such as those working in the area of
state-corporate crime to give priority to the structural level of analysis because by
definition the phenomenon cannot be understood if it is divorced from macrolevel
structures” (2006:243).
While the interactional level of analysis is no doubt of great significance to
understanding state-corporate criminality, the real strength of the theoretical model,
and what sets it apart from mainstream explanations of crime, is its attention to the
influence of structural and organizational forces that result in social harm. Providing
an example of how environmental crime can be perpetrated by the state, Kauzlarich
and Kramer (1998) applied the integrated theoretical model to nuclear production and
the waste it creates. Furthermore, Rothe and Mullins (2009) have stressed the
importance of international relationships by developing the international level of
analysis as separate from the institutional level. Drawing on the strengths of both of
these applications of the integrated theoretical model, this project proposes to further
incorporate the studies of green criminology and state-corporate crime while also
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delineating a separate level of analysis at the level of industry, which can assist in
highlighting the intersection between human and environmental harm.
Industry as a Level of Analysis
Located somewhere between the institutional and organizational levels of the
integrated theoretical model, this dissertation argues that an industry constitutes an
important level of analysis to be studied in its own right. As Aldrich (1979:185) notes:
“Ideally, an ‘industry’ should be defined as all those firms within the same niche which
are competing for the same resources, meaning that customers or clients treat their
products as interchangeable or as equivalent substitutes.” Any conceptualization of an
industry, however, must draw attention to the role of the state in shaping the
environment in which the corporate organizations operate. Confirming the
significance of the state in shaping the organizational environment, Aldrich (1979:164)
stresses that, “Indeed, the state must surely be the major force affecting organizational
formation in the twentieth century.” In many ways the laws and regulations created by
the state function as a matrix that constrains and encourages certain interactions within
and between organizational actors engaged in a common economic pursuit. The
relations of state and corporate organizational actors within a given industry might
provide an additional level of analysis that could lend further insight into
organizational deviance.
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Table 1: Integrated Theoretical Model of State Corporate Crime with Industrial Level
of Analysis

Catalysts for Action
Levels of Analysis
Institutional Level

Industrial Level
Organizational Level

Interactional Level

Motivation

Opportunity

Control
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Within the fields of corporate crime, state crime and state-corporate crime,
there have been relatively few systematic considerations of the deviant, harmful or
injurious actions that result from the interactions of a particular industry. Comparably,
within the literature on environmental crime, harm as a result of industrial relations is
more often considered, yet few studies have undertaken a systematic analysis of the
environmental harm caused by an entire industry. On the whole, the few studies of
industry structures that have been conducted occurred during the 1970s, looked
largely at economic crimes and lacked an organizational perspective (Leonard and
Weber 1970; Farberman 1975; Geis 1977; Denzin 1977). Clinard and Yeager (2006),
however, have explored industry as a unit of analysis by researching the ethical and
unlawful problems caused by the oil, auto and pharmaceutical industries.
Leonard and Weber (1970:408) argue that in order to understand occupational
crime, it is necessary to examine the market forces within different industries. They
argue that “Insufficient attention has been focused by sociologists on the extent to
which market structure- that is, the economic power available to certain corporations
in concentrated industries- may generate criminal conduct.” This approach to
occupational crime sees “criminogenic market structures” as a direct result of the
legally established market structure. From their perspective, practices which do not
abide by the laws of free market enterprise unencumbered by government regulation
are criminogenic within the context of the capitalist market. In this regard, the
consideration of social harm at the hands of industry is limited to strictly (capitalist)
economic terms. Concerning occupational crime within the automobile industry,
Leonard and Weber (1970:422) concluded that, “In sum, the frequent unethical
actions of dealers and mechanics in furnishing repair service to the public must largely
be regarded as coerced occupational crime resulting from a market structure in the
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automotive industry which provides the auto-maker with potential, and applied,
criminogenic power.”
Also looking into the automobile industry, Farberman (1975) examined how
illegal behavior at lower levels of the industry resulted from organizational pressures at
the top. Specifically, Farberman looked at how automobile manufacturers created a
criminogenic market structure by imposing new car dealers with service warranties
that resulted in the pressure to undertake illegal actions such as fraudulent service
operations and kickbacks. The term “criminogenic market structure,” Farberman
(1975:438) explains, “...means the deliberate and lawful enactment of policies by those
who manage economically concentrated and vertically integrated corporations and/or
industries which coerce lower level (dependent) participants into unlawful acts.” In
this regard, attention is drawn to the structure of the economic market within an
industry that generates pressures for actors at each level to engage in unlawful
behavior.
Taking the heavy electrical equipment industry as his object of analysis, Geis’
(1977) analyzed the 1961 antitrust violation trials of heavy electrical equipment
corporations such as Westinghouse and General Electric. In total, the trial involved
the criminal prosecution of 29 companies and 45 individuals. Almost all of the
corporate defendants plead guilty, while officials entered pleas of no contest which
resulted in both fines and jail time. Involving multiple organizational actors engaged in
a common economic activity, the price fixing conspiracy spread across the heavy
electrical equipment industry. One significant finding was the “willful and blatant
nature” of these offenses. Geis (1977:118-119) argues that “These were not complex
acts only doubtfully in violation of a highly complex statute. They were flagrant,
criminal offenses, patently in contradiction to the letter and the spirit of the Sherman
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Anti-Trust Act of 1890, which forbade price-fixing arrangements as restraints upon
free trade.”
Stressing a symbolic interactionist perspective, Denzin (1977) undertook a
case study of the American liquor industry and the five tiers which comprise it;
distillers, distributors, retailers, drinkers and the legal order. Organizations, he argues
“…are best conceptualized as complex, shifting networks of social relationships”
(1977:905). Denzin (1977:907) shares the assumptions of Hamilton et al (1938:3-4)
who describe the imagery of an industry:
In a literal sense, there is no such thing as an industry.... Instead ...
there is only a host of individuals . . . engaged in a varied assortment of
personal activities-the digging of coal, the smelting of ore, the
advancement of personal fortunes. . . . They are human beings who
engage in human activities.... It is amid this babble of tongues, this
confusion of purposes, this drama of divergent dramas that industry is
to be found.... Yet industry is a name for what is at best a loose
aggregate of business units engaged in performing a single service or
producing a single commodity.... An industry is like an individual ... it
has a character, a structure, a system of habits of its own. Its pattern is
out of accord with a normative design; its activities conform very
imperfectly with a charted course of industrial events.
Although this description of an industry captures the important relational dynamic of
such a complex economic enterprise, it does not grant enough consideration to the
highly organized character of these activities. Organizational actors within the context
of an industry must be considered as a mediating factor between individual humans
and an abstract economic marketplace.
Highlighting a crucial dimension of relations within an industry, Denzin
(1977:906) notes the important role that power, coercion, control and deception can
play. He argues that “Criminogenic activity evolves as a result of interaction among
(as well as within) each of these tiers” (1977:906). Denzin (1977:918) draws many
important conclusions about the criminogenic behavior of industry especially in terms
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of the opportunities, means and motivations, such as:
The complaisant and taken-for-granted attitude, both within and
without the industry, taken toward criminogenic activities suggests that
below the articulated legal structure there exists an informal structure,
one which often contradicts or supersedes the formal structure. The
informal structure may define as “legal” activities which are defined as
“illegal” by the formal structure. The taken-for- granted reality of the
former legal order is, perhaps, more illusory than it is concrete.
Within the liquor industry, Denzin seemed to find that actions which were formally
prohibited by law had informally come to be defined as appropriate and acceptable.
Thus, in many ways the formal legal order was often less influential than the informal
norms of the industry in regulating behavior. Anticipating Vaughan’s (1996) concept
of the normalization of deviance within organizational cultures, Denzin notes that the
informal criminogenic legal structure thus provided the opportunity for crimes within
the liquor industry to become a normal part of industry operations.
Similarly, within all tiers of the liquor industry, Denzin observed that there was
a collective nature and feelings of group solidarity that were conducive to normalizing
and legitimating criminogenic activities. He explains that:
This produces a callousness of attitude which crosscuts all tiers and
appears to be a factor in crimes of competition. The assumption that
other participants have few scruples fosters the belief that survival in
such an arena depends upon adoption of the same attitude. This belief
becomes the sine qua non for the presence of criminogenic activity in
any organizational complex. (1977:919).
Furthermore, within the liquor industry at all tiers, regulation depended on accurate
self-reporting by the industry itself. Denzin (1977:918) concluded that a lack of
regulation provided the means by which criminogenic activity was allowed to take
place:
Scarcity of penalties and weak enforcement of laws often allow the
industry to operate unmolested. Structural ties between the political
order and enforcement agencies (such as those between local liquor
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commissions and the police) belie separation of power between
legislation and implementation. Such ties collapse into one unit-the
liquor industry-the essential ingredients of power, control and
corruption.
Here it appears that Denzin is describing a recurring issue within the state-corporate
crime literature, state facilitation of criminal activity by creating a lax regulatory
environment in which industry operates.
In closing, Denzin (1977:920) notes that his findings are likely not exclusive to
the liquor industry and urges other scholars to examine whether similar criminogenic
behavior is found throughout different industries:
Bribery, kickbacks, antitrust violations, payoffs and the circumvention
of legal codes may or may not be specific to this industry. It awaits
further case studies of an historical and observational nature to
determine whether or not criminogenic conduct is basic to the survival,
growth and success of American economic enterprises.
It is therefore the task of future researchers to provide historically grounded, empirical
accounts of criminogenic conduct persisting within other American industries.
The oil industry
In their extensive research on corporate crime throughout the 1970s, Clinard
and Yeager (2006) note that certain industries tend towards law violations more than
others, specifically the oil, auto and pharmaceutical industries. From its inception, the
oil industry was wrought with serious ethical problems. Clinard and Yeagar
(2006:237) cite, “Ethical issues in the oil industry involve the restriction of
independent dealers, excessive profits, contrived shortages, pollution, misleading
advertising, interlocking directorships, and inadequate research and development.”
Despite the many attempts of the both politicians and the public to rein in the power of
the oil industry, its defining characteristic continues to be the oligopolistic domination
of the industry by a few massive corporations.
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The oil industry has “often showed utter contempt for the environment” and
has consistently opposed federal attempts to protect the environment (2006:250).
Clinard and Yeager (2006:25) cite a report by the Wall Street Journal (March 17,
1978), which it is important to note refers to the oil industry as a social actor in its
own right:
Angry oil industry officials plan to call on Interior Secretary Cecil
Andrus today to complain that regulations issued recently by his agency
could impede new offshore natural-gas production. The regulations,
which have upset the industry, require the filing with the Interior
Department of new, detailed plans and environmental reports before
gas producers would be allowed to either explore for or develop gas
reserves in offshore tracts leased from the federal government.
Legislation regulating the oil industry was often only implemented in response
to serious environmental damage. In a situation startlingly similar to that of the BP
Gulf of Mexico spill, in 1970 Chevron had been responsible for a runaway offshore
well that leaked somewhere between 600 to 1,000 barrels of oil a day into the Gulf of
Mexico for three weeks, creating a 52 square mile slick. Once considered a close ally
of the oil industry, the Secretary of the Department of Interior Walter Hickel convened
a grand jury to investigate the drilling practices of the fifty oil companies in the Gulf of
Mexico and undertake the “strongest possible action” against the guilty parties. “A
federal grand jury subsequently indicted Chevron on 900 separate criminal counts of
‘knowingly and willfully’ violating the law” (Hills 1971:196 as cited in Clinard and
Yeager 2006:251). As a result of this spill and others, Congress passed the Water
Control Improvement Act of 1970 which sought to regulate spill cleanups. “Thus,
government regulation in this as in other areas has in large measure been a response to
the inaction and irresponsibility of the oil companies” (Clinard and Yeager 2006:251).
What must come next are more case studies that observe the criminogenic
behaviors of other industries to assess whether the findings of Clinard and Yeager
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(2006), Denzin (1977) and others are unique or are widespread and thus symptomatic
of a much more systemic problem. The significance of studying industry as level of
analysis is critical to fully understanding both the human and environmental harm that
can result from a complex web of state and corporate actors involved in a common
economic pursuit. Seemingly more criminogenic than the others, the data presented by
Clinard and Yeager (2006:251) “…show that of all industries, the oil industry had the
most violations of federal laws and regulations, both in terms of total violations and in
terms of pollution violations.” Seen in this context, studying individual cases of oil
spills will reveal little about the social and institutional forces which enable them to
occur. Because of its persistent criminality, the nature and operation of the oil industry
must be considered in addition to independent organizational actors.
Research Design and Methods
This project seeks to explore the government and industry relations that
contributed to the explosion of the Deepwater Horizon rig as well as the state and
corporate interactions throughout the response to the oil spill. In order to understand
the current state of the offshore oil industry that led to the disaster, it is necessary to
first undertake a historical review of the federal regulation and development of the
industry since World War Two. By considering the financial incentives of offshore
leasing and development for the federal government, a better understanding of the
legislative actions and policies of successive administrations will come about.
Moreover, providing a historical perspective on the relationship between the
government and the offshore industry also helps to explain the changing nature of state
and corporate relations that caused the event and structured the response to the spill.
In addition to the essential role of the federal government in developing the
offshore oil industry, it is also important to evaluate the history and organization of the
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corporations most directly involved in causing the disaster: BP, Transocean and
Halliburton. An overview of the history of these corporations will provide a better
understanding of changes to the organizational culture that may have contributed to
the spill. Moreover, this will also help to substantiate the wide spread nature of
offshore oil accidents and stress the importance of examining the spill from an industry
wide perspective. Furthermore, it is also necessary to provide an account of the
organizational decisions made by BP, Transocean, Halliburton and the Minerals
Management Service that led to the technical causes of the explosion of the Deepwater
Horizon and the blowout of Macondo.
Examining the state and corporate response to the spill will highlight the
current power arrangements between the federal government and the offshore oil
industry. Analyzing the response to the spill will also provide a better understanding of
the structure of federal and corporate emergency response efforts, especially to
environmental disasters, in the post-9/11 era. As environmental disasters are becoming
increasingly likely due to climate change, the consequences of studying state and
corporate emergency response efforts become all the more significant.
To explore these research questions this project proposes to undertake a case
study approach. George and Bennett (2005:19-22) argue that the case study method
has four particular strengths. First, case studies allow for a higher degree of
conceptual validity since they allow the researcher “…to identify and measure the
indicators that best represent the theoretical concepts the researcher intends to
measure” (2005:19). Second, case studies also have the ability to examine deviant or
outlier cases that can contribute to the development of new variables and hypotheses.
Third, George and Bennet (2005:21) argue that “Case studies examine the operation
of causal mechanisms in individual cases in detail.” Finally, case studies also offer a
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particular advantage in modeling and assessing complex causal relations. Each of
these strengths of case study methodology makes it well suited to studying the
complex social, political and economic forces that contributed to the Gulf of Mexico
oil spill.
Vaughan (2007:17) contends that “Case studies of organizations are most
useful because they can expose macro-level influences, micro-processes, and cultural
influences external and internal to the organization.” The primary unit of analysis for
this project is located at the organizational level. While the potential for studying
industry as a level of analysis will be a constant focus of the inquiry, it is not within the
scope of this project to undertake a wholesale examination of the oil industry. Rather,
the aim is to consider what can be learned from BP’s Gulf of Mexico oil spill and other
acts of environmental state-corporate crime about the nature and operation of the
industry as a whole. It is the task of future research to embark on a systematic, in
depth understanding of the criminogenic forces of the oil industry.
Since the primary unit of analysis is the organization, much of the data that will
be used will be drawn from organizational actors, primarily government and corporate
entities, in the form of documents and reports. Multiple sources of data will be used
to understand the interorganizational relationships between government and the
offshore industry that contributed to the spill and the response. In an attempt to avoid
bias and to accurately represent the perspectives of the organizational actors involved,
data sources form both corporate and state actors will be used. Further, the state and
corporate perspectives will also be supplemented with journalistic and academic
accounts. The blending or mixing of different kinds of data, known as “triangulation,”
can help to ensure validity by providing evidence from multiple perspectives. Bringing
together government, corporate, academic and journalistic sources on the causes of
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the disaster and the response to the spill will provide a more reliable account.
Moreover, using the Integrated Theoretical Model of State-Corporate Crime to direct
the case study will provide a measure of external validity. In this way, findings that are
congruent with other cases of state-corporate crime lend support that they are perhaps
generalizable beyond the immediate incident.
Guided by the Integrated Theoretical Model, this analysis will focus primarily
on the organizational level of analysis. However, the institutional level of analysis will
also be brought to bear through historical, cultural and political-economic
considerations at every stage of the project. Situated between the two, the importance
of examining the industry as a level of analysis in itself will be supported. When
possible, interactional level factors occurring within the organization will be
incorporated as well. Furthermore, this account of the Gulf of Mexico spill will focus
on the motivations of government and corporate actors, the opportunities for deviance
to occur, and the presence or absence of social constraints. Above all, delineating the
nexus of government and corporate interactions that led to the spill and shaped the
response will be the overarching goal of this project.
Sources of Data
In order to better understand the state and corporate relations that contributed
to the blowout and the response to the spill, secondary data analysis of publicly
available documents will take place. Secondary documents including scholarly sources,
government reports and documents, internal reports and documents from BP, and
journalistic accounts will all be used to explore the Gulf of Mexico oil spill and past
events. Furthermore, a concerted effort will be made throughout the project to
provide internet links to every source of data possible. While this may be improbable in
some cases (for instance privatized academic journals and books), in the era of the
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internet nearly every source can be made publicly accessible with some additional
searching and documentation on the part of the researcher. Taking efforts to provide
internet links for data sources will further strengthen the reliability of the findings and
conclusions since others are encouraged to go directly to the original source itself, at
just the click of a link.
One primary source of data will be materials related to the presidentially
appointed U.S. National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and
Offshore Drilling’s (aka the “National Commission”) investigation into the spill,
specifically their report titled Deep Water: The Gulf Oil Disaster and the Future of
Offshore Oil Drilling. Other National Commission Staff reports will also be used to
obtain more detailed information, including The Amount and Fate of the Oil and The
Use of Surface and Subsea Dispersants. The dominant tone of the final report
stresses the faults of the offshore industry without adequately scrutinizing the role of
the federal government. These investigations will be considered the federal
government’s “official” account of the causes of the spill and the response and will be
critically evaluated accordingly. More importantly, the references supporting the
National Commission’s final report will likely prove to be a treasure trove of data and
information to draw on as well.
The U.S. Coast Guard also conducted extensive investigations into the
agency’s response to the incident. One report titled, BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill
Incident Specific Preparedness Review (ISPR) will be used to provide understanding
of the structure of the federal response and an analysis of the leading role played by
the Coast Guard. Another report by the Coast Guard titled Report of Investigation
into the Circumstances Surrounding the Explosion, Fire, Sinking and Loss of Eleven
Crew Members Aboard the Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit Deepwater Horizon in the
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Gulf of Mexico April 20-22, 2010, will also be evaluated concerning the immediate
causes. Since the Coast Guard worked closely with both the Obama administration and
BP in fighting the spill, these documents will give insight into the federal response
from an operational perspective.
The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration published numerous
reports on the calculation of the flow rate and the flow of the oil, as well as some of
the environmental effects of the spill. For example, the Oil Budget Calculator,
Deepwater Horizon will be considered in addition to the agency’s report titled, BP
Deepwater Horizon Oil Budget: What Happened to the Oil? Documents such as these
produced by NOAA will detail how the flow rate from Macondo was calculated and
what happened to the oil as a result of response efforts.
Numerous other government documents, reports and investigations will also be
incorporated into the analysis. The findings of congressional investigations into BP’s
prior offenses at its Texas City refinery and at its Prudhoe Bay facilities will be drawn
on. Also, government investigations into the 2008 Minerals Management scandal will
be included. Emails and memos will additionally be used to provide evidence,
particularly at the interactional level of analysis.
When they are publicly available, corporate documents, reports, and
investigations surrounding the spill and prior accidents will also be considered. For
example, BP’s Initial Exploration Plan, Mississippi Canyon Block 252, Regional Oil
Spill Response Plan- Gulf of Mexico as well as internal documents concerning the
accident investigations into the Deepwater Horizon and prior disasters.
Industry wide studies by government, corporations and non-profit
organizations such as environmental groups will also be used. For instance, Minerals
Management Service commissioned studies concerning the state of blowout preventers
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and causes of deepwater blowouts will be evaluated. This includes one report by the
Norwegian company Det Norske Veritas titled Forensic Examination of Deepwater
Horizon Blowout Preventer. Additionally, a report by the Center for American
Progress titled Big Oil Goes to College: An Analysis of 10 Research Collaboration
Contracts Between leading Energy Companies and Major U.S. Universities will be
evaluated for an industry wide perspective.
Other reports from nonprofit and media organizations will also be integrated.
One potential source of information, the Public Employees for Environmental
Responsibility (PEER) is an organization that acts on behalf of government officials
who blow the whistle on environmental wrongdoings, including scientific misconduct.
Journalistic accounts from media organizations such as ProPublica, Mother Jones, the
Nation, the New York Times, Reuters and Al Jazeera will be essential in providing
critical accounts of the spill and the response beyond government and corporate
perspectives. Similarly, books produced by scholars and journalists since the spill will
also be considered. For example, Antonia Juhasz’s (2011) Black Tide: The
Devastating Impact of the Gulf Oil Spill and Tom Bergin’s (2011) Spills and Spin:
The Inside Story of BP will help to round out the analysis.
All of these sources will be weaved together to create a chronological narrative
of the history of the federal regulation and development of the offshore oil industry,
the causes of the explosion of the Deepwater Horizon rig, and the state-corporate
response to the spill in the Gulf of Mexico.
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CHAPTER TWO: FEDERAL REGULATION OF THE OFFSHORE OIL
INDUSTRY
Peak Oil and Deepwater Drilling
Oil has been the quintessential resource fuelling the United States economy
since World War II, surpassing coal as America’s dominant energy source in 1950.
Shortly thereafter, in 1956 a geologist working for Shell Oil named M. King Hubbert
made a presentation before the American Petroleum Institute in which he predicted
that U.S. oil production would peak in 1970. He further warned that the decline in
output would occur at the same rate it had risen; rapidly. Known as “Hubbert’s
Peak,” his assessment was initially ridiculed by the industry, but his forecast was
ultimately proven accurate: U.S. oil production had indeed peaked by 1970.
Moreover, in 1969 Hubbert further warned that global oil production would also peak
by 2000. However, as the 1973 Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC) embargo dominated the U.S. political and industry agenda, the significance of
Hubbert’s predictions was dismissed. Additionally, Priest (2007a:1-2) contends that
“… little effort has been made to assess the implications of Hubbert’s accurate 1956
prediction in the late twentieth century. This evolution revolved around the efforts of
U.S. oil firms to stave off the decline in domestic production through extensive
exploration and technological innovation.”
Coinciding with peak oil and declining global reserves has been the rapid
growth of the offshore oil industry, particularly in the Gulf of Mexico. Sharing a
mutually profitable stake in exploring and developing offshore lands and the natural
resources they hold, policymakers and industry alike have viewed offshore oil drilling
in the Gulf of Mexico as the solution to maintaining America’s exponential oil
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consumption. “Barring future major discoveries elsewhere in the United States, which
seems unlikely, the Gulf of Mexico will have provided the most significant extensions
to U.S. petroleum reserves in the post-WWII period” (Priest 2007a:2). But as Priest
(2007b) argues, the business of the oil industry is the extraction, not the creation, of
oil. Drilling in continuously deeper waters is only a symptom of a more fundamental
problem: declining oil reserves.
The historical development of the Gulf should be characterized as an
adaptation to decline, not a breakthrough to growth. As the Gulf of
Mexico offshore industry matures, the limits on its potential become
more apparent, even with the revival of activity in deepwater. The fact
that industry must keep searching in ever deeper, more remote waters,
with increasingly expensive and sophisticated technology implies
growing scarcity, not abundance. (Priest 2007b: 260-261)
Offshore oil drilling must not be viewed as the solution to energy independence, but
instead as a desperate attempt to maintain dependence on oil in the face of declining
reserves. As the global oil supply begins to dry up, it becomes necessary to venture
into more treacherous waters, relying on riskier technologies that put humans and
ecosystems in harms way.
The traditional historical narrative of offshore oil development offered by
industry champions the success of technological advances in conquering the deep
waters of the Gulf. Yet it was not industry’s entrepreneurial ingenuity alone that led
the voyage to the deep water’s horizon. Support from the federal government was
absolutely essential throughout the offshore oil industry’s development. According to
Priest (2007b:234):
In each of these eras, the technological and organizational development
of the industry depended on some combination of government
assistance, relaxed terms of access, and unique environmental
conditions. The importance of these factors calls into question the
storyline of market-driven technology and its miraculous ability to
expand and create petroleum abundance in the Gulf.
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Boué and Jones (2006:236) come to a similar conclusion stating that, “…the
phenomenal success of the GOM deepwater would seem to owe far more to taxes (or
more precisely, the absence thereof) than to technology.” It is therefore important to
not only examine the historical and political contexts in which federal offshore policies
have been crafted, but also to critically assess the federal-industry motivations
underlying offshore oil exploration in the post-WWII period.
Jurisdiction over the outer continental shelf (OCS) off the coastline of the U.S.
has been a contentious issue between the federal and state governments following the
Second World War. The general thrust of federal legislation has granted the national
government far greater control over OCS resources while limiting the ability of coastal
states to oversee offshore development. At the root of the conflict is the fact that
coastal states suffer the consequences of offshore development but do not share in the
benefits. Compared to the national government, coastal states disproportionately
experience the ramifications of offshore exploration and development including the
construction and operation of drilling rigs, platforms, pipelines, treatment facilities,
refineries and pumping stations. Moreover, the secondary effects of such offshore
development also strain local social services such as schools, hospitals, housing and
police. Finally, the environmental effects of offshore oil drilling can have devastating
consequences that are specific to regional communities and ecosystems. Water and air
pollution, wetland destruction, as well as marine and ocean life disruption are costs
that must be differentially experienced by coastal states (Fitzgerald 2001:154-5; See
also Freudenberg and Gramling 1994:26-33). While differentially bearing these
burdens, coastal states receive limited royalties from federal leases of offshore lands
that lie beyond their boundaries.

49
Due to the risks and costs of offshore development experienced by coastal
states, Miller (1984) argues that states have a more vested interest in environmental
protection of the OCS than the federal government and therefore should be given a
role in the OCS development process. Far more than the federal government, coastal
states are better positioned to manage offshore development in an environmentally
considerate manner. In spite of this, offshore oil exploitation has almost exclusively
remained in the hands of the federal government with scarce regard for its effects on
coastal communities and the environment. As Miller (1984:450) charges, “The federal
government’s role as the proprietor of OCS revenues conflicts with its role as guardian
of the public trust in coastal resources. Its incentives, reinforced by political
considerations of massive federal budget deficits, tip toward rapid exploitation of OCS
resources.” Indeed, the history of U.S. offshore leasing and development has
demonstrated that the federal government, in coordination with the oil industry, has
pillaged and profited from public OCS resources at the expense of coastal
communities and the environment.
Establishing Federal Control: Early Offshore Oil Claims (1937-1954)
Foreshadowed by increasing demand for oil resulting from World War II and
the Cold War, federal officials undertook an inventory of national resources which
spotlighted the importance of offshore oil deposits, particularly to the Navy (Engler
1961:87). Leading the charge to stake claim on the oil, Harold L. Ickes Secretary of
Interior under the Truman administration, set out to establish federal control over
offshore land as early as 1937, first through Congress then through the Courts. As the
dispute played out, the oil industry was concerned that their existing drilling operations
contracted with state governments could be jeopardized by federal drilling or leasing.
Beginning with the earliest shallow water drilling attempts dating back to 1896,
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coastal states had managed offshore development and leasing. Up until 1937, state
ownership of the adjacent tidelands was “virtually unquestioned” and Congressional
policy had been one of non-intervention (Miller 1984:405). Known as the “equal
footing clause,” it was assumed that the original thirteen colonies became sovereign
and independent entities and succeeded to the rights (including jurisdiction over the
marginal sea) and title of the Crown at the time of the revolution. The debate over
state control of the tidelands abruptly changed when President Truman asserted the
federal government’s ownership of offshore lands in the 1945 Truman Proclamation,
though agreeing to honor existing state leases. Nevertheless, California, Louisiana and
Texas persisted in offshore leasing following WWII (Freudenberg and Gramling
1994:18).
Testing the federal claim to offshore lands, the Truman administration turned
to the courts. Commonly referred to as the “Tidelands cases” (see also Bartley 1953),
a series of Supreme Court decisions between 1947 and 1950 worked towards
resolving the battle between federal and state governments (United States v.
California (1947), United States v. Texas (1950), United States v. Louisiana (1950).
Despite prior court rulings from 1842 until 1935 that consistently granted coastal
states jurisdiction over submerged lands, the Supreme Court’s decision privileged the
federal government’s arguments of national sovereignty and defense, navigation and
international affairs. Thus, the court ruled that the federal government had exclusive
authority over the OCS. However, one crucial omission was made in the United
States v. California (1947) case: oil. As Miller (2001:408) points out:
Conspicuous by its absence was any reference to oil. Given that a
respectable argument can be made for national control of offshore oil
production on the grounds that a steady supply of oil is necessary to
‘fuel the engines of war’ and provide for the national defense, that
absence becomes more striking. A partial explanation lies in the
understandable reluctance of the U.S. to draw attention the fact that it
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was effectively attempting to expropriate very valuable resources from
the states without compensating them.
Boué and Jones (2006:33) draw similar conclusions about federal interest and intent in
controlling the oil and revenues contained in the OCS:
The US Federal government was aware that some very prolific fields
might be discovered offshore the Gulf Coast… Thus, the Tidelands
dispute was all about preventing the multi-layered national scheme for
the control of production (centered on the Connally Hot Oil Act, the
Interstate Oil Compact and the Railroad Commission of Texas) from
being undermined by new flows whose magnitude could be expected to
be much greater if the leasing process were in the hands of the revenuehungry costal states, as opposed to the steadier hands of the Federal
government.
After the Supreme Court cases, federal interests in offshore oil development began to
eclipse state control over coastal waters and the crucial resources that lay within them.
In 1950, following the decisions the Department of Interior halted new offshore
exploration but permitted the completion of drilling already in process. Offshore
leasing and exploration would not be resumed for another three years as Congress and
the presidential candidates debated the issue (Priest 2007:54).
The Submerged Lands Act and Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act of 1953
The Tidelands controversy became an important issue in the 1952 presidential
campaign as Dwight Eisenhower campaigned on the promise to restore offshore rights
to the states. Working towards this pledge, Congress passed two key pieces of
legislation that attempted to settle the dispute: The Submerged Lands Act and the
Outer Continental Shelf Act of 1953. This legislation set the limits of state jurisdiction
to three miles off the coastline while establishing the domain of the federal government
over the OCS. Of the coastal states, the compromise clearly benefited California the
most, whose OCS is much narrower and lies within 20 miles of the shoreline compared
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to the Gulf of Mexico region in which the OCS extends much further into deeper
waters.
In response to the Supreme Court’s decision in U.S. v. California Congress
passed the Submerged Lands Act in 1953. The Submerged Lands Act quick claimed
for the Gulf coast states the title to offshore lands that fell within three miles of the
shoreline. However, subsequent decisions ruled that both Texas and the west coast of
Florida can lay claim to three marine miles (about 9 miles) based on their jurisdiction
as sovereign nations prior to their admittance into the Union (Freudenberg and
Gramling 1994:20).
The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCLSA) of 1953 established federal
jurisdiction and control over the OCS extending outward beyond the states’ three mile
tidelands and furthermore stipulated a process for leasing. As Freudenberg and
Gramling (1994:165) explain, “Federal revenue from OCS leases comes from two
sources. A bonus bid is a sealed, theoretically competitive bid offered by a company,
or group of companies, to secure the acreage. Royalties represent a percentage of the
profit from the exploitation of any oil that is actually extracted.” As authorized under
the OCSLA, the Secretary of the Interior was charged with overseeing and
administering the lease which was to be coordinated by the Bureau of Land
Management (BLM) and the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS). Under this
arrangement, the BLM was responsible for reviewing nominations for leases and
overseeing competitive bids based on highest cash bonus bid with fixed royalty or
percentage bid with fixed cash basis. After the sale, the USGS regulated OCS
activities and collected royalties. Additionally, the coastal states had no role in the
leasing process and did not receive any OCS revenues (Fitzgerald 2001:54). The
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OCSLA remained the primary policy regarding offshore oil leasing and development
until key amendments were made in 1978.
Federal Royalties from Outer Continental Shelf Leasing (1954-1969)
While the Outer Continental Shelf legislation was theoretically a national
leasing program, sales differentially took place in the Gulf of Mexico region compared
to other parts of the country like the Pacific Coast. “From 1954 through 1969, there
were twenty-one OCS lease sales, generating approximately $3.4 billion in bonuses
alone, and the lease sales soon began to be realized as a major source of revenue for
the federal government…but in reality, all of but four of those twenty-one sales took
place in the Gulf of Mexico” (Freudenberg and Gramling 1994:21). Ever since the
federal government began OCS leasing in the Gulf of Mexico in 1954, the region has
continued to represent a significant source of financial revenue for the federal
government. As Boué and Jones (2006:1) argue:
From a fiscal standpoint, upwards of 90 percent of all OCS mineral
lease payments are generated in GOM, making petroleum activities in
the region the second most important individual source of revenue for
the US Federal government after general income taxation (admittedly,
it is a distant second place). Even in years of low oil and gas prices, the
revenues that the US Minerals Management Service (MMS) receives
from oil and gas activities in GOM would place the agency squarely
among the first 100 firms in Industry Week’s survey of the 500 largest
US manufacturing companies. Furthermore, the OCS offshore leasing
programme constitutes by far the largest non-financial auction market
in the world, in constant dollar terms.
OCS leasing in the Gulf of Mexico region is clearly a significant source of revenue for
the federal government making it a persistently politically contentious issue. With
such an enormous economic incentive, the federal government has been motivated to
promote offshore oil exploration and development at the expense of environmental
protection. Thus, the federal government often found itself working in close
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coordination with the oil industry to help explore and exploit the country’s OCS
resources.
Industry Influence on Government
The oil industry exerted great influence over the DOI in the Gulf of Mexico
region from the inception of the OCS federal leasing process. As Miller (1984:449450) states:
The federal government and the Interior Department have been quite
susceptible to oil industry influence. This is illustrated by the “closed
process” of decision making which existed between the oil industry and
the Secretary of the Interior from the time of the OCSLA’s passage
until its amendment in 1978, and by Secretary Watts proposed ‘fire
sale’ of one billion acres of OCS resources at a time of falling prices
and demand.
Furthermore, Fitzgerald (2001:54) also explains the revolving door between DOI and
the offshore oil industry:
During this period [1954-1969] decisions regarding OCS development
involved the petroleum industry and Interior officials, many of whom
were recruited from the industry. The Bureau of Budget’s (now Office
of Management and Budget) need for revenues and industry interest
determined when and where leasing would occur. Interior restricted
OCS offerings to keep the demand for the leases high, insuring the
receipt of maximum revenues. Interiors approach was ‘minimum
regulation and maximum cooperation.’
The federal incentive in offshore oil development is clear; it appears that the interests
of industry trumped national ones. Mutually beneficial for both parties, the federal
government in cooperation with the oil industry have profited from the OCS leasing
process while neglecting its impacts on coastal communities and the environment.
In the early 1960s and 1970s, federal oversight of the offshore industry was
best characterized by the philosophy of “minimum regulation, maximum cooperation.”
The USGS was understaffed and underfunded. In 1969, the USGS had only 12 people
overseeing more than 1,500 wells in the Gulf of Mexico region. The few trained
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supervisors and inspectors it did have lacked knowledge of the industry and its rapidly
changing technology. As cited by the National Commission (2011:28), “In general, as
a 1973 National Science Foundation study concluded, ‘the closeness of government
and industry and the commonality of their objectives have worked against
development of a system of strict accountability.”
From the very beginning, the federal government’s authority to control how
OCS resources are leased and developed has been “virtually without limitation.”
According to the National Commission (2011:67):
The root problem has instead been that political leaders within both the
Executive Branch and Congress have failed to ensure that agency
regulators have had the resources necessary to exercise that authority,
including personnel and technical expertise, and, no less important, the
political autonomy needed to overcome the powerful commercial
interests that have opposed more stringent safety regulation.
Especially since the reorganization of the BLM and the USGS into the Minerals
Management Service in 1982, government regulators became increasingly paralyzed in
their efforts to oversee OCS development.
Environmental Protection vs. Energy Development (1969-1981)
The push for offshore oil was stalled as the environmental consequences of
offshore development were soon brought to public attention. Not long after federal
leasing was opened along the Pacific Coast in 1966 and 1968, Union Oil’s production
well exploded on January 28, 1969 off the coast of Santa Barbara and continued to
leak for months (Molotch 1970). Of less prominence, two other offshore explosions
and spill occurred in the Gulf of Mexico not long after the Santa Barbara spill. In
February 1970, a platform owned by Chevron exploded and caught fire resulting in
pollution, damage to wildlife and postponed federal offshore leases. Shortly thereafter,
a platform owned by Shell exploded and caught fire on December 1, 1970, killing five
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people and injuring 37. Containing 21 different wells, the initial fire at one well quickly
spread to ten within one week. The disaster lasted 155 days before the fire could be
put out and the wells brought under control through a combination of controlled
burning, collecting the oil and drilling relief wells (Priest 2007a:145-7).
The Santa Barbara spill, followed by the others, forced the government to
implement stronger environmental policies. Moreover, national media coverage of
these offshore spills gave sympathy to the concerns of environmental groups and
raised public skepticism of OCS development. Not long after the spill and the national
attention it received, the Nixon administration was pressured to enact environmental
legislation including creating the National Environmental Protection Act as well as the
Clean Air and Clean Water Acts. Furthermore, in response to the spills the USGS
pushed for a redrafting of the American Petroleum Industry’s “recommended practice”
guidance documents for the selection, installation and testing of safety devices on
offshore rigs (U.S. National Commission 2011:30). These events and the publicity they
received had a significant, though temporary, effect on the development of offshore oil
drilling.
Following the Santa Barbara oil spill in 1969, legislation was passed that began
to focus on the environmental effects of offshore development. For example, the
Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA) of 1972 and the OCSLA Amendments in
1978 were initial legislative attempts to consider the environmental impacts of OCS
energy development. Moreover, the CZMA also granted the states greater say in the
development process and helped to voice environmental concerns. In contrast to the
federally dominated OCS model of “geographic dual federalism,” the CZMA
attempted to create a model of “cooperative federalism” between the national and
state governments which reasserted the rights of coastal states to protect, restore,
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plan, manage and regulate coastal development. In exchange for federal grants, coastal
states were required to develop a Coastal Zone Management Plan (CMP) which
allowed for the state review of federal actions effecting land and water use in those
areas. The CMP was to then be reviewed by the Office of Ocean and Coastal Resource
Management (OCRM), National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA),
within the Department of Commerce. Once the plan was approved its stipulations
then become enforceable polices thereby giving states the power to object to any
federal action which is in violation of the CMP (Wilder 1993).
Legislation such as the CZMA incorporated coastal states into the
development process and began to move towards OCS management that was more
protective of environmental resources than exclusive state or federal control over the
OCS. However, in spite of the potential for greater environmental considerations in
coastal development, the implementation of the CZMA has not been effective,
especially in the wake of the 1973 OPEC oil crisis and the push for “energy
independence.” Further hampering its progress, Kalen (2010:11080) notes that:
…historically, the coastal zone management (CZM) program has been
slow to develop, with considerable reluctance by the DOI to apply the
program to OCS energy development, and instead, the OCSLA and the
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) dominate and eclipse most
of the discussion about the OCS oil and gas program.
Consumed by recurring international oil crises throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the
political discourse on OCS development continued to neglect environmental concerns
in favor of economic ones. As a result, funding for the CZMA was subsequently
terminated beginning with the Reagan administration in 1981.
Outercontinental Shelf Leasing Act Amendments
Throughout both the Nixon, Ford and Carter administrations, numerous
lawsuits were brought by the public, environmental organizations and the petroleum

58
industry which challenged OSCLA both on the basis of environmental and national
energy issues. Passed twenty-five years before environmental concerns graced the
federal agenda, public litigation highlighted OCSLA’s leasing processes failure to
account for environmental effects. Fitzgerald (2001:64) explains that:
Many studies concluded that the OCSLA did not adequately address
environmental protection or the national energy crisis. The studies
recommended the establishment of an orderly long-term leasing
schedule, greater federal-state cooperation, increased public
participation in the process, the release to Interior of all industry data
necessary for resource evaluation, strict enforcement of all OCS
activities, and the utilization of the best available technology to prevent
and clean up oil spills.
As OCS development accelerated, the leasing process stipulated in the 1953 OCSLA
inadequately handled the changes and the need for amendments became evident. The
1978 OCSLA Amendments established the modern process for OCS leasing and
expedited development. The OCSLA Amendments put forth a five year schedule for
leasing and development of offshore lands and also mandates a review of the
environmental impacts. As Kalen (2010:11080-11081) explains:
Congress also established a four-stage process for OCS oil and gas
development: (1) the issuance of a five-year leasing program; (2) the
issuance of specific lease sales; (3) the approval of exploration plans;
and, lastly (4) the approval of development and production plans. The
first phase is critical, because the issuance of leases, and any subsequent
activities under any particular lease, can only occur if the lease or leases
have been included in the relevant five-year leasing program. This fiveyear leasing program, moreover, triggers the preparation of an
environmental impact statement (EIS), the first of several NEPA
documents.
Furthermore, elements of the 1978 OCSLA Amendments work against environmental
protection. For example, the law stipulates that the DOI must approve a lessee’s
exploration plan within 30 days, yet a detailed review to ensure environmental
safeguards can take far longer (U.S. National Commission 2011:80). Mandating the
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completion of an environmental impact studies for offshore development was a step in
the right direction, but more emphasis was placed on streamlining the leasing process
to expedite development rather than environmental considerations.
Under the 1978 OCSLA, Congress also failed to ensure rigorous
environmental oversight in the Gulf of Mexico by exempting oil and gas development
from requirements under NEPA. The U.S. National Commission (2011:80) states:
As a result of political compromise with oil and gas interests, the Act
exempts lessees from submitting development and production plans
(which include environmental safeguards) for [Department of Interior]
agency approval. Accordingly, Gulf leases, unlike those applicable to
other offshore areas, are not subject to the requirement of at least one
NEPA environmental impact statement for development plans for a
particular geographic area.
On its own initiative, in January 1981 the DOI went even further and categorically
excluded all offshore exploration and drilling applications for the Central and Western
Gulf of Mexico from NEPA review. In 1986 MMS would later revise its categorical
exclusion to allow for NEPA review under very narrowly defined “extraordinary
circumstances,” but agency personnel were reluctant to flag such applications (U.S.
National Commission 2011:81-2). In the end, the goal of expediting the leasing
process took precedence over the environmental concerns raised by the 1978 OCSLA
amendments, a trend that would persist in the years to come.
Neoliberal Offshore Development: The Rise and Fall of the Minerals Management
Service (1982-Present)
During the Reagan-Bush era, federal officials managing the OCS were
aggressive supporters of new offshore development in an attempt to end the federal
deficit and promote energy independence. This resulted in numerous policy changes
that altered the course of offshore leasing. According to Lester (1991:251-3 as
quoted in Wilder 1993:140):
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Radical changes undertaken in the early 1980s should be recalled here.
At that time, in order to push through new OCS development, the
“Reagan administration began its deregulation effort by appointing
[federal Office of Ocean and Coastal Resources Management]
administrators clearly sympathetic to the administration’s position of
offshore development… The ‘capture’ of OCRM by oil interests
became evident almost immediately after Reagan’s election.
Furthermore, Reagan also appointed the controversial James Watt to head the
Department of Interior. According to Priest (2007a:219), “Reagan’s Secretary of the
Interior, James Watt, believed fervently in letting the market determine energy
outcomes and releasing federal lands for exploration.” Upon his appointment, Watt
set out to promote energy independence by dramatically expanding drilling in the
OCS.
Within one year of his appointment, Watt had reorganized the functions
previously executed by the BLM and the USGS into one agency, the Minerals
Management Service (MMS). The combination of these two agencies into one created
an inherent incentive to privilege promotion of the offshore industry over safety and
environmental regulations. “When Interior Secretary Watt moved regulatory oversight
of offshore energy exploration and production to a new entity that was also
responsible for collecting revenue from the activity it regulated, he created a new
agency that inexorably came to be dominated by its focus on maximizing that revenue”
(U.S. National Commission 2011:76).
While the increased revenues generated by the new MMS benefitted both
government and industry alike, they came at the expense of increased safety and
environmental risks. As the National Commission (2011:56) asserts:
Revenue generation-enjoyed by industry and government- became the
dominant objective. But there was a hidden price to be paid for those
increased revenues. Any revenue increases dependent on moving
drilling further offshore and into much deeper waters came with a
corresponding increase in the safety and environmental risks of such
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drilling. Those increased risks, however, were not matched by greater,
more sophisticated regulatory oversight. Industry regularly and
intensely resisted such oversight, and neither Congress nor any series of
presidential administrations mustered the political support necessary to
overcome that opposition.
Immediately after the creation of the MMS, in July 1982 Watt proposed a new
five-year plan to lease nearly one billion acres of the OCS. This is in contrast to the 55
million acres offered in the prior June 1980 leasing plan. The alterations put in place by
Watt had negative consequences, including a decrease in the amount of bonuses
received per acre in addition to increasing opposition to the federal OCS program
from states. Despite Watt’s ambition, his proposed plan would never be fully realized
after facing a barrage of court cases challenging its legality. Nonetheless, the newly
formed MMS and Watt’s promise to expand offshore drilling with scant regulation did
succeed in the Gulf of Mexico (U.S. National Commission 2011:63).
Area-Wide Leasing
One of the most significant changes put in place by Secretary Watt at the newly
established MMS was the practice of “area wide leasing” (AWL) which opened much
larger sections of land at one time. Boué and Jones (2006:198) explain that:
This crystallized into an extraordinarily ambitious five-year leasing
programme that hinged upon offering industry nothing less than the
entire extension of the Federal OCS, by means of 41 lease sales. This
programme, and the policies that gave form to it, came to be known
under the uninspiring name of area wide leasing (AWL). This moniker
was due to the fact that the cornerstone of the programme was to offer
entire OCS planning areas at a time (each one up to 50 million acres in
extension), in preference to the method used until that point, which
consisted of only offering tracts that had been specifically nominated by
firms.
Under Watt’s plan, oil companies would propose areas for lease they thought to be
most profitable, rather than having the government select them. Characteristic of the
Reagan administration’s advocacy of market forces, policies changes during this

62
period such as AWL expanded the industry’s access and choice of leasing areas while
requiring less government oversight.
Within this laissez faire context, a split in the MMS’s organizational ethic
developed. Wilder (1993:161) explains that:
Political leadership installed during the Reagan Administration held a
political philosophy that placed great emphasis on unhindered natural
resource development and relied on market forces rather than oversight
by geological specialists. As a result, Reagan appointees took far less
scientific, selective approach to offshore management. Soon,
tremendous offshore tracts were being offered at much lower prices,
allowing the oil industry great leeway. This ‘area-wide’ approach to
leasing permitted industry to obtain sites at low cost and with littler
government interference.
In contrast to past federal OCS policy that sought to obtain fair market value for the
OCS leases, the Reagan administration gave industry greater access while requiring
less compensation and lax government oversight.
Scientists at the MMS experienced great pressure from their managers to
approve development plans without proper evaluation of the environmental effects.
According to the National Commission (2011:82):
With regard to NEPA specifically, some MMS managers reportedly
“changed or minimized the [MMS] scientists’ potential environmental
impact findings in [NEPA] documents to expedite plan approvals.”
According to several MMS environmental scientists, “their managers
believed the result of NEPA evaluations should always be a ‘green
light’ to proceed.” In some cases, there may also have been built-in
employee financial incentives that “distort[ed] balanced decisionmaking” to the extent that “[e]mployee performance plans and
monetary awards [were] . . . based on meeting deadlines for leasing or
development approvals.”
Moreover, as the volume of lease applications increased, especially in the Gulf of
Mexico, MMS regulators were understaffed and underfunded further restricting their
capacity to oversee implementation of federal environmental policy. All of these
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factors led to the development of a “culture of complacency” concerning compliance
with the environmental regulations put forth in NEPA (2011:82).
Congressional moratoria
Finding a common enemy in the Reagan-Bush OCS policy, environmental
activists learned to work with states to resist the federal government’s radical policy
changes. Beginning in 1982 following the implementation of AWL, annual
congressional moratoria became one avenue to express opposition to unregulated OCS
development. Wilder (1993:146) explains:
Moratoria operate through the actions of coastal state representatives
in Congress; resorting to the federal budgetary process, coastal state
representatives yearly insert spending prohibitions in appropriations
bills to prevent federal officials from spending dollars for OCS
exploration and development even though they are not formally part of
the federal OCS planning process.
After the first in 1982, some portion of the OCS has been under a leasing moratoria
ever since.
In an attempt to distance himself from the unpopular environmental policies of
the Reagan administration, George H.W. Bush campaigned on the promise to end
drilling off the shores of California and hoped to end the federal-state conflict over
OCS development (Fitzgerald 2001:214). Once elected, Bush issued a 1990
presidential directive that established a moratorium on most OCS offshore drilling that
was set to last until 2000. The moratorium excluded the Central and Western GOM
regions, but included all areas of offshore in Northern and Central California, Southern
California (with the exception of 87 tracts), Washington, Oregon, the North Atlantic
coast, and the Eastern Gulf of Mexico coast. Upon taking office in 1998, President
Clinton extended the moratorium through 2012 (Energy Information Administration
2005:11).
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The Legislative Push into Deeper Waters
In light of the moratoria imposed by the Bush administration, the strategy of
the Clinton administration was to encourage OCS development in already developed
areas. Therefore, the vast majority of offshore leasing took place in the Central and
Western Gulf of Mexico region which is particularly costly to explore and develop.
Most significantly, throughout the 1990s offshore drilling pushed to depths never
before experienced. According to Boué and Jones (2006:17), production in such deep
waters had been relatively recent:
In 1970 the average production weighted depth was just 100 feet, and
it was still below 200 feet in 1980. As late as 1990, it had barely
reached 250 feet. However, the trend towards a greater production
depth was accelerated significantly during the early 1990s, with the
weighted average reaching 1000 foot milestone in 1998 (at which point
deepwater production became the norm, rather than the exception, in
GOM).
Even as late as 2006, production was routinely taking place in 5000 feet of water, and
drilling 9000 feet, the record having been set by ChevronTexaco in 2003 at a depth of
10,011 feet (Boué and Jones 2006:17). Incentivized by federal legislation to search for
oil in deeper and more treacherous waters, the trend towards drilling in deeper waters
in the Gulf of Mexico began in the 1990s and was significantly accelerated throughout
the next decade.
Deepwater Royalty Relief Act 1995
At a time of low oil and gas prices, the Outer Continental Shelf Deepwater
Royalty Relief Act (DWRRA) sought to spur exploration and production by
exempting all fields found in deepwater leases (defined by MMS as greater than 200
meters or 656 feet) issued after November 28, 1995 from royalty payments, and doing
away with any administrative process of economic evaluation of need. Following the
DWRRA expiration in 2000, the policy was redefined and expanded by the Bush
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administration to encourage interest in even deeper waters. So successful was
DWRRA in encouraging deepwater development that by 1999 oil production from
deepwater wells had outpaced production from shallow wells for the first time (U.S.
National Commission 2011:72).
While deepwater exploration was indeed spawned by the DWRRA, it was done
at a substantial loss of income from royalties. As Boué and Jones (2006:188) point
out:
Deepwater royalty relief is often cited as the supreme example of the
unwavering disposition of the US government to do what has to be
done in order to give the maximum incentive possible to domestic oil
production, chiefly because it represents the explicit abandonment of
the principle that public mineral property (seen as a capital accumulated
by Nature) should never be surrendered to private parties without fair
and proper compensation. In oil circles everywhere, the deepwater
royalty relief initiative has been touted as responsible in no small part
for the sharp in crease in the number of deepwater blocks receiving bids
in lease sales held after 1995.
Going even further, in 1998 and 1999, the Clinton administration did away with price
triggers (the set market price for oil and gas at which royalty relief kicks in) for all
leases for those years. Multiple U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO)
reports since the DWRRA have questioned whether taxpayers have been receiving fair
market value for offshore lands as a result of royalty relief (See for example, U.S.
Government Accountability Office (2003; 2007; 2008; 2010).
Problems at Minerals Management Service
According to Freudenberg and Gramling (1994:26), “By the 1990s, the
Minerals Management Service, whose fundamental goal is the leasing of OCS lands,
effectively found itself denied access to those very lands.” Revenue generation had
consumed the majority of the MMS’s efforts at the expense of regulatory oversight,
something that was openly acknowledged by former MMS Directors for years (U.S.
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National Commission 2011:76). In November 1996, the MMS’s budget had reached
its lowest point ever further hindering its ability to effectively oversee the industry.
With the lack of funding came fewer unannounced inspections. As highlighted by a
report by the Department of Interior Inspector General, by 1999 MMS inspections had
declined significantly and were no longer effective. “Precisely when the need for
regulatory oversight intensified, the government’s capacity for oversight was
diminished” (U.S. National Commission 2011:75).
As the industry moved ever further offshore, the MMS struggled to keep with
the evolving deepwater technology and the little training inspectors did receive was
inadequate.
According to a recent survey conducted at the request of the Secretary
of the Interior, “[a]lmost half of the [MMS] inspectors surveyed do not
believe they have received sufficient training.” MMS, unlike Interior’s
Bureau of Land Management (which inspects onshore oil and gas
drilling operations), has no “oil and gas inspection certification
program” and no exam “is required of each inspector in order to be
certified.” MMS “does not provide formal training specific to the
inspections process, and does not keep up with changing technology.
Some inspectors noted that they rely on industry representatives to
explain the technology at a facility.” (U.S. National Commission
2011:76-7)
Federal salaries at the MMS stagnated and the agency struggled to attract trained and
qualified personnel, especially engineers. In the MMS Gulf of Mexico offices, for
instance, between 2005 and 2009 the number of permits for offshore drilling increased
71 percent (from 1,246 to 2,136), yet there was not enough qualified engineers to
review them. As the agency was overwhelmed with applications, operators began to
“shop around” different offices outside of the appropriate jurisdictional area to seek an
engineer who would approve the permit (U.S. National Commission 2011:74).
MMS Royalties in Kind program
Beginning in 1997, the process by which the MMS collects royalties from
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offshore leases underwent a significant shift. Known as “taking royalties in kind” (or
RIK), this process allocates a certain percentage of the oil and gas produced to MMS
that it can then either transfer to other federal agencies or it may sell to refineries.
Accepting payment in the form of oil and gas differed from MMS’ former policy of
accepting cash payments based on the value of oil produced, known as “royalty in
value” (RIV). The switch from RIV to RIK advantaged the oil industry since it
reduced administrative costs and made it so leases would not be subject to audit,
despite being worth millions (and sometimes billions) of dollars (U.S. Department of
Interior 2008:8). As the Project on Government Oversight (2008:4) argues,
“Essentially, the RIK program asks taxpayers to trust that industry delivers the correct
amount of oil or gas to the government in lieu of cash, but has reduced oversight to such a
degree that the GAO labeled RIK’s management “an honor system.” Furthermore, the
primary source of RIK revenues comes from the Gulf of Mexico region where nearly 72
percent of crude oil royalties and 45 percent of gas royalties were garnered through the
program in 2005 (Project on Government Oversight 2008:6).

Initially, MMS was publicly against the implementation of RIK citing concerns
over reduced revenues, though it did not take long for the agency to align its view
with that of the industry (U.S. Government Accountability Office 2003). Extensively
lobbied by the oil industry, the George W. Bush administration also favored the RIK
program, and received encouragement from the American Petroleum Institute:
In 2001, a memo from the American Petroleum Institute to Vice
President Dick Cheney’s energy task force stated that “RIK should be
considered part of a comprehensive national energy strategy and a
permanent tool for the Minerals Management Service to use in fulfilling
its mission.” The memo also stated industry’s opposition to paying for
royalties in cash, and detailed industry’s legal challenges aimed at
halting the government’s efforts to establish regulations for fair marketbased royalty payments. (Project on Government Oversight 2008:11)
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The RIK program therefore became an important part of the Bush-Cheney
energy strategy. As RIK continued to blossom, so did the relationship between MMS
and the oil industry. Encouraged by exploration into ever deeper waters, lavish royalty
relief programs facilitated an increasingly close relationship between the oil industry
and MMS. Attesting to the “revolving door” between government and industry, there
were multiple examples of high ranking DOI and MMS officials serving during the
Bush administration that left their appointments to go work for companies they
formerly oversaw (Project on Government Oversight 2008:12-14).
The Energy Policy Act of 2005 which President Bush signed into law on
August 8, included provisions that utilized royalty relief to stimulate offshore oil and
gas production in both the shallow and deepwater of the Gulf of Mexico (Energy
Information Administration 2005:17). In addition to royalty relief, the Bush
administration also banished longstanding moratoria on OCS development.
Capitalizing on the high gas prices and faced with upcoming elections, in 2008 Bush
used the opportunity to lift a presidential drilling moratorium that wasn’t set to expire
in 2012, put in place by his father and later extended by Clinton. Going even further
to provide industry access to offshore lands, Congress allowed a twenty year
prohibition on offshore drilling to expire later that year (Pelofsky and Daggett 2008).
On the whole, the Obama administration’s offshore oil policies did not initially
differ significantly from that of the Bush administration. Like the prior administration,
Obama favored a continuation and expansion of deepwater exploration and royalty
relief through the RIK program. Despite the objection of environmental activists that
opposed the controversial appointment, President Obama selected Ken Salazar to be
Secretary of Interior. Graced with the support of the oil industry, Salazar was
criticized by environmentalists for having a weak conservation record, especially
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concerning energy development, global warming and protecting scientific integrity
(Broder 2008).
Reversing his campaign promise, President Obama, alongside Secretary
Salazar, continued in the tradition of their Republican and Democratic predecessors by
encouraging offshore exploration in deeper and unexplored territories. Just weeks
before the BP Gulf of Mexico spill on March 31 2010, the Obama administration
gifted the oil industry expansive access to the OCS when he announced the opening of
167 million acres of offshore lands for leasing, most of which had never before been
leased. In addition to expanding leasing in the Central Gulf of Mexico, the proposal
ended a longstanding moratorium along the East Coast ranging from the northern tip
of Delaware to the central coast of Florida. The chief beneficiaries of the proposed
leasing expansion were the largest U.S. offshore oil producers: BP, Shell and Chevron
(Broder 2010). Despite this support, the pervasive industry influence in the MMS
RIK program became glaring in the early months of the Obama administration and
Secretary Salazar was forced to acknowledge the corruption.
Normalization of Deviance: The MMS Royalty-in-Kind Program Scandal 2008
Epitomizing the intimate relationship between the MMS and the offshore oil
industry, in 2008 Congressional reports revealed that up to a third of the MMS
department employees involved in the royalties-in-kind (RIK) program had been
engaged in serious misconduct over the past several years including rigging oil
contracts, taking money as oil consultants and having sexual relationships and using
drugs with oil and gas company representatives. The investigation into the MMS RIK
program based in Denver, Colorado uncovered a pattern of ethical failure that revealed
“a pervasive culture of exclusivity, exempt from the rules that govern all other
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employees of the Federal Government” (U.S. Department of Interior 2008, no page
number). As the report explains:
…the results of our investigation reveal a program tasked with
implementing a “business model” program. As such, Royalty in Kind
(RIK) marketers donned a private sector approach to essentially
everything they did. This included effectively opting themselves out of
the Ethics in Government Act, both in practice, and, at one point, even
explored doing so by policy or regulation. (U.S. Department of Interior
2008, no page number)
In an attempt to codify their unique relationship with industry and exempt
themselves from the guidelines governing all other federal employees, MMS RIK
employees formed a study group to consider altering the rules in June 2006 (U.S.
Department of Interior 2008:6-7). One document titled “The Initiative to Clarify
Guidance for RIK Interaction with Industry” stated that:
It is clear that the Federal government ethics/procurement rules do not
offer unambiguous guidance to RIK staff and management. It seems
logical that these rules/policies, developed in the context of government
in an adjudicator role for the regulated community, do not provide clear
guidance, since they do not envision government as business
counterplay in a commercial marketplace. (U.S. Department of Interior
2008:6)
Without any oversight and regulation, employees of the MMS RIK program
and the oil industry had melded to become one. Far from being perceived as “deviant”
activity, intimate fraternization between MMS and the industry had become the norm,
enough to even consider legally codifying the relationship. This normalization of
deviance had become so ingrained that employees of the RIK program sought to
legalize their intimate relationships with industry that were prohibited by federal law.
After the fallout from the RIK scandal, on September 16, 2009, DOI Secretary Ken
Salazar was forced to announce that it was time to end the RIK program.
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Nevertheless, while the RIK program may have been terminated, the influence of the
oil industry continued to pervade the MMS organizational culture.
Allegations of inappropriate relations with the oil industry are not unique to the
MMS RIK office in Denver. MMS officials at the Lake Charles Louisiana district
office that oversaw drilling in the Gulf of Mexico were investigated in 2010 for
accepting gifts from industry representative such as meals, tickets to sporting events,
and hunting and fishing trips. The report found “…that a culture of accepting gifts
from oil and gas companies was prevalent throughout the MMS Lake Charles
office…” (U.S. Department of Interior 2010:1). Following a 2007 investigation and
termination of one regional MMS supervisor of the New Orleans office for accepting
gifts from an offshore drilling contractor, employees at the Lake Charles office
appeared to drastically decrease their participation in these illegal behaviors. It seems
that the MMS organizational culture was plagued at the highest levels by corruption,
setting the tone for other members of the agency.
The interviews conducted by the Inspector General highlight the
inseparableness of the offshore industry and government regulators at the MMS:
According to [MMS Lake Charles District Manager Larry] Williamson,
many of the MMS inspectors had worked for the oil and gas industry
and continued to be friends with industry representatives. “Obviously,
we’re all oil industry,” he said. “We’re all from the same part of the
country. Almost all of our inspectors have worked for oil companies
out on these same platforms. They grew up in the same towns. Some of
these people, they’ve been friends with all their life. They’ve been with
these people since they were kids. They’ve hunted together. They fish
together. They skeet shoot together ….They do this all the time.” (U.S.
Department of Interior 2010:3)
Williamson’s description shows how the intimacy between MMS and offshore industry
goes far beyond formal organizational relations, and extends into regional, cultural,
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social and personal histories of these employees. Their shared experience is clear:
“Obviously, we’re all oil industry.”
By the time of the Deepwater Horizon explosion, regulation of the offshore
industry had deteriorated to little more than a formality. Created in the era of declining
regulation amidst increased privatization, the scandals that plagued the MMS are
rooted in the fundamental organizational dynamics of the agency. When Secretary
Watts merged the USGS with the BLM, two competing missions came to dictate the
MMS: collection of royalties and regulation of offshore development.
Over time, the MMS began to operate under a business model, offering
industry more offshore leases of greater swaths of the Gulf of Mexico. As the industry
expanded into deeper waters, the MMS experienced cuts in funding that hindered its
ability to keep pace. Furthermore, the MMS was unable to adapt its regulatory
framework to address the new proliferation of specialized contractors relied on by the
offshore industry. As the National Commission (2011:74) explains:
When the lessee directly regulated by the government is itself not
performing many of the activities critical to well safety, that separation
of functions poses heightened challenges for the regulator. But there
was no apparent effort by MMS to respond to those challenges by
making the service companies more accountable.
The MMS and the DOI were unable to effectively regulate the rapidly evolving
industry and the increasing reliance on outsourced contractors.
Catering to the industry’s interests became an implicit part of the MMS’s
mission and corruption became a pervasive part of the organization in multiple sectors.
Due to the revolving door between government and industry, most of the employees at
the MMS had at some point worked for the private sector and maintained deep bonds
with friends in the industry that are rooted in the region, culture and personal histories.
Even after attempts by Secretary Salazar to reform the MMS following the 2008 RIK
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scandal, the closeness between the MMS and the industry had become far too
pervasive to prevent the blowout of the Macondo well.
Conclusions
As guardian and administrator of the nation’s offshore resources, the federal
government has profited immensely from the private leasing of public offshore lands.
Above all else, revenue from offshore leases has been the primary goal behind federal
expansion of deepwater exploration and development. Regardless of their political
party, each presidential administration has thus played a key role in supporting
legislation that paved the way for drilling in deeper waters within the Gulf of Mexico.
Repeated offshore disasters such as the 1969 Santa Barbara oil spill have helped to
raise awareness of the need for increased safety and environmental oversight in the oil
industry and have even provided the impetus for monumental environmental legislation
to be passed. However, these reforms were largely superficial and development of the
offshore industry consistently superseded environmental protection.
Particularly since the Reagan administration, federal policy has allowed
regulation and development of the OCS to become increasingly controlled by the oil
industry itself. Although the relationship between the offshore industry and the
Department of Interior was close from the beginning, it only became closer as drilling
moved into deeper waters. Federal legislation has provided the opportunity for
corporations to take additional risks by reducing the royalties on OCS leases in deep
water while simultaneously weakening regulatory oversight, especially in the Gulf of
Mexico.
As the offshore industry expanded, employees at the underfunded and
inadequately staffed MMS turned to illegal means to perform their jobs. Fraternizing
with oil industry representatives had become a normal part of the culture at the MMS
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despite federal ethics guidelines that prohibited such close interactions. By the time its
employees were having sex and doing drugs with oil industry representatives, the
regulatory mission of the MMS was overcome by the shared goal of profit both for the
federal government and the offshore industry. Lacking any regulatory controls, the
disintegration of federal oversight further allowed the offshore industry to take
additional risks in the pursuit of profit.
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SECTION II: CAUSES OF THE DEEPWATER HORIZON EXPLOSION
CHAPTER THREE: CORPORATE ACTORS
The explosion of the Deepwater Horizon rig and the blowout of the Macondo
well in the Gulf of Mexico was the end result of polices and actions of three crucial
corporations: BP, Transocean, and Halliburton. In reality, however, the complex
corporate arrangements that led to the disaster were far more complicated due to the
reliance on private contractors to provide services to the Deepwater Horizon.
Nonetheless, as the majority shareholder of the Macondo well and the lessee of the
Deepwater Horizon, BP had the primary legal responsibility for overseeing operations
on the rig. The Deepwater Horizon rig was owned and operated by Transocean, who
employed the vast majority of the rig’s crew and consequently most of those who were
killed in the explosion. Completed by Halliburton just hours before the explosions, the
faulty cement job was identified by the National Commission as a contributing factor
to the blowout. Both BP and Transocean were responsible for the operation and
maintenance of the rig’s blowout preventer, the last line of defense against an
uncontrolled flow of oil from the well. Due to their essential role in causing the
blowout, the history, structure and culture of each of these corporations must be
considered.
Overarching Failure of Management at BP, Transocean, Halliburton
As the primary culprit and the corporation most directly responsible for the
disaster, greater attention will be given to the organizational culture of BP and its long
history of recklessly perpetrating human and environmental harm both onshore and
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offshore. Major restructuring of BP’s corporate culture occurred during the reign of
the company’s superstar CEO, Lord John Browne. During his tenure as CEO from
1995- 2007, Browne rapidly propelled BP from a fledging oil company to an industry
leader. After undergoing numerous acquisitions and mergers with other large
companies including Amoco and Arco, Browne radically decentralized BP, reduced
levels of management, and incentivized cost cutting. These policies created an
organizational culture which lacked oversight while encouraging risky behaviors at the
cost of worker and environmental safety. It did not take long for Browne’s corporate
vision to become a reality that led to a series of disasters at BP’s facilities onshore and
offshore in the years before the Gulf of Mexico spill.
Yet BP’s culture of deviance did not develop in isolation, but resulted from
broader historical, political and economic forces that similarly shaped other offshore
corporate cultures as well, including Transocean and Halliburton. One of the most
significant findings identified by the U.S. National Commission on the BP Deepwater
Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling was an overarching failure of management at
not only BP, but Transocean and Halliburton as well. Had there been better
management, risks would have been properly identified, communicated and addressed
(U.S. National Commission 2011:90). For instance, BP’s management failed to
adequately address the risks created by changes to the well design and procedures
(2011:122). Last minute changes to the well design and cementing procedures were
not subject to peer review or management of change processes. “At Macondo, such
decisions appear to have been made by the BP Macondo team in ad hoc fashion
without any formal risks analysis or internal expert review. This appears to have been a
key causal factor of the blowout” (2011:123).
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The problems of management and communication existed not only internally at
BP, Transocean and Halliburton, but extended out between the companies and their
contractors as well. The National Commission found that information was excessively
compartmentalized and contractors did not share key information with each other or
BP. “As a result, individuals often found themselves making critical decisions without
a full appreciation for the context in which they were being made (or even without
recognition that the decisions were critical)” (2011:123).
A thorough evaluation of the mismanagement at BP, Transocean and
Halliburton must not obscure the systemic nature of the disaster and its rootedness in
the nexus of government and the offshore oil industry. Stressing the need to address
these fundamental relations, the National Commission (2011: 122) concluded:
The blowout was not the product of a series of aberrational decisions
made by rogue industry or government officials that could not have
been anticipated or expected to occur again. Rather, the root causes are
systemic and, absent significant reform in both industry practices and
government policies, might well recur. The missteps were rooted in
systemic failures by industry management (extending beyond BP to
contractors that serve many in the industry), and also by failures of
government to provide effective regulatory oversight of offshore
drilling.
British Petroleum (BP)
British Petroleum (BP) has a long, bloody international history since its
inception. Making their fortune from the large oil discoveries in Iran (then Persia), the
Anglo-Persian Oil Company had a close relationship with the British government over
the years and was essential in facilitating the shift of the Royal Navy from operating on
coal to oil. Following Iran’s nationalization of its oil industry in 1953, BP was forced
out of the country, halting Britain’s access to Iranian oil. In reaction, Winston
Churchill urged the CIA in conjunction with M16 to launch a coup d’état on
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democratically elected prime minister Mohammed Mossadegh, thereby returning BP’s
foothold in the middle east (Bergin 2011:4). But the fight over Iran’s oil was only one
of the many injustices committed by British Petroleum in pursuit of dominance in the
global oil industry. In the decades that followed, BP began to grow and diversify its
operations in the Middle East, the North Sea, as well as Alaska. Both in the U.S. and
abroad, BP would experience catastrophic incidents at each stage of production from
extraction of oil onshore and off, to transportation, and refinement.
Lord John Browne, BP CEO 1995-2007
By the 1980s BP’s reputation dwindled and it was considered a “two pipeline
company” by industry rivals that had been in danger of going under. Largely guided by
the leadership of Lord John Browne who became CEO in 1995, BP went from a minor
player to an industry leader within less than a decade. Like his father before him,
Browne started his career at BP out of college, beginning with a team exploring the
northern coast of Alaska at Prudhoe Bay in 1969. Following in the footsteps of CEO
Bob Horton who had closely mentored him during BP’s turnaround of Standard Oil of
Ohio (Sohio) in the 1980s, Browne had earned himself a reputation as an aggressive
cost cutter who embraced risk. By 1980, Browne had been appointed by Horton as the
head of Exploration and Production (known as BPX), BP’s most profitable unit. It
was during his time as head of BPX that Browne began to implement his policies of
outsourcing, decentralization and cost cutting (Bergin 2011).
His rapid success in turning BP around earned him a superstar-CEO status in
Britain. Bergin (2011:5) describes:
His achievements saw him voted the UK’s ‘most admired’ business
leader four years in a row- an unprecedented endorsement. It prompted
Fortune magazine to declare him the most powerful man in business
outside America, saw the Financial Times dub him the ‘Sun King’,
while the left-leaning Guardian declared him ‘the nearest thing British
business has to a rock star’. His success earned him a knighthood, an
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appointment to the House of Lords and a fortune worth tens of millions
of pounds. In the eyes of the public and most BP employees, he was the
very embodiment of BP
Breaking the stereotypical image of the rugged Big Oil CEO, Browne never drove a
car but preferred to ride in a limo. He was a man of refined tastes who enjoyed tailored
suits, the opera and the services of a butler. Never marrying and living with his mother
until her death, many people had speculated about Browne’s sexuality, but he was not
openly gay until a “kiss and tell” tabloid story leaked by a former lover forced his
resignation as CEO in 2007 (Bergin 2011:6).
Though highly intelligent, those close to him described Browne as unemotional
and detached which at times contributed to falling outs with friends. Following his
retirement, Browne remarked to a journalist that in his 40 years at BP, he never lost a
single night’s sleep due to concerns about work. “If one was the sort of person to lose
sleep over work, he told the journalist, one could not be a CEO” (Bergin 2011:7).
Browne’s calculated callous nature no doubt made it easier to implement his brazen
company policies.
A small group of BP’s rising star executives which came to be known as the
“turtles” (since they had to travel with their home on their backs), were closely
mentored and favored by Browne and traveled everywhere with him. These executives
were groomed in Browne’s image, ultimately to become his successor and included
Tony Hayward, John Manzoni, and Bob Dudley, among others (Bergin 2011:27-30).
Such intensive training ensured Browne’s aggressive cost cutting strategies continued
beyond his reign.
Organizational Changes
Developed and put in place during his leadership of BPX, Browne’s
revolutionary changes to BP’s organizational structure truly came to fruition during
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his time as CEO. As BP continued to undergo mergers and acquisitions, the company
became more decentralized and relied increasingly on outsourced services from private
contractors. Big oil fields or clusters of small ones functioned like separate, stand
alone companies and made decisions independent of BP’s central bureaucracy. Under
Browne’s plan, the central bureaucracy of the company disintegrated, and the role of
top executives would become to simply fund the projects. In theory, Browne
rationalized that these changes would encourage entrepreneurship and maximize profit
(Bergin 2011:22). Managers were incentivized to meet a limited number of short term
goals to increase production levels while decreasing cost. Although some people
within the company raised concerns that this led to a tendency to put off necessary
upgrades and improvements that might show up in the bottom line, Browne was not
convinced. “One of the big problems at BP, as he saw it, was that the engineers who
called all the shots wanted to ‘gold plate’ every platform, refinery and pipeline”
(Bergin 2011:24).
The decentralization, outsourcing and cost cutting policies while BP was
undergoing multiple mergers and acquisitions resulted in rapid growth without proper
management and oversight. Over the decades that followed, the effects of Browne’s
policies came to be actualized as persistent accidents throughout BP’s facilities
worldwide, ultimately setting the stage for the Deepwater Horizon blowout.
Incrementally, the disintegration of the company led to a normalization of deviance
which rewarded risk taking among management at the expense of workplace
infrastructure and safety.
Amoco merger
In August 1998, BP acquired Amoco, at the time the fourth largest US oil
producer. The BP-Amoco merger was the largest industrial merger ever at the time
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and the integration of the two companies was difficult amidst severe job cuts, mostly
through early retirement. Amoco had developed an organizational culture that fostered
deep technological expertise, something BP was desperately lacking for decades.
However, BP did not utilize this strength of Amoco’s structure. Instead, the merger
had been all about cost cutting rather than technological refinement (Bergin 2011:35).
Furthermore, just as the BP takeover of Amoco occurred, in 1999 Browne
issued a 25 percent cost cut target across the company which placed enormous
pressure on managers to avoid necessary, though costly, upgrades and safety features
at Texas City and other BP plants. According to Bergin (2011:36):
The brutality of the integration process and the performance-related
remuneration packages meant only ambitious, ends-focused people felt
at home at BP. Managers who cared about means and broader
measures of performance beyond production and cost levels
increasingly did not see a role for themselves at the company.
Shortly after the purchase of Amoco, BP bought six other companies, including Arco:
Lord Browne had gone on a “buying spree” (Public Broadcasting Station 2010). After
purchasing Arco for $27 billion, BP overcame Shell for the number two spot in the US
oil market. Throughout the mergers and acquisitions, Browne continued to
decentralize BP’s organizational structure including responsibility for ensuring
compliance with health, safety and ethical matters.
Offshore operations
Considered a late-comer to offshore oil drilling, the BP-Amoco merger also
gave BP control over Amoco’s profitable natural gas operations in the Gulf of Mexico.
According to Boué and Jones (2006:298), “As far as BP goes, this company
succeeded in carving out a position for itself in the deepwater despite its later starter
status, but only by taking enormous risks and running bills that very few companies
would have had the resolve or the resources to imitate.”
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The company had been involved in offshore drilling prior to the BP-Amoco
merger, but BP benefited immensely by sharing technology and patents with Shell on
the Mars project which started in 1992 and began production in 1996. Located in the
Mississippi Canyon Block in the northern Gulf of Mexico, the permanent drilling and
producing Mars oil platform reached depths of 2,940 feet. At the time, Shell was the
established industry expert in offshore operations, leading the charge into increasingly
deeper waters. Since the Mars prospect was viewed as a risky endeavor, Shell invited
BP to participate as financer, granting them a 28.5 percent share of the project.
The partnership benefited BP the most, since the company had no deepwater
experience in comparison to Shell who had been the deepwater leader at the time.
Essentially, Shell relinquished to BP half a century of pioneering knowledge and
technology of offshore oil drilling (Priest 2007a:256). As Priest (2007a:260) explains:
The deal let BP in on the deepwater Gulf of Mexico business, giving its
managers and engineers a close-up view of all aspects of Shell Oil’s
operations, from its exploration and reservoir evaluations models to its
drilling and production techniques. With nothing in deepwater, BP
‘went to school’ and subsequently staked out a big position in the Gulf.
By 2004, the British oil giant was the largest leaseholder and, after
Shell E&P Company, the second-largest producer in the deepwater.
During Hurricane Katrina in 2005 the rig experienced damage which temporarily
forced it out of commission, though oil production from the Mars project still
continues today. Through the Mars project, BP acquired centuries of technical
knowledge and expertise without the concomitant experience and responsibility
necessary to fully appreciate the implicit dangers of deepwater drilling.
Prior Offenses
As the century turned, Browne’s policies began to take their toll. In the decade
leading up to the Gulf of Mexico spill, BP had been responsible for numerous
accidents, spills, injuries and deaths at its onshore and offshore facilitates in the US
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and abroad. In fact, at the time of the Deepwater Horizon explosion, BP was on
probation for previous violations and was under investigation by the Department of
Interior, the Department of Justice and the Department of Labor: BP was a known
repeat offender (Public Broadcasting Station 2010). Each of these disasters should
have been a signal of the dire shape of the company and could have provided an
opportunity for reflection, reform or even reprimand. Unfortunately, they did not.
Texas City refinery explosion, March 2005
Before the Deepwater Horizon, BP had been faulted for the “biggest industrial
accident in decades.” BP’s 1,200 acre Texas City, Texas refinery was acquired in 1998
as part of the $61 billion acquisition of Amoco. Even after the merger, the majority of
the staff and managers at Texas City were almost exclusively former Amoco
employees (Bergin 2011:81). Built in 1934, the facility was sorely in need of costly
maintenance and upgrades at the time BP acquired it and was further allowed to
degrade. On March 23, 2005 an explosion occurred at the plant which resulted in 15
deaths and 180 injuries. The problems with safety had been well known by workers
and management alike, yet internal memos and emails indicated that BP had discussed,
and then opted not to install the necessary $150,000 upgrade that would have
prevented the explosion. In the thirty years leading up to the Texas City refinery
explosion, there had been 23 worker deaths at the plant, averaging about one death
every 16 months (Public Broadcasting Station 2010).
An independent inquiry into the Texas City disaster led by former Secretary of
State James A. Baker III conducted hundreds of interviews with employees at the
plant and uncovered weak leadership within BP and a deficit of attention to effective
safety measures. Among other findings, the report noted fundamental problems in
BP’s “decentralized management system and entrepreneurial culture,’ which left safety
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processes to the discretion of managers and did not define what was expected of
them” (Timmons 2007). Furthermore, the report cited that workers at BP’s US
refineries were thinly staffed, overworked and were reluctant to report accidents and
safety concerns to superiors for fear of repercussions. While the report failed to
conclude that BP purposely reduced spending on safety, it did note that aggressive
cost cutting practices were an important factor. For example, “At the Texas City
refinery, total maintenance spending fell 41 percent from 1992 to 1999, and total
capital spending fell 84 percent from 1992 to 2000. On top of those cuts, BP
challenged its managers to reduce costs by 25 percent after its merger with Amoco in
1999” (Timmons 2007).
According to the report of the U.S. Chemical Safety Board (CSB), an
independent federal agency with the responsibility for investigating industrial chemical
accidents though lacking enforcement power, internal documents demonstrated that
global BP management had “significant knowledge” of its problems with maintenance,
spending and infrastructure not only at the Texas City refinery, but many of BP’s
business units around the world. The U.S. Chemical Safety Board (2006) noted:
A 2004 BP Group internal audit of 35 business units including Texas
City found significant common gaps, including a lack of leadership
competence which pointed to “systematic underlying issues,”
widespread tolerance of noncompliance with basic safety rules, and
poor implementation and monitoring of safety management systems and
processes.
As mandated by the OSHA Process Safety Management standard, oil refineries
are required to conduct “management of change” safety reviews in which a formal
process analyzes and documents the ramifications of changes in safety procedures. The
CSB noted longstanding problems with the management of change process at Texas
City. As Merrit (2007) explains:
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As described in our report, a number of design and equipment changes
were never evaluated under BP’s management of change policy, even
though the refinery had designated the equipment as “safety critical.”
Our report also notes that BP management allowed operators and
supervisors to alter, edit, add, and remove procedural steps without
conducting management of change reviews to assess the safety risk.
In the end, BP paid victims and their families over $1 billion on the condition
that they can never criticize BP or the event publicly. Following multiple independent
and government investigations into the accident, BP was sanctioned with $71 million
in fines. However, no officials were ever found responsible, charged with crime or
held accountable for the incident (Public Broadcasting Station 2010).
Even after the fatal events at Texas City in 2005, deaths at the refinery
continued and BP neglected to address safety violations. In October 2009 the
Occupational Health and Safety Administration fined the company $87.4 million for
failing to address the violations. At the time, this was the largest ever fine imposed by
OSHA, even surpassing the original $21.3 million fine for the 2005 event itself (Bergin
2011:132). Tony Hayward argued that the Obama administration sought to send a
tough message to the entire industry and that they were making an example of BP with
such excessive fines. However, according to Bergin (2011:133):
The fact was that, even if one stripped out the 709 citations OSHA
announced in October 2009, BP’s U.S. refineries would still have been
way ahead of their rivals in breaching regulations. Between June 2007
and February 2010, BP incurred 862 citations from OSHA compared to
127 for Sunoco, the next worst offender, and 119 for ConocoPhillips,
the third worst offender.
Even among its peers in the industry, BP stood out as an extreme offender of safety
violations. Despite all of these violations, BP’s stock continued to remain profitable
for its investors, providing little incentive to make substantial reforms.
Thunder Horse rig accident, July 2005
Completed in 2004 at a cost of over $5 billion, the state of the art Thunder
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Horse rig was BP’s showcase platform symbolizing the company’s ability to innovate
and push technology to the limits. Yet the rig quickly came to symbolize BP’s hubris.
Even before it began to pump oil, the 43 story rig nearly toppled over into the Gulf of
Mexico during Hurricane Dennis in July 2005. Following an investigation, it was
revealed that the damage was not caused by the hurricane. Rather, in a rush to finish
the project BP engineers had incorrectly installed valves used to control the flow of
water in the stilts keeping it afloat: a check valve installed backwards had caused it to
take on water rather than dispose of it (Lyall 2010). Bergin (2011:91) contends that
“The flaws were the direct result of BP’s design, chosen in the hope of meeting
Browne’s overly ambitious production targets…The combination of an ambitious
design, a rushed delivery and BP’s eroded technical capability made problems almost
inevitable.”
Prudhoe Bay, Alaska oil spills 2006
In 2006, BP was also responsible for what at the time was considered the
second worst oil spill in Alaska’s history next to the Exxon Valdez. Also partially
owned by ConocoPhillips and Exxon Mobil, the Prudhoe Bay facility is the largest oil
field in the US. Opened in the 1960s, the infrastructure at the facility had been
designed to last twenty years before being replaced. The facility operated on a “run
everything to failure” policy in which upgrades were only implemented after the
infrastructure had failed (Public Broadcasting Station 2010). In March 2006, pipeline
corrosion led to a leak that went undetected for a week and resulted in a spill of over
6,350 barrels (260,000 gallons) of oil. Just a few months later a second spill occurred
in August leaking 25 barrels of oil and forcing BP to halt production altogether at the
facility and causing a notable spike in oil prices throughout the country. As a result of
the spills, BP was ultimately forced to replace 16 miles of corroded pipeline at the
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price of $250 million and undertook a reorganization of the management structure at
the Alaska facility.
To evaluate its corrosion control program at Prudhoe Bay, BP hired the
consulting firm Booz Allen Hamilton. The report produced by the firm revealed that:
1) the leak detection systems were inadequate and emergency shutdown procedures
were not clear or enforced, 2) corrosion inspection and monitoring programs were
static and did not change in response to external factors, 3) audit processes focused on
issues other than corrosion or were ignored entirely, and 4) poor communication links
made it difficult for senior managers to get useful information from line managers.
Furthermore, the report noted that “BP’s budgeting process did not provide
transparency on the risk trade-offs to senior managers. Budgeting was largely driven
by top-down targets” (“Key Findings” 2007). It is interesting to note, however, that
BP was later questioned by congressional investigators about its attempts to delete a
key finding in the Booz Hamilton report that identified “budget pressure” as a
contributing factor to the Alaska oil spills (Baltimore 2007).
Commonalities can be found between the events in Texas City in 2005 and at
Prudhoe Bay in 2006. Carolyn Merritt, the chairman of the Chemical Safety Board
who examined the Texas City incident, was asked to review the report prepared by
Booz Allen Hamilton in response to the 2006 accident and offers a number of insights.
The Booz Allen report refers to a “normalization of deviance” at the Prudhoe Bay
facility in which “risk levels gradually crept up due to evolving operating conditions”
of the pipelines. Comparatively, Merritt (2007) stated that “We observed a similar
indifference to growing catastrophic risk in our Texas City investigation.” Risk and
deviance, it seems, had become a pervasive and normalized part of BP’s safety culture.
Congressional hearings were held in 2006 to examine what had gone wrong
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with BP’s pipeline in Alaska. Hearings were again conducted in 2007 to assess the
progress BP had been made with the pervasive pipeline corrosion since the spills.
Forebodingly, the title of the hearings asks, “The 2006 Prudhoe Bay Shutdown: Will
Recent Regulatory Changes and BP Management Reforms Prevent Future Failures?”
The investigations stressed that BP undertook severe cost cutting measures between
1999 and 2005 and that this may have contributed to pipeline corrosion. According to
the internal documents provided by BP to the committee, “…cost cutting pressures
on Prudhoe Bay operations were severe enough that some BP field managers were
considering reducing or halting the range of actions related to preventing or reducing
corrosion” (Prudhoe 2007:2).
Criminal investigations of BP
As early as 2004, corrosion technicians and others had begun to raise concerns
that a corrosion-related pipeline rupture at the Alaska facility was likely to occur.
Scott West, the special agent-in-charge at the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) Criminal Investigation Division, had been investigating alleged crimes in
connection with the 2006 pipeline rupture and was planning to bring felony charges
against BP and the company’s senior executives. Conducted in coordination with the
FBI, the DOJ and Alaska state environmental and regulatory officials, West’s probe
was one of the top two environmental crime cases being handled by the EPA in 2007.
The investigations uncovered millions of documents and ample evidence to prosecute
BP for criminal charges.
These efforts, however, were thwarted when the Bush administration’s DOJ
opted to charge the company with only a misdemeanor violation of the Clean Air Act,
thereby abruptly putting an end to West’s criminal investigation of BP. The charge,
many felt, amounted to a “slap on the wrist” and as a result, no BP executives faced
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any criminal liability for the Alaska spills (Lindner 2010; Leopold 2010). Surprised by
the actions of the DOJ, West commented “Never …have I had a significant
environmental criminal case shut down by the political arm of the Department of
Justice, nor have I had a case declined by the Department of Justice before I had been
fully able to investigate the case. This is unprecedented in my experience” (Public
Employees for Environmental Responsibility 2008).
The DOJ’s decision to leniently sanction BP with a misdemeanor rather than
pursue felony criminal charges might be part of a larger trend in the prosecution of
corporate criminals during the Bush administration. Between 2005 and 2008 the DOJ
opted to defer prosecution of more than 50 companies suspected of wrongdoing by
using “deferred prosecution agreements.” Deferred prosecution agreements allow
businesses to escape the cost and stigma of battling criminal charges by permitting
them to avoid trial and instead pay fines and appoint an outside monitor to implement
internal reforms (Lichtblau 2008). These types of agreements had been scarcely used
in the past, but the Bush administration employed them widely in dealing with
companies (though not with individuals) in cases of financial crimes, export control
violations, kickbacks and environmental violations, rather than prosecution. Letting
potentially criminal corporations off the hook, “In general, such agreements result in
companies acknowledging wrongdoing by not contesting criminal charges, but without
formally admitting guilt. Most agreements end after two or three years with the
charges permanently dismissed” (Lichtblau 2008).
Caspian Sea blowout 2008
In September 2008, a BP rig in the Caspian Sea off the coast of Baku, Azerbaijan
experienced a blowout caused by many of the same factors as the Deepwater Horizon.
In both cases BP had opted to use “quick dry” cement infused with nitrogen bubbles,
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yet this more risky decision can lead to nitrogen bubbles forming channels in which oil
and gas can escape up through the well. After the blowout, with the help of the
Azerbaijan government and with the silent collusion of Exxon and Chevron, BP
attempted to conceal the incident from the other companies as well as the Bush
administration. In fact, the full story was not made public until late 2010 when
Wikileaks released a secret cable from the U.S. Embassy to the State Department in
Washington laying out the whole story of the 2008 Caspian blowout. Had the facts of
this case been known sooner, there is a chance that the Deepwater Horizon explosion
could have been prevented (Palast 2011).
Consistently, BP has escaped liability for its human and environmental harms
across the globe. In every instance, BP was able to evade responsibility for its actions.
Despite countless government fines totaling millions of dollars, the company failed to
address the failures of organizational management put in place by John Browne, even
after a change in leadership. Rapid expansion coupled with increasing decentralization
and diminishing oversight made workplace accidents and spills inevitable. Yet even in
the face of multiple disasters the company’s stock remained unfazed and BP refused to
learn from its mistakes. Rather than deter or prevent another accident, the deaths,
injuries, penalties and fines simply became a cost of doing business, unable to impede
the reckless drive to the top of the industry.
Transocean
The Deepwater Horizon rig was built in 2001 by Hyundai Heavy Industries at
a price of $560 million (Jordans and Burke 2010). The rig, however, was owned and
operated by the world’s largest offshore drilling operator, Transocean. Transocean
drills in over 30 countries and employs more than 18,000 people. In 2001, the
Deepwater Horizon set a new world record when it drilled the Macondo well on behalf
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of BP. Reaching depths of 35,055 feet, the more than six miles long well operated in
4,130 feet of water (Transocean 2011). At the time of the explosion, BP was
Transocean’s biggest client in the Gulf of Mexico. BP had recently extended its
$500,000 a day contract for Transocean’s Deepwater Horizon to continue drilling the
Macondo well and there was great pressure from BP’s management to finish the
cement job (Casselman 2010).
Prior Problems with the Deepwater Horizon Rig
Under Transocean’s operation, the Deepwater Horizon rig experienced
multiple incidents during its ten year life. Just months after being launched from a
shipyard in South Korea in February 2002, the Deepwater Horizon leaked 267 barrels
of oil into the Gulf setting a pattern that was to continue. Moreover, in June 2003 the
rig floated off course and released 944 barrels of oil into the Gulf, followed quickly by
a loss of 74 additional barrels of oil the next month. Under contract from BP, the
Deepwater Horizon leaked 212 barrels of an oil based lubricant in November 2005 and
in January of the same year 15 gallons of overflowing diesel fluid led to a fire (Jordans
and Burke 2010).
Past Accidents
While the explosion of the Deepwater Horizon rig was perhaps Transocean’s
most devastating accident, it was certainly not the first. The company has had a long
and troubled history dating back to 1979 under the name Sedco, when it was run by
Governor of Texas Bill Clements and his family. At that time, this blowout in the Gulf
of Mexico was the worst the world had ever seen. Claiming that the rig was
unseaworthy and the crew was poorly trained, the federal government sought $12
million in damages, but Sedco managed to pay only $2 million. Sedco was sold to
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Schlumberger in 1984, which later transferred its offshore operations to what became
Transocean Offshore in 1999 (Mattera 2010).
Over the past decade, Transocean has been faulted for numerous accidents that
have resulted in significant environmental damage and human harm. For example, in
2000, Transocean was responsible for an eight ton anchor accidentally falling from a
rig in the Gulf of Mexico and rupturing an underwater pipeline thereby resulting in a
spill of nearly 100,000 gallons of oil. Off the coast of Texas in 2003, a fire broke out
on a Transocean rig killing one worker and injuring many others. Moreover, a
Transocean rig in the North Sea in 2005 experienced similar problems as the 2010 spill
in the Gulf (Mattera 2010). Additionally, in 2008 eight people were killed off the coast
of Scotland when a support vessel capsized while towing a massive chain used to
position a Transocean rig. Missteps by Transocean and other parties were found to be
a contributing factor in the accident (Meier 2010).
Although spills, fires and accidents such as these are not unique to rigs
operated by Transocean and frequently occur throughout the industry due to
equipment failure, human error and environmental damage, the company had a
particularly bad track record not only on the Deepwater Horizon but on other rigs as
well. Transocean had an increasing number of federal investigations and a declining
reputation among oil companies that hired them. “Nearly three of every four incidents
that triggered federal investigations into safety and other problems on deepwater
drilling rigs in the Gulf of Mexico since 2008 have been on rigs operated by
Transocean, according to an analysis of federal data” (Casselman 2010). Noting an
increase in incidents by Transocean following a November 2007 merger with rival
GlobalSantaFe, Casselman (2010) notes that “In 2008 and 2009, the surveys ranked
Transocean last among deep-water drillers for “job quality” and second to last in
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“overall satisfaction.” For three years before the merger, Transocean was the leader or
near the top in both measures.” After Transocean’s merger with GlobalSantaFe, it
seems as the company’s organizational culture took a turn for the worse.
In addition to safety and environmental violations in its offshore operations,
Transocean is also responsible for numerous other international criminal violations.
For example, they have been investigated for human rights violations in Myanmar.
They have also reported conducting business in countries that sponsor terrorism
including Syria and Iran. Moreover, the company is also under criminal investigation
for tax fraud in Norway and is the target of tax inquires in the U.S. and Brazil (Meier
2010). Clearly, Transocean has demonstrated a pattern of criminogenic behavior that
spans beyond the Deepwater Horizon.
Halliburton
Employing 80,000 people and operating in over 80 countries, Halliburton is
one of the world’s largest provider of services and products to the oil and gas industry
(Halliburton 2012). Halliburton is one of the top U.S. cementing companies for
offshore oil drilling alongside Schlumberger and BJ Services. Less than 24 hours
before the explosion on the Deepwater Horizon rig, Halliburton had completed
cementing the Macondo well. Sealing a well with cement is one of the most
dangerous procedures on a drilling rig. “A 2007 study by three U.S. Minerals
Management Service officials found that cementing was a factor in 18 of 39 well
blowouts in the Gulf of Mexico over a 14-year period. That was the single largest
factor, ahead of equipment failure and pipe failure” (Gold and Casselman 2010).
The blowout of Macondo and the explosion of the Deepwater Horizon was not
the first incident that had been linked to Halliburton’s poor cement job. In a strikingly
similar situation in the Timor Sea, “Last year, Halliburton was also implicated for its
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cementing work prior to a massive blowout off the coast of Australia, where a rig
caught on fire and spewed hundreds of thousands of gallons into the sea for ten
weeks” (Baram 2010). Moreover, Halliburton’s practice of adding nitrogen bubbles to
its cement slurry (its signature special ingredient), has been identified as a contributing
factor in other deepwater blowouts in addition to the Deepwater Horizon.
Just like BP and Transocean, Halliburton has also had a long history of
international corruption and war profiteering, particularly related to the 2003 invasion
and occupation of Iraq. The company had incredibly close ties to the Bush
administration and received no bid contracts totaling billions of dollars for the
reconstruction of the country. Furthermore, in 2010, the Nigerian government also
filed corruption charges against Dick Cheney related to his duties as Halliburton’s
CEO. Halliburton’s actions have also been addressed within the literatures on statecorporate criminality. For example, Rothe (2006) has identified war profiteering in the
form of overcharging by Halliburton in Iraq as a form of state-facilitated corporate
crime due to the government’s aggressive refusal to take regulatory action against the
company. Rothe (2006:218) asserts, “As these examples show, Halliburton has a
history of corporate criminality and questionable organizational practices.” Indeed,
these deviant organizational practices persisted through the blowout of Macondo.
Conclusions
The collective corruption and mismanagement of BP, Transocean and
Halliburton culminated into an unprecedented disaster on the Macondo well. Yet in
the decades leading up the Deepwater Horizon blowout, each of these companies
consistently demonstrated reckless, illegal and socially harmful behavior in numerous
instances. Thus, it seems as though criminality is a persistent and pervasive part of
BP, Transocean and Halliburton’s organizational cultures. Without any regulation or

95
oversight to place cautionary limits on drilling for oil in increasingly deeper waters,
BP, Transocean and Halliburton tested, and crossed, the limits on the Macondo well.
While each of these companies must be scrutinized individually for their
deviant actions, it must not obscure the fact that they operated in an industry which
condoned, encouraged and rewarded risky behavior. Across the oil industry, massive
restructuring that occurred during the late 1980s and 1990s allowed for declining
oversight in the pursuit of increased profits. This trend of decentralization due to
corporate mergers, amidst ongoing deregulation by government, cultivated the
conditions that led to the blowout of Macondo. The explosion of Deepwater Horizon
and the blowout of Macondo are not an aberration, but symptoms of a much larger
problem inherit in the government and corporate relations comprising the offshore oil
industry.
The organizational goals of BP under the leadership of CEO John Browne
centered on rapid growth, decentralization and extensive cost cutting. Since managers
were rewarded with bonuses when jobs were completed under budget and ahead of
schedule, there was strong incentive to undertake illegal means to meet company
goals. By making bonuses contingent upon reducing costs, managers at BP were
motivated to ignore vital safety upgrades. This deviance became increasingly
normalized as Browne’s policies unfolded, ultimately resulting in numerous accidents
including the Texas City disaster in 2005 and the Prudhoe Bay oil spills in 2006.
During a time of rapid growth through mergers and acquisitions, policies which
decentralized the organizational structure without corresponding oversight provided
the opportunity for illegal means to develop within BP. Despite efforts to punish BP
for its harmful actions, monumental fines imposed by government regulators were
nevertheless insufficient to force compliance and prevent the blowout of Macondo.
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CHAPTER FOUR: THE BLOWOUT OF MACONDO
The very real danger of an offshore well blowout has long been widely
recognized by government and industry alike. The technical cause of the Macondo
blowout was an unstable cement job coupled with the inability of the blowout
preventer to seal the well. These failures were made possible by a series of calculated
decisions by BP to rapidly finish the well while minimizing costs. A number of last
minute changes to the well design made by BP and hastily approved by the MMS,
helped to weaken the well and increased the likelihood of a blowout.
Blowouts in the Gulf of Mexico most often result from cementing the well, but
despite this fact little has been done to reduce the hazards involved in this process.
Rather, the MMS does not dictate guidelines for cement slurry mixtures, but instead
defers to industry standards. During the cementing of the well, Halliburton ignored the
results of failed tests that indicated the cement slurry was unstable. Once the blowout
of Macondo did occur, the blowout preventer on the Deepwater Horizon failed to
sever the rig from the well. Although managers from Transocean and BP had been
made aware of problems with the blowout preventer in the weeks leading up to the
disaster, this information was never reported to the MMS and no action was taken to
address them. After the malfunction of the blowout preventer, the Deepwater Horizon
crew had no choice but to abandon ship.
Following the explosion and evacuation of the rig, government and corporate
officials began attempts to control the flow of information and images to the public at
the expense of the surviving members of the Deepwater Horizon crew. Survivors from
the explosion were forced to watch the rig burn and collapse with their missing
comrades onboard. On the long journey back to shore, the survivors were
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interrogated by officials from the Coast Guard, the MMS as well as lawyers from
Transocean. The lawyers from Transocean coerced the crew members into signing
waivers denying that they saw anything or sustained injury from the accident.
Immediately upon reaching land at 1:27 a.m. on Earth Day, the exhausted and
traumatized survivors were forced to submit to mandatory drug testing.
On the evening of the explosion and throughout the following day, Transocean
imposed a communications blackout to prevent the spread of information about the
accident. Across the Gulf of Mexico, crews on offshore rigs were prohibited from
using the telephone or internet to contact friends and family. When the news finally
made its way to land, the few carefully controlled images of the Deepwater Horizon
engulfed in flames were provided to the public by the Coast Guard. This close control
of information and images surrounding the spill by government and corporate officials
established a trend that persisted for the duration of the response.
BP and the Macondo Well
BP paid more than $34 million to the MMS in March 2008 for exclusive
exploration and drilling rights for a nine square mile plot in the Gulf of Mexico known
as Mississippi Canyon Block 252 (U.S. National Commission 2011:89). Fifty nautical
miles off the Louisiana coastline, the location of the Macondo well is incredibly
isolated, with only ocean for as far as the eye can see. Macondo’s name came from
the fictitious cursed town in Colombian Nobel Prize winning author Gabriel Garcia
Marquez’s novel One Hundred Years of Solitude. The first well to be drilled under the
new lease, Macondo was initially planned to reach drilling depths of 20,200 feet,
though the well only made it to 18,360 feet after encountering difficulties. Even at this
depth, Transocean’s Deepwater Horizon had set a new record in deepwater drilling for
the Macondo well.
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After purchasing the lease, BP became the legal operator of all activities on
Block 252. While BP was primarily responsible for the well since it controlled a 65%
share, Anadarko Petroleum Company (25%) and MOEX Offshore (10%) were also
part owners and BP maintained regular contact with its partners throughout drilling
operations (U.S. National Commission 2011:321). On the Deepwater Horizon, BP
was responsible for overseeing the actions of a complex web of private contractors
who perform nearly every stage of drilling. As the National Commission (2011:92)
states:
But BP neither owned the rigs, nor operated them in the normal sense
of the word. Rather, the company’s Houston-based engineering team
designed the well and specified in detail how it was to be drilled. A
team of specialized contractors would then do the physical work of
actually drilling the well—a common industry practice. Transocean, a
leading owner of deepwater drilling rigs, would provide BP with a rig
and the crew to run it. Two BP “Well Site Leaders” (the “company
men”) would be on the rig at all times to direct the crew and
contractors and their work, and would maintain regular contact with
the BP engineers on shore.
The dynamically positioned mobile offshore drilling rig Deepwater Horizon
was not the first rig to drill Macondo. Transocean’s Marianas was the initial rig that
began drilling in October 2009, reaching a total of 9,090 feet before being forced to
stop 34 days later as Hurricane Ida approached. Although the Marianas had been
moved off site to avoid the storm, it was nonetheless damaged enough to require
replacement by the Deepwater Horizon which arrived on January 31, 2010 and began
operations shortly thereafter. These and other events delayed drilling the well.
At the time of the explosion, the well was more than fifty days behind schedule,
costing BP $2 million a day and putting the project nearly $100 million over budget
and counting. On top of this, BP was shelling out $500,000 in daily operating costs, in
addition to another $1 million in internal costs (Juhasz 2011:6). The delay of the well
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and its growing expense weighed heavily on BP managers, as their bonuses were
variably linked to completion timelines and budget targets. In the weeks leading up to
the spill, company emails consistently debated strategies to save money, in every
instance choosing the cheaper option. So great was the pressure from the “company
men” leading up to the blowout that an entourage of top level BP and Transocean
executives had arrived on the Deepwater Horizon the day of the disaster to push for a
speedier completion of the Macondo well. Later that evening, the executives would be
violently confronted with the results of their policies.
Causes of the Blowout
Blowout events are a regular occurrence in the Gulf of Mexico, though most
happen in shallow waters less than 300 feet since most drilling occurs in this area. As
drilling creeps into deeper waters, blowouts can be expected to take place in these
locations as well. According to Juhasz (2011:11):
Gas kicks are routine. Even blowouts occur far more often than the
industry would have us believe, and with increasing frequency. From
2005-2010, twenty-eight blowouts occurred in the Gulf of Mexico,
four of which took place in the eighteen months preceding the blowout
of the Macondo well. From 1999 to 2004, there were twenty blowouts,
and from 1993 to 1998 there were just eleven.
The regularity of blowouts and the risks associated with cementing an oil well
have been well documented by government and industry reports. According to the
MMS, between 1992 and 2006 there were a total of 39 blowouts, or one for every 387
wells drilled during that period. All but one of these blowouts occurred in the Gulf of
Mexico. This is a decline from 1971 to 1991 during which 87 blowouts occurred, or
one in 246 wells drilled. Moreover, most of these blowouts occurred in water less than
500 feet with only 16% occurring in greater depths (Izon, Danenberger and Mayes
2007:84). While the frequency and severity of well blowouts has decreased more
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recently, the MMS found that the percent of blowouts resulting from cementing
operations has increased significantly. Out of the 39, cementing problems were
responsible for 18 blowouts (Izon et al. 2007:88).
Aware of the potential for a deepwater blowout mostly likely to result from a
poor cement job, BP in conjunction with Transocean and Halliburton disregarded
every safeguard against such a disaster. According to the National Commission
(2011:115):
The immediate cause of the Macondo blowout was a failure to contain
hydrocarbon pressures in the well. Three things could have contained
those pressures: the cement at the bottom of the well, the mud in the
well and in the riser, and the blowout preventer. But mistakes and
failures to appreciate risk compromised each of those potential barriers,
steadily depriving the rig crew of safeguards until the blowout was
inevitable and, at the very end, uncontrollable.
The last lines of defense against a blowout were systematically discarded as BP rushed
to complete the well. Identifiable decisions were made by management at BP,
Transocean and Halliburton concerning the use of drilling mud, the design of the well,
the cementing process, and the maintenance of the blowout preventer, making an
uncontrollable deepwater blowout inevitable.
Drilling Mud
In order to prevent oil and gas from escaping up the well, millions of gallons of
“drilling mud” are pumped into the well which travels in a closed loop. At a pricey
$100 a barrel, drilling mud is a blend of synthetic chemicals, polymers and weighting
agents that are used to lubricate and cool the drill bit, and maintain well pressure. The
weight and density of the mud must constantly be monitored since low mud weight
can result in a release of oil or gas into the well, known as a “kick.” On the other
hand, mud that is too heavy can result in fracturing of the surrounding formations.
Therefore a balance must be found between circulating enough mud to suppress the oil
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and gas below, but not exerting too much pressure which could weaken the well, lead
to a loss of circulation and increase the potential for a blowout below the seabed floor.
An initial problem encountered by the Macondo team was a “lost circulation”
event on April 9, 2010, meaning that drilling mud began flowing into cracks in the
formation rather than back up to the rig therefore resulting in lost returns. As a result,
drilling was halted. Engineers realized that they had “run out of drilling margin,” and
continuing to bore any deeper would further jeopardize the stability of the rock
formations. Therefore, drilling was prematurely ceased at 18,360 feet (U.S. National
Commission 2011:94). From this point on as cementing operations began, one of the
greatest concerns of BP’s team was the pressure placed on the fragile rock formations
and the risk of a subsea well blowout.
Changes to the Well Design
After examining the well, BP concluded that there were sufficient reserves to
economically justify inserting final production casing string which would allow the
company to recover oil and gas upon future return. Once the casing was in place,
Halliburton would close the well by filling the casing with a specialized cement blend.
The primary cement job is the first attempt which must seal off (or “isolate”) the
hydrocarbon-bearing zone from the space surrounding the casing and from the inside
of the casing itself (U.S. National Commission 2011:95).
BP made numerous changes to the well design that were not adequately
reviewed internally or by the MMS. Five days prior to the incident, BP had made three
changes to its planned well design in a span of only 24 hours; all of which were rapidly
approved by the Department of Interior, in some cases within minutes of the request.
Alterations such as the decision to use a long string casing, which increased the
potential for a weak seal along the casing walls, had been questioned by engineers at
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BP (Hammer 2010). Nonetheless, continuing to push the project towards completion
in the quickest, easiest manner, BP management elected to use the easier long string
design. BP also decided at the last minute to use fewer centralizers inside the casing,
further weakening the well’s design. Taken together, these hasty changes to the well
design increased the likelihood of a blowout.
During the cementing process, BP decided to use a lighter, though less stable,
cement slurry mix containing nitrogen bubbles in an effort to reduce the amount of
pressure on the well. Moreover, BP opted to use less cement and to circulate it at a
slower rate than what is considered safe industry practice to protect against a blowout.
Furthermore, the cement used by Halliburton failed multiple tests, suggesting that it
lacked integrity. Finally, once the cementing process was complete, it failed numerous
critical tests indicating that the well not properly sealed. Ultimately these signs were
dismissed, ignored and unrecognized by BP, Halliburton and Transocean.
Long string casing design
Initially, BP’s design team planned to use a “long string” production casing,
“…a single continuous wall of steel between the wellhead on the seafloor, and the oil
and gas zone at the bottom of the well” (U.S. National Commission 2011:95). This
design allowed for easier access for future production operations. After the lost
circulation event, a “liner,” was selected since it would be easier to cement into place.
A liner is “…a shorter string of casing hung lower in the well and anchored to the next
higher string. A liner would result in a more complex- and theoretically more leakprone- system over the life of the well” (2011:95). However, there was disagreement
between engineers at BP and Halliburton on which design to use. According to the
National Commission (2011:95-6):
On April 14 and 15, BP’s engineers, working with a Halliburton
engineer, used sophisticated computer programs to model the likely
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outcome of the cementing process. When early results suggested the
long string could not be cemented reliably, BP’s design team switched
to a liner. But that shift met resistance within BP. The engineers were
encouraged to engage an in-house BP cementing expert to review
Halliburton’s recommendations. That BP expert determined that certain
inputs should be corrected. Calculations with the new inputs showed
that a long string could be cemented properly. The BP engineers
accordingly decided that installing a long string was “again the primary
option.”
After pressure from BP management, the decision was made to go with the original
long string plan, despite concerns raised by engineers at Halliburton and BP.
Fewer centralizers
In the original designs, BP intended to install 16 centralizers along the long
string, which are designed to secure sections of casing together. Yet on April 1, 2010,
BP’s supplier, Weatherford, had only six “sub” centralizers available (which screwed
in place), with the only other alternative being “slip-on” centralizers (placed over the
casing) which the BP team refused to use. BP had an aversion to using slip on
centralizers, fearing other equipment might get caught on them.
Using sophisticated software designed to model the likely outcome of the
cement job, Halliburton engineer Jesse Gagliano calculated that more than six
centralizers would be needed to prevent against channeling. By his estimations, 21
centralizers would need to be in place (U.S. National Commission 2011:96-7).
According to the National Commission (2011:97):
Gagliano told BP engineers Mark Hafle and Brett Cocales about the
problem on the afternoon of April 15. With de facto leader John Guide
out of the office, Gregory Walz, the BP Drilling Engineering Team
Leader, obtained permission from senior manager David Sims to order
15 additional slip-on centralizers—the most BP could transport
immediately in a helicopter. That evening, Gagliano reran his
simulations and found that channeling due to gas flow would be less
severe with 21 centralizers in place. Late that night, Walz sent an e-mail
to Guide explaining that he and Sims felt that BP needed to “honor the

104
[OptiCem] modeling to be consistent with our previous decisions to go
with the long string.”
When senior BP official John Guide returned the next day, he resisted the
change and argued that they were not custom made as specified. However, it seems as
though Guide’s decision to go with fewer centralizers seems to be motivated more by
economic factors since the last minute addition of 45 pieces of equipment would add
ten more hours to the job (U.S. National Commission 2011:97). Even once the final
decision was made, BP did not communicate this change in design to Halliburton. The
National Commission (2011:116) notes:
BP did not inform Halliburton of the number of centralizers it
eventually used, let alone request new modeling to predict the impact
of using only six centralizers. Halliburton happened to find out that BP
had run only six centralizers when one of its cement engineers
overheard a discussion on the rig.
In the end, BP installed only six centralizer subs in the long string casing, which was
installed in its final position on April 19, 2012. Using fewer centralizers is yet another
decision made by BP to save time and money that contributed to the destabilization of
the well.
Cementing the Well
BP made a number of critical decisions that placed constraints on Halliburton’s
cementing design. One compromise made by BP was the decision to limit the amount
of drilling mud circulated before cementing. Extensive circulation helps ensure against
channeling, whereby oil and gas can escape up through bubbles that form channels up
through the well and destabilize the cement job. Ideally, enough drilling mud is used to
circulate the mud “bottoms up,” meaning the well continues to be filled with drilling
mud until it reaches the bottom and the returns back up to the top. However, pumping
more mud requires more time, and the BP team feared another lost returns event
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caused by applying too much pressure. “Accordingly, BP circulated approximately 350
barrels of mud before cementing, rather than the 2,760 barrels needed to do a full
bottoms up circulation” (U.S. National Commission 2011:100).
Also in an effort to reduce the amount of pressure placed on the well to avoid
a lost returns event, BP instructed Halliburton to use less cement and to pump it a
lower rate. Yet pumping greater amounts of cement at higher rates is standard
industry practice to protect against uncertain cementing conditions. “As designed, BP
would have Halliburton pump a total of approximately 60 barrels of cement down the
well- a volume that its own engineers recognized would provide little margin for
error” (U.S. National Commission 2011:100). Finally, in consultation with
Halliburton, BP opted to use lighter cement formula which injects nitrogen bubbles
into the cement slurry just before pumping it into the well (2011:100). Adding
nitrogen to the mix was intended to make the cement lighter and more elastic.
Failed cement tests ignored
The type of cement that is used and its composition is not regulated by the
MMS, but operators are urged to consult the standards put forth by the American
Petroleum Institute. Ultimately, the oil and gas companies make the final decision on
cement. Before it can be used, cement slurry must be tested since its composition and
stability can change depending on rig conditions and how it is stored. Halliburton
performed initial analysis on the cement slurry it planned to use on the Macondo well
on February 10, 2010. The test results, which were provided to BP, revealed that the
foam slurry design was unstable, though it does not appear that this information was
ever acknowledged.
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Upon further testing, Halliburton continued to identify the cement slurry as
unstable, though it is not clear that this information was provided to BP. According to
the National Commission (2011:101):
Documents identified after the blowout reveal that Halliburton
personnel had also conducted another foam stability test earlier in
February. The earlier test had been conducted under slightly different
conditions than the later one and had failed more severely. It appears
that Halliburton never reported the results of the earlier February test
to BP.
In mid-April just before pumping began, Halliburton conducted yet another test
after BP had provided more accurate information about the well conditions. Just like
the two tests performed in February, this test also showed that the cement slurry
would be unstable, though it does not appear that this information was reported to BP.
According to Halliburton, this test was performed improperly by its lab personnel,
though it has not provided sufficient evidence to back this claim. Nonetheless, “This
should have prompted Halliburton to review the Macondo slurry design immediately,
especially given how little time remained before the cement was to be pumped” (U.S.
National Commission 2011:117). Halliburton performed a second test on April 18,
which was stopped short of the intended 48 hour duration and appeared to indicate
cement stability.
Although the second test at least arguably suggests the foam cement
design used at Macondo would be stable, it is unclear whether
Halliburton had results from that test in hand before it pumped the job.
Halliburton did not send the results of the final test to BP until April
26, six days after the blowout. (U.S. National Commission 2011:102)
This strongly suggests that at the time Halliburton approved the use of the cement
slurry that tests results had not yet been made available. The results of the tests and
thus the stability of the cement slurry were therefore questionable. Halliburton and the
Transocean crew finished pumping the primary cement job on April 20 at 12:40 a.m.
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and the amount of oil flowing back reduced to a trickle. By 5:45 a.m. that morning,
Halliburton, Transocean and BP were all quick to claim success for completing the
cement job (2011:102).
Negative pressure test
After cementing the well, the crew began to prepare for temporary
abandonment of Macondo. Prior to temporary abandonment, MMS requires that a
positive-pressure test which, among other things, evaluates the ability of the casing in
the well to hold in pressure. In addition to the positive pressure test, a negative
pressure test also was completed. The negative-pressure test checks both the integrity
of the casing and the integrity of the bottomhole cement job.
One of the major contributing factors to the blowout was an inability to
properly conduct and interpret the negative pressure tests. The negative pressure test
ensures that no oil or gas is flowing up through the cement. At the time, there were no
MMS regulations or written protocols for how to undertake negative pressure tests,
and BP was not required to do so. Moreover, neither BP nor Transocean had any
standard procedures for the tests and did not train their Well Site Leaders at Macondo,
or other personnel, how to perform them. As the National Commission (2011:119)
found, employees at BP and Transocean did not appreciate the importance of the
negative pressure test and the potential for a breech in well integrity. As a result, the
negative tests were premature and conducted hastily. Juhasz (2011:22) explains:
There were several problems with the test that they were performing. It
was the second negative test that day; both tests were premature,
adding to the already unstable well. The foamed cement used by
Halliburton required forty-eight hours to strongly solidify. Nonetheless,
the first negative test was performed just sixteen and a half hours later,
and the second test was just twenty-one hours later.
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Conducting the tests so close together further helped to destabilize the well, setting the
stage for the explosion.
At 5:00 p.m. the crew began the test by running the drill pipe down below sea
level and pumping a “spacer,” a liquid mixture that separates the heavy drilling mud
from the seawater. Seawater is then pumped to displace the mud from below the
mudline to above the blowout preventer. The manner in which BP chose to go about
its spacers for its negative pressure test was novel, the National Commission notes. In
an attempt to avoid having to properly dispose of hazardous waste onshore, BP
incorporated them into its spacers. As the National Commission (2011:106) found:
BP had directed M-I SWACO mud engineers on the rig to create a
spacer out of two different lost-circulation materials left over on the
rig—the heavy, viscous drilling fluids used to patch fractures in the
formation when the crew experiences lost returns. M-I SWACO had
previously mixed two different unused batches, or “pills,” of lostcirculation materials in case there were further lost returns. BP wanted
to use these materials as spacer in order to avoid having to dispose of
them onshore as hazardous waste pursuant to the Resource and
Conservation Recovery Act, exploiting an exception that allows
companies to dump water based “drilling fluids” overboard if they have
been circulated down through a well. At BP’s direction, M-I SWACO
combined the materials to create an unusually large volume of spacer
that had never previously been used by anyone on the rig or by BP as a
spacer, nor been thoroughly tested for that purpose.
Combining two spacers at once in an effort to save money created an abnormally large
volume of liquid which may have distorted the pressure test readings. It must be
stressed that a method such as this had never before been used or tested as a spacer,
and it is possible that it may have clogged the kill line (2011:119). Because of all these
anomalies, the Transocean crew should have been particularly on the look out for
abnormal pressure readings.
After displacing the mud, the well needed to be shut in and the pressure
brought down to zero under close observation. Try as they might, the crew was unable
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to bring the pressure to zero after shutting in the drill pipe, even after multiple
attempts. “Nevertheless, at 8 p.m., BP Well Site Leaders, in consultation with the
crew, made a key error and mistakenly concluded the second negative test procedure
had confirmed the well’s integrity. They declared the test a success and moved on to
the next step in temporary abandonment” (U.S. National Commission 2011:109).
Cement bond log test canceled
Even under normal conditions, a negative pressure test is very important in
cementing a well. So confident was BP in the cement job, that at 7:30 a.m. it canceled
evaluations by a team of technicians from the oil service contractor Schlumberger that
had been standing by for more than a day to perform the final and most reliable cement
evaluation tests on Halliburton’s primary cement job known as a cement bond log
(U.S. National Commission 2011:102). “By sending Schlumberger’s cement
evaluation team back to shore, BP chose to rely entirely on the negative-pressure test
to directly evaluate the integrity of the primary cement at Macondo” (2011:118). The
cement bond log is considered the “gold standard” in testing cement jobs and it is not
entirely clear why BP choose to cancel the test unexpectedly at the last minute.
According to Juhasz (2011), there are competing accounts to explain why
rather than complete the test the Schlumberger employees left the rig on an
unscheduled flight at 11 a.m. on April 20, 2010. One explanation purported by BP in
testimony and internal analysis is that its executives opted not to do the test and
therefore sent the employees home. Some argue that this was done in an effort to save
time and money, especially if the test were to have found problems. The test itself
would have cost BP at least $100,000 and discovering problems like an uneven cement
job could cost an additional $30 million (Juhasz 2011:20).
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Other accounts, however, suggest that Schlumberger had performed the test
which indicated that gas was leaking through the cement. After the technician
informed BP that the well needed to be killed, the BP manager in charge refused. The
Schlumberger employee then called his supervisor to be sent an unscheduled helicopter
to leave the rig as soon as possible (Juhasz 2011:19-20). As Juhasz (2011: 21)
concludes, “Had the Schlumberger crew stayed on the Deepwater Horizon to run the
test, they would surely have found that Halliburton’s cement job was faulty; the
findings of the negative tests performed later that day by the drill team, which showed
the well to be stable, were wrong…” These conflicting accounts are difficult to
reconcile since the National Commission neglected to interview any employees from
Schlumberger about the incident. Nonetheless, it is clear that by canceling the cement
bond log test and sending the Schlumberger crew back to land, BP saved both time
and money, if not the discovery of an unstable cement well.
The Explosions
After what was interpreted as a successful negative-pressure test, the crew
then began to monitor the well for “kicks” (unplanned influxes of gas or fluids) while
they prepared to set the surface cement plug. Everything was going smoothly and the
drilling pipe pressure was steadily decreasing as seawater displaced the heavy drilling
mud in the riser. Going unnoticed by the crew, at 9:01 p.m. drilling pressure began to
unexpectedly increase, possibly resulting from hydrocarbons plowing up past the
heavy drilling mud. It was not until around 9:30 p.m. that the crew noticed a
“differential pressure” between the drilling pipe and the kill line, and therefore shut off
the pumps to investigate. Although it appeared increasingly likely that the well was
experiencing a kick, the well was never shut in. When drilling mud began spewing
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back onto the rig floor between 9:40 and 9:43 p.m., only then did the crew realize that
a kick had occurred (U.S. National Commission 2011:111-3).
The crew responded with immediate action by rerouting the mud flowing back
up into the mud-gas separator rather than overboard into the sea. At 9:41 p.m. they
then closed one of the annular preventers on the blowout preventer in an attempt to
shut in the well. Despite their best efforts, flow back quickly overwhelmed the system
and set the stage for ignition and explosion, the first of which occurred at 9:49 p.m.
According to BP’s internal investigation, the computer had registered gas
flowing into the well much earlier while the crew was running the negative pressure
test. Yet no one on the rig was aware of this danger since the automatic gas alarms
had intentionally been inhibited. The system had been set to record information but not
to trigger alarms, running the risk of inconveniently waking the crew up in the early
hours of the morning due to false alerts. Furthermore, the inhibited automatic gas
alarm was not specific to the Deepwater Horizon but had been made standard on the
whole Transocean fleet. As a result, the automatic shutdowns which would have
contained the gas did not occur (Juhasz 2011:24). Normally, BP’s onshore operations
center might have been alerted to the changes in pressure as the oil and gas forced its
way out. Yet the outsourced onshore alert system only functioned between traditional
business hours and were not available to alert the crew of the immediate danger
(Bergin 2011:156).
Executives visiting Deepwater Horizon
The VIP executives touring the bridge were similarly unaware of the disaster
unfolding on the deck of the rig. On the day of the disaster, four executives from
Houston were onboard for a 24 hour “management visibility tour” (U.S. National
Commission 2011:5). Led by Transocean Offshore Installation Manager Jimmy
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Harrell, executives from BP and Transocean were on board to celebrate the
Deepwater Horizon being the first rig to go seven years without a “lost-time accident.”
The trip was not only celebratory as senior level officials (whose bonuses depended on
saving money and making deadlines) had come to the rig to put pressure on the crew
to complete the overdue well (Juhasz 2011:5-6).
BP’s vice president for drilling and completions for the entire Gulf of Mexico
Patrick O’Bryan, who had never before been on an offshore rig, along with managers
for performance from both BP and Transocean had spent the afternoon and evening on
a tour of the rig led by Captain Curt Kutcha. Around 9 p.m. the executives were
escorted to the bridge to show off the impressive technology on the Deepwater
Horizon. Described as “basically playing a video game,” they were allowed to use a
joystick computer station which imitates steering the entire rig (Juhasz 2011:6).
We can only imagine the thrill for the visiting executives who got to
‘steer’ the rig. They even tried to intensify the experience by simulating
increasingly rough conditions. “We loaded into the simulator about 70knot winds and 30-foot seas and two thrusters down and then you
switch into the manual mode and see if the individuals can maintain the
rig on locations,” explained visiting Transocean executive Daun
Winslow, the operations manager-performance for the North American
division. For the BP president O’Bryan, the ‘newbie’ on the rig, “we
loaded up with the most environment,” Winslow said. (Juhasz 2011:8)
Just as O’Bryan took his turn on the simulator things suddenly got all too real. The rig
began to violently shake, followed by a hissing sound and the first explosion. The first
explosion occurred at 9:49 p.m., taking out the power on the rig and disabling the
communication systems. It was then quickly followed by a second explosion ten
seconds later.
With the visiting executives adding to the commotion on the bridge, the bridge
crew was slow to take immediate action following the explosions. At 9:47 p.m.
Andrea Fleytas (one of only three women on the entire crew) manually activated the
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rig’s general alarm and then activated the distress button alerting the Coast Guard at
9:53 p.m. Although Fleytas’ distress call was the only call for help from the Deepwater
Horizon, she was immediately reprimanded by Captain Kutcha for acting without his
authority. In the confusion the crew had also neglected to activate the Emergency
Disconnect System (EDS). Once activated, the EDS is designed to trigger the blind
shear ram, freeing the rig from the riser. After receiving proper permission from
Transocean OIM Jimmy Harrell, records indicate that the crew activated the EDS at
9:56 p.m., but nothing happened (Juhasz 2011:31-2; U.S. National Commission
2011:13-4).
Failure of the Blowout Preventer
The blowout preventer (BOP) is the last line of defense against an uncontrolled
well event and managers at BP and Transocean put all their trust into this technology.
Concerned about the final plans for cementing Macondo, Jimmy Harrell, the top
Transocean executive on the rig, affirmed the crew’s faith in the blind shear ram when
he stated, “Well, I guess that's what we have those pinchers for” (Hammer 2010).
The BOP on the Deepwater Horizon was manufactured and designed by
Cameron International, but was owned, operated and maintained by Transocean.
Standing over five stories high, the BOP is an emergency safety device that is bolted to
the seabed floor. In the event of a blowout, or an uncontrolled discharge from the
well, the Deepwater Horizon’s BOP was designed to seal in a number of ways. As the
National Commission (2011:93) explains:
The top two were large, donut-shaped rubber elements called “annular
preventers” that encircled drill pipe or casing inside the BOP. When
squeezed shut, they sealed off the annular space around the drill pipe.
The BOP also contained five sets of metal rams. The “blind shear ram”
was designed to cut through drill pipe inside the BOP to seal off the
well in emergency situations. It could be activated manually by drillers
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on the rig, by an ROV, or by an automated emergency “deadman
system.” A casing shear ram was designed to cut through casing; and
three sets of pipe rams were in place to close off the space around the
drill pipe.
Moreover, the BOP is capable of maintaining enough hydraulic pressure to fully close
all valves one time even in the event of power loss to the rig.
As a very last means of defense, the emergency backup deadman system is a
battery powered automatic mode function device that is supposed to activate the blind
shear rams to close the well. Yet on the Deepwater Horizon the deadman switch failed
to initiate the BOP. As cited in Juhasz (2011:34):
According to BP’s internal investigation, ‘insufficient charge was
discovered on the 27-volt AMF battery bank in the blue pod, and a
failed solenoid valve 103 was discovered in the yellow pod.’ In other
words, the batteries had been allowed to run down.
The failures of the BOP had all come down to a failed valve and a low battery.
Although some BOPs can be remotely accessed through an acoustic switch, federal
regulations do not mandate them and the Deepwater Horizon did not have a remote
trigger. Since 2000, the MMS had considered requiring operators to install the costly
acoustic triggers but had decided against it following industry pressure (Gold,
Casselman and Chazan 2010). BP continued attempts to activate the BOP through
remotely operated vehicles into the night and for days after the explosion, but to no
avail.
The Department of Interior hired the Norwegian company Det Norske Veritas
to conduct a forensic investigation of the Deepwater Horizon’s failed BOP. The report
found that the extremely high pressure of oil and gas shooting up through a 5.5 inch
drill pipe caused it to bend and knocking it off center from the middle of the BOP.
Because the pipe was not centered, the BOP was unable to use its blind shear rams to
seal the pipe. The report attributed the failure to a flaw in the design of the BOP, not
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to poor maintenance of the device, therefore placing the blame on the manufacturer.
Cameron International argued that the BOP was built to industry standards and was
not designed to withstand such extreme emergency conditions such as a pipe becoming
off center.
The failures of the BOP on the Deepwater Horizon should not have come as a
surprise. As recognized by industry and government studies, blind shear rams are quite
vulnerable and the failure of a single part can disable the whole system. Examining
15,000 wells drilled off North America and the North Sea between 1980 and 2006,
Det Norske Veritas identified 11 instances of well blowout in which the BOP was
activated. Only in six cases was the well brought under control; a failure rate of 45
percent (Barstow, Dodd, Glanz, Saul and Urbina 2010).
A recurrent reason for the failure often involved the blind shear rams which
slice the pipe. Commissioned by the MMS, two studies conducted in 2002 and 2004
by West Engineering Services found that even when the shear rams did work, they
often still were unable to cut the pipe. It was revealed that only three of 14 newly built
rigs had BOPs that could squeeze off and cut the pipe at the water pressure likely to
be experienced at the equipment’s maximum water depth. The report specifically
mentioned Cameron International for using calculations to determine shear ram
strength that were lower than required (West Engineering Services 2004). Despite
these findings, the MMS never revised its BOP regulations or required any action from
industry.
Privileging profit over safety, the oil industry has consistently fought against
mandatory testing of blowout preventers. In 2010, BP and other companies funded a
study that argued that pressure tests be conducted every 35 days, rather than more
frequent testing every 14 days as was mandated. The study found that such a change
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could save an estimated $193 million a year in lost productivity. At a costly $700 per
minute to stop operations and pull up the BOP for repairs, the decision to prolong,
delay and neglect maintenance operations saves companies millions of dollars
(Barstow et al. 2010).
Indeed, BP and Transocean had neglected to service the BOP on the
Deepwater Horizon even though the problems had been reported in the BP Daily
Operations Reports as early as March 10, 2010. Federal regulations require that
operations be suspended and the BOP raised for examination if problems are
identified. However, BP and Transocean officials had been alerted that the BOP was
not functioning properly due to a hydraulic leak in the yellow control pod and no
action was taken. BP’s team leader on the rig John Guide testified that he had been
told of the leak, but failed to report this information to the MMS. Moreover, chief
electronics technicians Mike Williams had reported that the annular on the BOP was
also damaged just weeks before the blowout (Juhasz 2011:33-4). Although crew
members had brought the problems with the BOP to the attention of their superiors,
management at BP and Transocean neglected to report this information to government
regulators or take any action to remedy the issues.
Evacuation and Initial Response
Once the Emergency Disconnect System failed to activate the blowout
preventer and sever the riser from the rig, there was nothing left for the crew to do but
abandon ship. As explosions on the rig continued, the evacuation was chaotic and the
traditionally rigid chain of command on the Deepwater Horizon fell apart. Not even
Captain Kuchta maintained control of the evacuation, as he had abandoned ship before
the crew was off the rig. The crew struggled to properly launch the lifeboats and ten
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people opted to take the dangerous leap 100 feet from the rig into the dark, cold ocean
below.
Waiting nearby to collect mud from the Deepwater Horizon to use on another
BP well, the Damon B. Bankston rescued the 115 surviving crew members from the
waters (Juhasz 2011:35). The first Coast Guard responders arrived by helicopter on
the scene at 11:22 p.m. to begin evacuating the sixteen injured crew members. By
11:30, managers took a final count of the crew members on board the Bankston only
to discover that eleven men were unaccounted for: Jason Anderson, Dale Burkeen,
Donald Clark, Stephen Curtis, Roy Kemp, Gordon Jones, Karl Dale Kleppinger, Blair
Manuel, Dewey Revette, Shane Roshto and Adam Weise (U.S. National Commission
2011:17).
Haphazard Firefighting Efforts
With the rig still attached to the uncontrollable well, it was nearly impossible to
quell the fire on the Deepwater Horizon. But until firefighting efforts began, the rig
did not appear in danger of sinking. Just like the evacuation, firefighting efforts were
impromptu, and no one took control. While Coast Guard boats soon arrived on the
scene, their regulations prohibited them from leading firefighting efforts unless it is in
assistance of a regular firefighting agency. Instead, firefighting duties were the
responsibility of the rig owner and operators: BP and Transocean. Lacking planning
and preparation, the attempts to put out the rig were conducted by four to six private
Good Samaritan boats that were in the area. The ships began spraying an estimated
6,000 gallons of saltwater, which unintentionally contributed to the sinking of the rig
by flooding Deepwater Horizon’s buoyancy chambers with thousands of pounds of
water (Mehta and Solomon 2010). The Coast Guard’s investigation of the explosion,
fire, and sinking of the rig, found that the agency failed to follow its own firefighting
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policy. Moreover, the report identified the unsupervised application of tons of salt
water by private boats as a contributing factor to the collapse of the Deepwater
Horizon (U.S. Coast Guard 2010). The collapsed rig caused multiple kinks in the pipe
tethering the riser to the well that began leaking oil at an alarming rate.
Treatment of Survivors
Once they were rescued by the Bankston, the surviving crew members were
forced to wait for twelve hours on board as they watched the rig- which for many had
been their home for over eight years- burn, twist and then topple into the ocean.
Sitting there hour after hour watching the conflagration with all its
cascading smaller explosions was “one of the most painful things we
could have ever done,” said Randy Ezell. “To stay on location and
watch the rig burn. Those guys that were on there were our family. It
would be like seeing your children or your brothers or sisters perish in
that manner. And that- that put some mental scarring in a lot of
people’s heads that will never go away. I wish that we could, to the
bare minimum, have moved away from the location or something where
we didn’t just have to sit there and review that many hours. That was
extremely painful.” (U.S. National Commission 2011:18-9)
Finally, at 8:13 the next morning the Bankston was finally given permission to
return to shore with the surviving crew members. But before they could return, at the
direction of the Coast Guard a stop was made at the Matterhorn drilling rig at 2:09
p.m. to pick up supplies (tobacco, water and coveralls) in addition to government
investigators. Juhasz (2011:48) states:
Investigators from the Coast Guard and the Interior Department were
waiting there to board the Bankston, but the crew was forced to wait
an extra forty five minutes for the lawyers from Tidewater, the
corporate parent of Transocean, to arrive. With all the investigators and
lawyers finally on board, the Bankston took off for the remaining nineand-a-half hour ride home to Fourchon, Louisiana. En route, the
government investigators questioned some of the crew and had all fill
out written statements.
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As if interrogation was not enough, when the vessel finally arrived to shore at
1:27 a.m. on Earth Day, the traumatized crew members were welcomed by security
guards and portable toilet where mandatory drug tests were administered, per standard
Coast Guard procedure for all serious marine incidents resulting in damage more than
$100,000 or death. The search for the cause of the disaster was to begin with the
crew members (Urbina and Gillis 2010).
The crew members were then transported by private buses and escorted in the
back entrance of a hotel to finally be reunited with their families. But before they could
make contact, they were pressured to sign a statement by lawyers from Transocean
alleviating the company of responsibility (Shapiro 2010b).
The statement was a form letter. The crew members were to fill in the
date, their names and addresses, and there they were at the time the
evacuation was ordered. Two sentences at the end read “I was not a
witness to the incident requiring the evacuation and have no firsthand
or personal knowledge regarding the incident” and “I was not injured
as a result of the incident or evacuation.” The crew was asked- if they
agreed- to initial those statements. (Juhasz 2011:48)
Exhausted, traumatized and wanting to be reunited with their loved ones, the crew
members signed the statement. Currently, these signed statements are being used by
Transocean’s lawyers against crew members seeking emotional distress and other
claims in court (Shapiro 2010a).
Initial Images of Deepwater Horizon
First on the scene to begin documenting the official account of the explosion
was the Coast Guard. “Within days, everyone across the country saw the same images.
The photos were taken by the coast guard, provided to media outlets, and quickly
seared into our collective psyche” (Juhasz 2011:43). The isolated location of the rig
helped to contain the spread of images to the public, but within hours nearby rigs in
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the Gulf of Mexico had heard word, or could visually see the flames of the fire on the
horizon.
Quickly identified as a BP oil rig, the images went global. Even for
people accustomed to seeing things explode on television, it was a
shocking sight. Perhaps it was the isolation of the event: no cityscape,
no people we could see, and, in most cases, no sound. The comparisons
most commonly made were to outer space, including the explosion of
the space shuttle Challenger. (Juhasz 2011:43)
The unfolding disaster came to be defined by the carefully controlled images
provided by the Coast Guard of the rig engulfed in flames. A lack of people,
background and sound, imbued the visual images with an additional layer of
significance. Moreover, the isolated location in which the incident took place greatly
shaped the subsequent response. The setting of the explosion and spill therefore
allowed for greater control over the crime scene, including the ability to limit access to
officials, the media and the public. Just as quickly as the evacuation had occurred, the
clampdown on communication began.
Communications Blackout on Rigs in the Gulf of Mexico
After the explosions, a communications blackout took effect in the early hours
of April 21 and lasted for over thirty hours. The ban prohibited both phone and
internet contact with others onshore and applied to all Transocean rigs in the Gulf of
Mexico. According to Juhasz (2011:47), particularly for those crew members on other
rigs in the Gulf that night:
The Internet ban was the worse of the two. Most rigs come equipped
with just two satellite telephones. This, and perhaps the relative youth
of the crew, explains why Facebook is their dominant mode of
communication with friends and family on shore. The blackout meant
no communication other than the wave of rumors coming across the
television…
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The Gulf-wide ban was partially lifted at 7 a.m. on April 22, when phones were
allowed to be used, though internet use continued to be prohibited.
Despite all of the tragedy experienced by the surviving crew members of the
Deepwater Horizon, they were forbidden to contact their families “…until there was
more definitive information” (U.S. National Commission 2011:17). It is uncertain
whether the ban on communication was issued by the Coast Guard or Transocean, but
in either case, it applied to all Transocean rigs in the Gulf of Mexico and was
supported by the Coast Guard. Transocean justified the ban by stating it was trying to
contain rumors while determining the missing crew members. However, others on
board thought that the blackout might be an attempt by the corporations involved to
control information and get their stories straight before it spread to the public (Juhasz
2011:46). In any event, Transocean was successful in limiting images and information
about the Deepwater Horizon from reaching shore.
Conclusions
Within the offshore oil drilling industry, both government and corporations
alike have recognized the potential for a serious deepwater blowout. Privileging profits
over safety, the offshore industry has fought against the federal regulation and
implementation of safety devices due to increased costs. Despite being the leading
cause of deepwater blowouts, there was no federal regulation to direct the cementing
process or test the integrity of the cement job. Thus, there were few barriers in place
to protect against an uncontrolled deepwater blowout.
On the Deepwater Horizon rig, the BP’s overarching goal was to quickly finish
the overdue well while saving money. In pursuit of this organizational goal, BP made
numerous critical decisions that weakened the stability of the well and helped to ensure
that a blowout would occur. First, BP elected to use less drilling mud before
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cementing when using more is standard industry practice to prevent against blowout.
Second, the company decided to use a long string casing design when alternative
would have been safer. Third, BP used six compared to the recommended twenty one
centralizers. Fourth, BP opted to use an untested hazardous mixture for spacers in the
cementing process to avoid the cost of disposal onshore. Finally, in order to save time,
money and avoid the discovery of a costly failed cement job, at the last minute BP
made the decision to cancel the cement bond long test, which is considered the “gold
standard” of well integrity tests. Rapidly reviewed and approved by regulators at the
MMS, each of these decisions increased the risk of a deepwater blowout, and pushed
the well closer to a blowout.
BP’s risky decisions placed constraints on both Transocean and Halliburton,
who did little to resist the changes despite the danger posed. Pressure from BP
management to finish the job rapidly provided the opportunity for illegal means to be
undertaken at Transocean and Halliburton as well. Halliburton ignored the results of
failed tests suggesting the slurry was unstable and failed to report this information to
BP. Moreover, BP, Transocean and Halliburton were all quick declare the cement job
a success and to ignore the questionable negative pressure test results indicating the
well was unstable. Furthermore, despite known problems with the blowout preventer,
management at neither BP nor Transocean undertook the costly effort of halting
operations and fixing the BOP, as required by federal law. The normalization of
deviant practices had therefore spanned beyond BP’s organizational culture and had
come to affect the interorganizational operations on board the Deepwater Horizon. In
the end, lax federal regulation and the normalization of deviance on the rig allowed
something as simple as a loss of hydraulic pressure and a low battery on the BOP to
seal the fate of the Deepwater Horizon.
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In the immediate aftermath of the explosions, government and corporate
officials sought to control the flow of information and images about the Deepwater
Horizon explosion at the expense and mistreatment of the surviving crew members.
Following their rescue by a nearby servicing boat, the survivors were forced to watch
the rig burn, and then topple into the Gulf with their missing comrades on board.
Although the Coast Guard is not legally responsible for leading firefighting efforts, an
investigation into the disaster identified haphazard firefighting efforts as a contributing
factor to the collapse of rig and the unleashing of Macondo. Before heading back to
shore to be reunited with their families, the survivors were interrogated by officials
from the MMS and the Coast Guard, and were pressured to sign waivers of liability by
lawyers from Transocean. As if the exhausted crew had not suffered enough,
immediately upon returning to shore they were welcomed by security guards
administering mandatory drug testing. Close handling of survivors of the explosion by
government and corporate officials helped contain the flow of unauthorized
information from spreading while a unified story of the disaster could be established.
In the wake of the explosion, Transocean issued a communications blackout
prohibiting telephone or internet use for rigs throughout the Gulf of Mexico. The ban
on communications provided an opportunity for Transocean, BP, the MMS and the
Coast Guard to carefully coordinate information and images of the Deepwater Horizon
before it reached the public, a trend that continued throughout the response to the
spill.
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SECTION III: STATE-CORPORATE RESPONSE TO THE SPILL
CHAPTER FIVE: OVERVIEW AND STRUCTURE OF THE STATECORPORATE RESPONSE
The response to the 2010 Gulf of Mexico oil spill is best characterized as a
state-facilitated corporate cover up. Hiding the extent of the environmental
devastation was a major task of the response efforts. The federal government worked
as co-combatants with BP in the fight to contain the Macondo well, hide the oil and
prevent public visibility of the spill’s effects. While BP and the government may have
been working together to contain the spill, BP was clearly calling the shots. The
predominance of privately contracted oil spill response organizations hired by BP
made them beholden to the company’s direction. As with most aspects of the
response, BP was funding operations therefore giving them de facto operational
control. The overrepresentation of vulnerable populations such as unemployed
persons, racial minorities and inmate labor in the most hazardous cleanup jobs
outsourced through a web of private contractors and subcontractors, further
contributed to BP’s ability to censor its operations.
The response to the Gulf of Mexico spill involved an unprecedented
mobilization of people and resources involving federal, state and local governments in
coordination a massive army of privately contracted oil spill response organizations
(OSROs) hired by BP. Regulated by the Oil Spill Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA) and the
National Contingency Plan, this complicated organizational structure of response is
mutually dependent on the success of government and private efforts alike as “cocombatants” in the fight against the spill. Federal responders struggled with the
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demands for information from officials, media and the public. In an effort to achieve a
“whole of government” united response message, lower levels within the federal
structure were prohibited from communicating with the media unless it had first been
reviewed and approved by the White House and the Department of Homeland
Security. Furthermore, to meet its obligations under the Oil Spill Pollution Act BP
relied heavily on contractors and subcontractors which worked alongside federal
responders. Such an extensive network of private forces with an array of technical
expertise made it difficult for federal responders to exert effective supervision and
control. Finally, during the 152 days which BP and the government attempted to
contain the well through numerous methods, federal oversight increased significantly
as BP’s failures persisted. While this may have given the impression of federal
authority, many felt that these efforts were too little, too late.
Federal Structure of Command
The Oil Spill Pollution Act (OPA) was signed into law in August 1990 by
George H.W. Bush, largely in response to public concern with the Exxon Valdez oil
spill. The OPA greatly expanded the federal government’s management over response
and prevention of spills off the coast of the United States by providing money and
resources. The OPA also included a section that amended the National Oil and
Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan, otherwise known as the National
Contingency Plan (NCP). The NCP is the federal government’s blueprint for
responding to and preparing for both oil spills and hazardous substance releases. The
OPA amended the NCP by including a section that specifically prepares for a Spill of
National Significance (SONS) including description, impact and the need for
coordination between federal, state, and local governments alongside the responsible
party.
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National Incident Management System (NIMS)/The Incident Command
System (ICS) is a core set of principles guiding a nation wide response to natural
disasters and emergencies and is the national standard by which all response
organizations plan for emergencies. NIMS/ICS is intended to command, control and
coordinate a response when the spill goes beyond the jurisdictional or functional
responsibility of more than one agency. The ICS coordinates the efforts of individual
agencies to work towards one common goal, regardless of the size of the incident.
The Unified Command (UC) is an expansion of the ICS which includes
agencies, organizations, and or private industries which have authority and jurisdiction
over aspects of the spill response. A Unified Area Command (UAC) is established
when incidents under an area command involve multiple jurisdictions. It also enacts the
Federal On Scene Coordinator (FOSC) which, among other things, is responsible for
directing and providing technical assistance to all response efforts at the site as well as
ensuring access to information (U.S. Coast Guard 2010:3)
Beginning with the 1968 National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution
Contingency Plan, otherwise known as the National Contingency Plan (NCP), the
federal role in oil spill response was codified. Since then, the NCP has grown in size
and scope to now encompass 15 federal agencies that make up the NRT including the
EPA, USCG, U.S. Department of State (DOS), U.S. Department of Defense (DOD),
U.S. Department of the Interior (DOI), U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), U.S.
Department of Transportation (DOT), U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), General
Services Administration (GSA), Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA–
DHS), U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), Department of Labor (DOL),
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), Nuclear Regulatory Commission
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(NRC), and Department of Commerce/National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA) (U.S. Coast Guard 2011:39).
Once a significant oil spill has occurred in the United States, a chain of federal
organizations are activated to respond to the incident. The National Response System
(NRS) is the mechanism for coordinating response actions by all levels of government
working in support of the Federal On Scene Coordinator (FOSC). Under the
jurisdiction of the Coast Guard, the FOSC is the primary federal responder that directs
and coordinates all response efforts. The NRS is comprised of a number of levels
beginning locally with the Area Committee, which involves representatives from
federal, state, and local governments that assist the FOSC in preparing for emergency
response through development of an Area Contingency Plan (ACP). The Regional
Response Team (RRT) includes federal and state agency representatives that assist the
FOSC in planning, preparedness, and coordination at a regional level. As the Coast
Guard’s (2011:140) review explains:
There are 13 Regional Response Teams (RRTs), 1 for each of 10
Federal regions plus 1 for Alaska, 1 for the Caribbean, and 1 for the
Pacific Basin. Each RRT maintains a Regional Contingency Plan (RCP)
and has State as well as Federal Government representation. EPA and
the Coast Guard co-chair the RRTs. Like the NRT, the standing RRTs
are planning, policy, and coordinating bodies and do not respond
directly to the scene. The RRT provides assistance as requested by the
On-Scene Coordinator during an incident.
Included under the authority of the RRT is the use of dispersants, which can be
preauthorized under the oil spill response plan. Assisting at all levels of the NRS are
scientific, technical, and other specialized support entities from various federal
agencies (U.S. Coast Guard 2011:139).
There was a great deal of confusion as to how to respond to the disaster on the
part of the states and local officials. Due to their frequent experience with hurricanes,
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the Gulf States are familiar with the emergency response as delineated by the National
Response Framework under the Stafford Act. In a bottom up fashion, the NRF gives
more authority to the local level through a state directed, though partially federally
funded, response to disasters. The NCP on the other hand, implements spill response
in a top down manner with the federal government managing state operations with
little involvement from the local level (U.S. Coast Guard 2011:71; U.S. National
Commission 2011:138).
Under the NCP, the National Response Team (NRT) role is to oversee the
RRTs and provide national level technical coordination and support to response
organizations. However, “The extensive involvement of the White House and top
Administration officials resulted in what many have termed the “political nullification”
of the NRT in the Deepwater Horizon incident, feeling that the NRT was essentially
bypassed as the central policymaking body for oil spill response” (U.S. Coast Guard
2011:86). In this regard, the administration officials overstepped their boundaries and
did not abide by the national structures of oil spill response. These actions
unnecessarily complicated the response and hindered efforts according to the Coast
Guard.
Spills of National Significance
The Deepwater Horizon incident was declared a Spill of National Significance
(SONS) on April 29, 2010, making it the first spill to be designated as such. As part
of the National Response System, a Spill of National Significance is:
A spill that, due to its severity, size, location, actual or potential impact
on the public health and welfare or on the environment, or the
necessary response effort, is so complex that it requires extraordinary
coordination of Federal, State, local, and responsible party resources to
contain and clean up the discharge. (U.S. Coast Guard 2011: 141)
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Once a SONS has been declared, a number of federal resources are initiated
including the National Incident Command and the National Incident Commander
(NIC). Although there is no formal policy or doctrine directing its functions, the
National Incident Command is an overarching federal organization designed to address
the demand for information from officials, media and the public. In an attempt to
create a cohesive message, the NIC organization provided operational control in
implementing the “whole of government” response by acting as a central clearing
house for vetted information. Although the NIC was initially slow to respond and
forced to catch up on information gaps, it was progressively able to invoke a “unity of
messaging” as the spill continued (U.S. Coast Guard 2011:82).
Once the NIC goes into effect, the Federal On Scene Coordinator in charge is
replaced by a National Incident Commander who becomes the public figure leading the
response. The function of the National Incident Commander (NIC) is to serve as the
link between the President, the Secretary of Interior, the Commandant of the Coast
Guard, and with all stakeholders in a catastrophic spill (U.S. Coast Guard 2010:1).
Delaying his retirement to fight the spill, Coast Guard Admiral Thad Allen was
appointed the NIC on May 1, 2010. Admiral Allen has had a long history with federal
emergency response in the Gulf region. For example, he oversaw the ocean rescue and
return of Elian Gonzalez in 1999. Moreover, in the aftermath of hurricanes Katrina
and Rita and the incompetence of FEMA director Michael Brown, Allen was
appointed by President Bush to lead the federal response. Furthermore, Allen also
served as NIC in the 2002 SONS Gulf of Mexico drill, making him a qualified
candidate if there ever was one. Initially, the role of the NIC was not clearly
communicated to the public, but after some time Admiral Allen came to be viewed as a
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credible spokesperson for the “whole of government” response (U.S. Coast Guard
2011:67).
While the federal government had been running drills for a SONS event since
1997, there had been no actual application of the drills to reality. The first SONS
exercise took place in Philadelphia in 1997. After that, SONS exercises have taken
place in Alaska in 1998, the Gulf of Mexico in 2002, California in 2004, the New
Madrid Seismic Zone in 2007, and Northern New England in March 2010. Following
each of these drills, after-action reports have been conducted to assess shortcomings in
preparedness and offer recommendations for improvement.
In the 2002 Gulf of Mexico drill, in which Admiral Thad Allen functioned as
the NIC, one problem that had been identified was the importance of properly
managing onsite visits by VIPs (such as elected officials, senior agency and industry
executives). Since multiple command centers are involved in cleanup operations, the
report stressed that it would be prudent to maintain a single source of responsibility in
handling VIP visits. Another trend observed from past SONS events was a lack of
participation by the Department of Homeland Security which resulted in a lack of
familiarity with the NCP (U.S. Coast Guard 2011:128-30). As the U.S. Coast Guard
(2011:126) states:
There is a lack of Cabinet-level interest and participation in Spill of
National Significance (SONS) exercises, which was demonstrated by
many Cabinet-level individuals that became intimately involved in the
incident demonstrating a lack of familiarity with marine oil spill
management during the Deepwater Horizon incident.
This shortcoming had serious ramifications throughout the Deepwater Horizon
response as officials from the White House and DHS circumvented the NRT and
exercised significant authority outside of their jurisdiction. Although this weakness had
been identified early on, the Coast Guard was unable to effectively integrate Cabinet
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level administrators into the drills to properly educate them on their role in spill
response. In spite of all the SONS drills and after action reports, “The Coast Guard
has not demonstrated consistency in the implementation of lessons learned from major
oil spill exercises or incidents” (U.S. Coast Guard 2011:130).
External Communications: “Feeding the Beast”
Lessons learned from these drills concerning the lack of involvement from the
White House and DHS would come back to haunt the response to Deepwater
Horizon. The Coast Guard and other responders were unprepared to deal with the
onslaught of demands for real time information from the public, media and other
government organizations. As the Coast Guard’s review of the Deepwater Horizon
response found, the number of career public affair specialists within the agency had
dwindled over the past decade, resulting in a lack of senior personnel with the requisite
crises communications training (U.S. Coast Guard 2011:66). Managing information
was a major obstacle to the response organization. As the Coast Guard’s (2011:96)
report states:
Many responders described the problem as the seemingly insatiable
demand for more and more granular information. The phrase “feeding
the beast” was used to describe the process by which officials tried to
meet that demand. Attempting to meet the continuing demand for
information competed with the response organization’s staffing
resources. When asked about info management, every person
interviewed during this review stated that “feeding the beast” affected
the entire response in a negative manner.
Political influence from the White House and the Department of Homeland
Security also complicated the response by instituting several layers of review and
approval in an effort to craft a unified message. This “whole of government” approach
“…hindered the Coast Guard’s ability to meet National Contingency Plan
requirements for keeping stakeholders informed about the status of the response”
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(U.S. Coast Guard 2011:65). External and public affairs functions became centralized
and were elevated to the highest levels of the response organization, the Unified Area
Command, which became the hub for information (2011:66). Lower levels of the
response organization were restricted from interacting with local and national media.
Coast Guard officials, including the most senior in command (the Federal On Scene
Coordinator), were prohibited from making statements to the media that were not first
reviewed by the White House and DHS. The chain of approval for public statements as
described the Coast Guard’s (2011:67) review:
Information regarding the incident was channeled up to the UAC where
it was packaged and released after review and approval from DHS
[Office of Public Affairs]. Coast Guard FOSCs who operated at the
UAC were not authorized to conduct media interviews, hold press
conferences, or send press releases without prior approval from DHS.
The additional handling and approval process for releases of
information often prevented the response organization from providing
real-time information. Because the Coast Guard was severely restricted
in its ability to distribute timely, accurate information, it was perceived
by some that the Federal Government was purposely withholding
information pertaining to the incident from the American public.
The complex structure of federal review contributed to a sluggish release of
information to the public. Moreover, such dominance in external communications from
the administration departed from the traditional National Response Team’s Joint
Incident Command model by excluding BP from media opportunities. Following
failed attempts to plug the well and increased federal oversight in the response,
government officials symbolically halted their practice of holding joint press
conferences with BP (U.S. National Commission 2011:151). Viewing the responsible
party as a co-combatant, the Coast Guard felt that the exclusion of BP from media
events obfuscated the appearance of a “joint” or “unified” response (U.S. Coast Guard
2011:67).
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Government Science Advisors
On May 10, 2010, President Obama appointed Department of Energy
Secretary Dr. Steven Chu to gather a team of government officials and scientists to
assist BP in containing the well. These “government science advisors” were well
respected in their fields, but had limited experience with deepwater petroleum
engineering. Over time, the science advisors evolved from helping BP diagnose the
situation, to “substantively overseeing BP’s decisions on containment” by June.
However, in large part government scientists were dependent on BP for data and
expertise. As the National Commission (2011:149) states:
Perhaps because the lines of authority were unclear, BP’s sharing of
data with the government science teams was uneven at first. BP gave
information when asked, but not proactively, so government officials
had to know what data they needed and ask for it specifically. Finally,
both the national laboratories team and the science advisors had to
educate themselves on the situation, and on deepwater petroleum
engineering, before they knew enough to challenge BP and participate
in high-level decisionmaking.
Despite their best efforts, delayed federal involvement and a lack of access to
information hindered the ability of government advisors to take on an effective
supervisory role.
BP’s Role in Unified Command
The Oil Pollution Act 1990 makes clear that in the event of a spill, the private
company (the “responsible party”) is responsible for plugging the well, cleaning up the
oil and compensating the victims. The Coast Guard had the option to “federalize” the
spill under the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund (part of the OPA 1990), thereby leading
and funding all aspects of the cleanup process and seeking reimbursement for the
expenses later from the responsible party. Instead, the Coast Guard chose to work in
coordination with BP, viewing them as a “co-combatant” in fighting the spill (U.S.
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National Commission 2011:134-5). As the National Commission (2011:133-4)
describes:
Consistent with the Unified Command framework, BP played a major
role from the outset. Most Coast Guard responders had a BP
counterpart. For instance, Doug Suttles, BP’s Chief Operating Officer
of Exploration and Production, was the counterpart to the Federal OnScene Coordinator. BP employees were scattered through the
command structure, in roles ranging from waste management to
environmental assessment. Sometimes, a BP employee supervised
Coast Guard or other federal responders.
At the time of the disaster, the Minerals Management Service (MMS) was the
only federal agency responsible for understanding and regulating deepwater wells and
related technology. Throughout the efforts to contain the blowout, MMS employees
struggled to oversee BP’s operations due largely to a disparity in resources, technical
knowledge and expertise. Due to this, the MMS was effectively unable to oversee and
regulate BP’s containment efforts. Nonetheless, both the Coast Guard and MMS were
required to work side-by-side with the responsible party to stop the spill. According to
the National Commission (2011:136):
Though the Coast Guard and MMS believed they had to work closely
with BP, others in government did not share this view of the
relationship with the responsible party. At an April 29 press conference
with several senior administration officials, Coast Guard Rear Admiral
Sally Brice O’Hara referred to BP as “our partner,” prompting
Secretary Napolitano to emphasize, “They are not our partner.”
Secretary Salazar later said on CNN that the government would keep
its “boot on the neck” of BP.”
Regardless of such rhetoric, BP worked quite closely with federal responders, at times
uncomfortably close. Furthermore, BP’s employment of a wide array of privately
contracted oil spill response organizations raises the question of who was really
directing response efforts.
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Private Contractors: Oil Spill Response Organizations (OSRO)
There exists an entire industry which caters to the needs of both responsible
parties and government responders during oil spills. Nearly all of the response efforts
in the Gulf were outsourced to private contactors hired by BP. According to Johnson
(2010b), BP employed a massive “private contractor army” of oil spill response
organizations:
The true story of the BP disaster is how private contractors, not the
government, are handling the response. Of the tens of thousands of
people responding to the greatest environmental catastrophe in the
history of the nation, vast majority are under contract to the foreign oil
giant BP. This private army includes workers shipped in from California
making $10 an hour to clean the beaches, ex-military public relations
experts, and submarine robotics companies. There are no contractors
working directly for the government.
In oil spill clean up, the Coast Guard is granted supervisory powers over oil
spill response, though it is not responsible for providing the majority of the equipment.
As the National Commission (2011:132) states:
Although the National Contingency Plan requires the Coast Guard to
supervise an oil-spill response in coastal waters, it does not envision
that the Coast Guard will provide all, or even most, of the response
equipment. That role is filled by private oil-spill removal organizations,
which contract with the oil companies that are required to demonstrate
response capacity. BP’s main oil-spill removal organization in the Gulf
is the Marine Spill Response Corporation, a nonprofit created by
industry after the Exxon Valdez disaster to respond to oil spill.
The Marine Spill Response Corporation and its network of subcontracted response
organizations went into action following the explosion of Deepwater Horizon on April
21, 2010.
Working conditions of private contractors
The overwhelming majority of the labor involved in the cleanup efforts was
privately contracted and overseen by BP. According to the U.S. Occupational Health

136
and Safety Administration (2011:2) who monitored the working conditions of spill
responders:
During the peak of the operations, more than 47,000 men and women
were involved in responding to and cleaning up the oil spill each day.
This included more than 42,000 response and cleanup workers
employed by BP and its contractors, 1,600 members of the National
Guard, and more than 2,400 federal employees. The area of operations
spanned the coastline from Louisiana to Florida, as well as offshore
operations from the shoreline to the site of the release; 6,400 vessels
were involved in the operations.
It became apparent early on that the network of private OSROs was insufficiently
staffed to deal with a spill of such magnitude. This lack of personnel created a “HR
challenge” as OSROs rapidly conducted background checks, physicals and drug tests,
before hiring and training responders within a little over a week. “Once hired, the
individuals were ‘badged’ as a BP contractor…” (U.S. Coast Guard 2011:103).
Long hours, scorching heat and hazardous working conditions contributed to
significant workforce turnover, especially within the ranks of the beach cleaning
personnel. Per OSHA regulations, beach workers began their day at 6 a.m. and
cleaned for 20 minute intervals and then rested for 40 minutes to allow respite from
the sun. Described as a “Sisyphean task,” workers assigned to beach cleanup were
divided into two teams which continued this regimen for twelve hours per day, seven
days per week under the blazing sun. Advertised by the Louisiana Workforce
Commission as “green jobs,” hazardous oil spill removal cleanup paid $10 and
received hundreds of unemployed applicants. This labor force, however, was
inconsistent (Young 2010). As noted by the Coast Guard (2011:104), the treacherous
working conditions resulted in an unreliable labor force with rates of high turnover:
However, because so many of these individuals on this incident had no
previous experience in oil spill cleanup, a large number of them were
surprised by the difficult conditions they encountered, including long
hours and often extremely dangerous heat indices. As a result there was

137
significant turnover in the ranks of new hires, especially in the ranks of
beach cleaning personnel.
Parish presidents put a great deal of pressure on BP and Unified Command to
employ local fishermen left without work due to the spill, who they saw as more
capable due to their familiarity with the Gulf. Furthermore, Gulf residents were also
hesitant about the private contractors brought to the region to respond to the spill who
might be depriving deserving locals of opportunities. According to the National
Commission (2011:140):
As contractors and subcontractors set up camp in towns across the
Gulf to carry out response activities, residents viewed them with
suspicion. People in Lafourche Parish, for example, worried about the
out-of-state oil-spill-response contractors who took over their shores
bringing crime and taking away spill-related job opportunities.
Despite concerns such as these, BP continued to rely on out-of-state labor though
making select efforts to utilize certain local labor supplies.
Inmate Labor
In some instances, rather than paying local residents to clean the beaches, BP
employed tax-deductable prison labor. Not only is prison labor inexpensive, but
inmates are easier to silence compared to free citizens. Incentivized by the Work
Opportunity Credit which rewards the private sector for hiring certain risky “target
groups,” employers can earn a tax credit of $2,400 for each work release inmate, and
are also eligible to earn back 40% of the wages paid (Young 2010). With no control
over their work assignments, inmates were coerced into enduring one of the most
toxic jobs. As Young (2010) asserts:
Inmates can’t pick and choose their work assignments and they face
considerable repercussions for rejecting any job, including loss of
earned “good time.” The warden of the Terrebonne Parish Work
Release Center in Houma explains: “If they say no to a job, they get
that time that was taken off their sentence put right back on, and get
sent right back to the lockup they came out of.” This means that work
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release inmates who would rather protect their health than participate in
the non-stop toxic cleanup run the risk of staying in prison longer.
In the media and government sources alike, reports of prison labor in the
response are virtually non-existent, yet it was common knowledge to those involved in
cleanup efforts. As part of their sentence, some inmates were forced to endure
hazardous working conditions without pay while officials publicized the efficient use
of convict labor. Young (2010) documents:
A lieutenant in the Plaquemines Parish Sheriff's Office told me that
three crews of inmates were sandbagging in Buras, Louisiana in case oil
hit there. “They’re not getting paid, it’s part of their sentence,” she
said. “They’ll work as long as they’re needed. It’s a hard job because of
the heat, but they're not refusing to work.” In early May, Governor
Bobby Jindal's office sent out a press release heralding the training of
eighty inmates from Elayn Hunt Correctional Center in “cleaning of oilimpacted wildlife recovered from coastal areas.”
While the efficient use of convict labor appeared to officials as positive public
relations, some Gulf residents were incensed by the reliance on prison labor. Even
though many were reticent to voluntarily apply for beach cleanup jobs, locals were
nonetheless angered by the visible use of prison labor over more deserving
unemployed residents. Even so, the needs and desires of local residents were
superseded by the desires of BP’s private contractors.
According to Perkins, the Louisiana Secretary of Corrections, James
LeBlanc, met with disaster contractors in early June and asked them to
stop using inmate labor until all unemployed residents found work. But
as the spill has so dramatically demonstrated, in this new environment,
the government seems only able to make polite requests. BP calls the
shots, and its private contractors, like ES&H, are the sole clean-up
operators. From there, subcontractors, such as Able Body Labor,
decide whom to employ. (Young 2010)
In spite of anger from Gulf residents about the loss of job opportunities, prison
inmates continued to play a large role in the beach cleaning efforts. The power of BP
and its contract army prevailed over the concerns of the victimized local population.
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Racial Disparities
Beyond inmates though inclusive of them, African Americans were
overrepresented in the most dangerous jobs during response operations. So
conspicuous was the racialized nature of the cleanup that the president of the National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) Benjamin Todd
Jealous sent a letter to BP’s CEO Tony Hayward documenting the injustices and
asking BP to address them. During his trip to the Gulf, Jealous (2010) observed that,
“Workers of color tend to be assigned the most physically difficult, lowest paying jobs,
with the most significant exposure to toxins, while white workers tend to be in
supervisory, less strenuous positions.” Furthermore, he noted that contractors of color
were not being given equal consideration for job opportunities. Those residents who
were participating in response operations were not being provided proper protective
clothing or masks, often resulting in reports of irritated eyes, nausea, breathing
problems and headaches. Additionally, workers were also required to sign
nondisclosure forms which forbid them to discuss the hazards of their working
conditions. As Jealous noted (2010), “People who are compelled to apply for cleanup
work in order to feed their families- due to inadequacies of the claim process- are
forced to sign documents that prohibit discussion of working conditions and forfeit
legal redress for lost livelihoods.” In closing, Jealous ends his letter to Hayward
requesting that BP take action to deal with the racial disparities. It does not appear
that corrective actions were taken to remedy these problems.
Even amidst the frenzy to screen, hire and train responders, federal officials
took special effort to ensure that BP and its subcontractors were not hiring
undocumented immigrants. Desperate for jobs and fearful of competition, Gulf
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residents were quick to react to even the appearance of undocumented cleanup
workers. In the midst of such a crisis, pro- immigration advocates questioned the
wisdom of halting cleanup operations to check the legal status of workers. According
to Correal (2010), on two different occasions in May “Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) in Louisiana confirmed that its agents had visited two large
command centers—which are staging areas for the response efforts and are sealed off
to the public—to verify that the workers there were legal residents.” Despite close
monitoring of response efforts by the Border Patrol and ICE, no arrests were made
during the raids. Nonetheless, undocumented workers were still used in cleanup
operations, providing yet another population of controllable labor (Correal 2010).
Waste disposal and environmental justice
A less visible dimension of the cleanup was the disposal of the waste that had
been removed from beaches and skimmed from the water. After collection, the waste
was then bagged by BP’s contractors before being transferred to area landfills which
were disproportionally located in minority and low income communities. As of August
1, 2010, BP’s Oil Spill Waste Summary asserted that nearly 40,000 tons of oiled waste
had been put into landfills in Alabama, Florida, Louisiana and Mississippi (Bullard and
Huang 2010). When possible, oil was recycled and reprocessed, for example with
contaminated water, but in many cases oil soaked clothing, boom and other debris is
impossible to clean and must be discarded.
A 1988 EPA exemption to the federal Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act (RCRA) allows waste from oil and natural gas exploration and production to be
deposited into municipal landfills without being labeled as “hazardous.” However, the
EPA later acknowledged that despite the exemption, oil spill waste nevertheless posed
harm to human health and the environment if not managed properly (Schor 2010a).
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Stressing the need to retract exemptions for the oil and gas industry as a means of
strengthening local control over waste management, Schor (2010a) cites New Mexico
environment secretary Ron Curry:
“I’m not saying that if these exemptions were gone, the spill in the Gulf
would have not occurred,” Curry said. “But what it signifies is ... at the
state and federal level, how strong the oil industry’s input is.” If state
officials want to take a firmer hand in protecting local groundwater
from toxic trash, Curry added, “these laws stand in your way.”
Even though cleanup workers wore protective clothing to handle the waste, it was
never officially designated as “hazardous” therefore allowing it to escape more
stringent handling standards.
The National Commission (2011:170) points out that the federal government
does not normally supervise the disposal of non-hazardous waste, and the EPA
continues to maintain that waste from the BP spill is not hazardous. Yet on June 29,
2010 the EPA and Coast Guard issued a directive which mandated BP to submit a
number of reports (referred to as “Deliverables”) that addressed: regularly sampling
and testing the waste, tracking where the waste was being handled (in “staging areas”)
and where it was disposed, as well as developing a community outreach program that
made information available to the public about the waste disposal plan (Watson and
Armendariz 2010). Despite continued pressure from the Coast Guard, BP deferred the
release of data on waste management and was not forthcoming with officials or the
public about its operations. Although BP’s “Recovered Oil/Waste Management Plan
Houma Incident Command” was approved on June 13, 2010, it was not until August
19, 2010 that BP submitted the final “Deliverables” satisfying the Coast Guard and
EPA’s requirements.
Once BP and the EPA began implementing the directive, concerns of
environmental justice were raised as waste from the spill cleanup was disproportionally
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dumped into municipal landfills in minority and low income areas. Environmental
justice scholar Robert Bullard (2010) explains that:
…a significantly large share of the BP oil-spill waste, 24,071 tons out
of 39,448 tons (61 percent), is dumped in people of color
communities. This is not a small point since African Americans make
up just 22 percent of the coastal counties in Alabama, Florida,
Mississippi, and Louisiana, while people of color comprise about 26
percent of the population in coastal counties.
Furthermore, the largest amount of waste (14,228 tons) was sent to a landfill located
in a community where people of color make up three-fourths of the residents living
nearby. Minority communities throughout the Gulf region have historically endured a
disproportionate burden of environmental harms that gave rise to the environmental
justice movement. As Bullard (2010) concludes, “Allowing the BP, Gulf Coast states,
and the private disposal industry to select where the oil-spill waste is dumped only
adds to the legacy of environmental racism and unequal protection.”
For the duration of the response, this intricate web of federal, state, local and
private sector response organizations exerted unprecedented force against the
persistent spill on the shores and in the waters of the Gulf. At times, it was often
unclear exactly who, or what, was directing the flow of response operations. Through
its extensive employment of private sector contractors, BP at least maintained
financial, if not operational, control over the oil spill response apparatus. Officials
from the White House and DHS sought to create a unified message to the public by
prohibiting officials within the Coast Guard and other agencies from releasing
statements that had not first been reviewed and approved by the administration. In this
regard, the Obama administration seemed to be primarily concerned with promoting
positive public relations, both for itself and for BP. As the spill dragged on and public
anger mounted against BP, oversight increased significantly as the federal government
sought to maintain its legitimacy.
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Killing Macondo
Once the spill began, it did not take long to realize just how unprepared both
the federal government and the offshore industry were to contain an uncontrollable
deepwater blowout. Despite past warnings attesting otherwise, the offshore industry
as a whole seemed to be under the dangerous delusion that there was essentially no
risk of a deepwater blowout. Since the Exxon Valdez, the Oil Pollution Act of 1990
had failed to incentivize industry to make necessary improvements in spill response
technologies and did not provide funding for federal agencies to conduct research. As
the National Commission states (2011:132-3), “Though incremental improvements in
skimming and boom had been realized in the intervening 21 years, the technologies
used in the response to Deepwater Horizon and Exxon Valdez oil spills were largely
the same.” Similarly, compared to the June 1979 blowout of Mexico’s exploratory
Ixtoc well in the Bay of Campeche, the desperate methods to contain the Macondo
well were virtually identical. As the Coast Guard’s (2011:109-10) review argues:
There appeared to exist a long-standing belief by BP and the industry
that, through safety system redundancy and the multiple layers of
mitigation measures designed to reduce the operational risk during
exploratory well drilling operations, the ultimate risk of a deepwater
well blowout was essentially zero….The mentality associated with
mitigation layers and attendant risk reduction is well rooted and
widespread throughout the exploration and development community
within the United States, and has had the effect of creating a void in
any type of substantive research to advance response equipment
technology…
Moreover, with the exception of the containment dome, BP did not begin to construct
any of the deployed containment devices including the riser insertion tool, the top hats,
top caps or the capping stack until after the spill had already begun (U.S. Coast Guard
2011:109). The search for effective response technologies to an uncontrollable
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deepwater blowout did not become a priority until the explosion of the Deepwater
Horizon forced it.
Methods to Contain the Spill
As contractors for BP came to realize that they would be unable to activate the
blowout preventer to close the well after the third attempt, they began to search for
more innovative options. Early on, drilling a relief well was recognized as the primary
option to address the blowout, though it would take up to three months to complete.
Drilling for the primary relief well began on May 2, and after insistence from Secretary
Salazar, BP began drilling a back-up relief well on May 17 (U.S. National Commission
2011:132).
While efforts to collect the oil and contain the well ensued, other methods were
used to deal with the surface oil. These methods included placing boom (which is used
to corral and contain oil) and skimming with vessels to collect the oil, applying
chemical dispersants to oil slicks (and at the wellhead), as well as in-situ burning. Due
to its prominent visibility, boom came to be viewed as a measurement of the federal
response by local residents. As a result the placement of boom came to be driven by
political and economic pressures rather than by the need to protect environmentally
sensitive areas (U.S Coast Guard 2011:76: U.S. National Commission 2011:153).
Prior to Deepwater Horizon, in-situ burning (ISB) had never been used
operationally on such a wide scale, though it has been used in spill cleanup since 1967.
In-situ burning, which is the process of containing, igniting and controlling spilled oil,
was quite efficient and as a result played an expanded role in the response. According
to the U.S. Coast Guard (2011:48):
There were a total of 411 burns initiated during the Deepwater Horizon
incident, of which 376 were determined to have burned a significant
quantity of oil. The longest duration burn lasted for more than 11
hours, and there was some limited night burning. Sixteen ISB
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operations were conducted on June 18 alone, accounting for the
removal of approximately 2.5 million gallons of oil.
These efforts helped prevent oil from reaching the shoreline and environmentally
sensitive areas, but emitted immense amounts of hydrocarbons into the atmosphere in
the process. As a precaution, air quality and its effects on wildlife were monitored
during ISBs. Despite ISBs proclaimed success, there was nonetheless insufficient
burning equipment in the Gulf, leaving responders struggling to manufacture and
obtain scarce response resources (U.S. Coast Guard 2011:46-8).
Chemical dispersants were also used in unprecedented proportions in response
to the spill. In addition to surface application, for the first time dispersants were also
applied subsurface directly at the well head. In total, more than 1.8 million gallons
were used to break up the oil into small droplets which then sank to the bottom of the
Gulf. A lack of research on the effectiveness of dispersants in addition to their toxicity
led the pubic and officials alike to question their excessive use. These concerns
notwithstanding, dispersants played a key role in reducing the immediate visible impact
of the spill.
Containment dome
At the same time that BP scientists were contemplating the novel use of subsea
dispersants, they began considering the use of a containment dome, also known as a
“cofferdam,” to capture the oil. Following inspection by the MMS, the containment
dome was lowered on the evening of May 6, 2010. Although the likelihood of
collecting oil with the cofferdam was quite uncertain, in a presentation to the
Department of Interior BP presented the likelihood of success as “Medium/ High.”
Industry experts speculated that this method would fail due to hydrate formation that
would cause blockage, which in the end was the cofferdam’s downfall. Furthermore,
the ill fate of the cofferdam was also affected by inaccurate estimates of the flow rate.
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BP claims that during this time it believed the flow rate to be less than 13,000 to
14,000 barrels a day and therefore based collection capacity at a maximum of 15,000
barrels a day. Yet as it was later revealed, the well was actually gushing at a rate of
60,000 barrels a day (U.S. National Commission 2011:145-6).
After the failure of the containment dome, the next collection device BP
attempted was the Riser Insertion Tube Tool on May 16, 2010. The Riser Insertion
Tool was a tube four inches in diameter that fit into the end of the riser and
transported oil to the Discoverer Enterprise vessel above. Over the course of its nine
days of use, this first effective means of containment captured 22,000 barrels of oil
(U.S. National Commission 2011:146).
Top kill and junk shot
Though they had never been used in deepwater, the “top kill” and “junk shot”
methods to contain the well were standard industry techniques for dealing with a
blowout. The National Commission (2011:149) explains:
A top kill—also known as a momentum or dynamic kill—involves
pumping heavy drilling mud into the top of the well through the BOP’s
choke and kill lines, at rates and pressures high enough to force
escaping oil back down the well and into the reservoir. A junk shot
complements a top kill. It involves pumping material (including pieces
of tire rubber and golf balls) into the bottom of a BOP through the
choke and kill lines. That material ideally gets caught on obstructions
within the BOP and impedes the flow of oil and gas. By slowing or
stopping the flow, a successful junk shot makes it easier to execute a
top kill.
Fighting pollution with pollution, beginning May 26, 2010 for a period of three days
BP pumped over 100,000 barrels per day of heavy drilling mud and made numerous
shots of junk into the blowout preventer in a desperate attempt to plug the well. Like
the cofferdam, BP’s Hayward overinflated the potential for success while industry and
government officials were less hopeful. Even BP engineers had admitted that the top
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kill method was unlikely to work if the flow rate exceeded between 13,000 and 15,000
barrels a day (U.S. National Commission 2011:150). Thus, had an accurate flow rate
been available at the time, such efforts might not have been attempted. As the Coast
Guard’s (2011:37) review asserts:
The “official” flow rate throughout the Top Kill preparation and at the
beginning of the Top Kill operation was 5,000 BPD. Information
gained through the Coast Guard’s Preparedness Review process
indicated that engineers involved in the Top Kill attempt felt that the
effort would fail if the flow rate were above 13,000 BPD. One can only
speculate at this time whether or not the Top Kill attempt would have
been undertaken had more accurate flow rate information been
available to those working on the source control issue.
BP speculated that the most likely reason for the failure was the collapse of
rupture disks and feared that as a result, capping the well might no longer be an
option. Previously, BP had stated that if the top kill was unsuccessful, that the next
step might be to cap the well by installing a second blowout preventer. Shutting in the
well in this manner involved significant risk of oil and gas flowing through the
ruptured disks and into the rock surrounding the well thereby causing an
“underground blowout” where hydrocarbons would rise through the layers of rock an
up through many points in the seabed floor. As a result, BP and the government opted
to table the strategy of capping the well until early July (U.S. National Commission
2011:158).
Following the failure of the top kill and junk shot methods, confidence in BP’s
ability to manage containment efforts waned and public anger surged. “The failure of
the top kill marked a turning point for the government science teams, with the
government significantly increasing its oversight of the containment effort” (U.S.
National Commission 2011:158). Marking the start of increased government
oversight, on May 28, 2010 President Obama made his second trip to the Gulf to meet
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with state and local officials. Around this time Obama made a number of key
announcements. First, on May 21 he established the National Presidential Commission
to investigate the spill. Second, he issued a “tripling” order of Coast Guard forces.
Third, on May 27 he also announced a temporary moratorium on deepwater drilling
which would remain in place until it was lifted seven weeks ahead of schedule on
October 12 (U.S. National Commission 2011:150-1). By the middle of June, the
federal oversight structure was more firmly in place (2011:161).
As part of the increased federal oversight, the government science advisors
also began reviewing BP’s strategy for well containment, questioning assumptions and
evaluating worst case scenarios (U.S. National Commission 2011:161). Enclosed with
a June 18, 2010 email from Dr. Chu to the advisory team, the Secretary formally
ordered the Federal On Scene Coordinator Admiral Wilson, to require BP to submit
any pending decision on containment to the government for review. Moreover, during
mid to late June the science advisors also began to increasingly seek the advice of
industry experts about source control which frustrated BP, but was generally helpful to
government personnel (2011:162).
Top hat and capping stack
Continuing to pursue collection efforts, BP’s next strategy beginning on June
1, 2010 was to sever the riser still attached to the blowout preventer to install a
collection device, known as a “top hat,” directly on top of it. Learning from the
cofferdam experience, this time BP took efforts to prevent the formation of hydrates
by injecting methanol. The top hat was in place by June 3, and by June 8 the device
was collecting 15,000 barrels of oil per day (U.S. National Commission 2011:159).
The next effort was installing a “capping stack” on top of the blowout
preventer in hopes of shutting in the well. A capping stack is a smaller version of a
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blowout preventer which is similarly designed to stop the flow of gas and oil. The
strategy was uncertain with the possible risk of an underground blowout. Installation
began on July 9, 2010 and the cap was in place by July 12. While the process of
temporarily closing the capping stack through a well integrity test was authorized by
Admiral Allen on July 12, the test was postponed following concerns from industry
representatives. According to the National Commission (2011:164):
BP faced significant criticism of the wisdom of attempting the test, with
Exxon and Shell raising concerns associated with shutting in the well
that had yet to be considered by BP or the government. In the most
extreme scenario, one industry expert suggested that an underground
blowout could cause the sands around the wellhead to liquefy and the
entire BOP to disappear into the sea floor.
Considering these risks, the government science advisors opted to postpone the test
for 24 hours while additional analysis could be conducted. Satisfied with their review,
the advisors reauthorized the test but with careful monitoring of well pressure
throughout its duration. Under close observation, on July 15, 2010 BP began to shut
the stack and for the first time in 87 days, no oil flowed from the well. Early pressure
data alarmed the government science advisors, leading almost everyone to favor
ending the test and reopening the well. Notwithstanding these concerns, the well
remained closed at BP’s insistence.
Using a procedure called “static kill,” on July 19, 2010 BP raised the possibility
of killing the well before completing the relief well. The static kill strategy is similar to
the top kill strategy as heavy drilling mud is pumped into the well to push back gas and
oil. However, the pumping rates necessary for the static kill to succeed were now far
lower since the well had been capped (therefore making the oil and gas “static”). Like
the others, this procedure was also incredibly risky. Stressing the radical uncertainty of
the situation:
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On July 28, BP received an unsolicited letter from Pat Campbell, a Vice
President at Superior Energy Services, which owned BP contractor
Wild Well Control, recommending in no uncertain terms that the static
kill not proceed. Campbell, who had worked with legendary wellcontrol expert Red Adair, reiterated a point already raised by others in
the industry: that the only pressure the well could withstand for certain
was the current shut-in pressure (approximately 6,920 pounds per
square inch at the time he wrote). (U.S. National Commission
2011:167)
Regardless of these hesitations, the government approved BP’s plan for the static kill
which began on August 3, 2010. The static kill succeeded and BP followed the mud
with cement. On August 8, Admiral Allen announced that the well had passed the
pressure test which continued to hold the despite concerns.
The first relief well intercepted the Macondo well in mid-September which
allowed BP to inject cement and permanently seal the reservoir on September 19,
2010. After a long, desperate battle the BP-government strategy was finally victorious
as Admiral Allen announced, “the Macondo 252 well is effectively dead” (U.S.
National Commission 2011:169). Once the well was sealed the number of responders
in the Gulf began to scale back and the National Incident Command officially stood
down on October 1, 2010 (2011:170).
Although Macondo was officially declared dead on September 19, 2010, recent
reports from August 2011 have even suggested that the Macondo well was not
successfully capped. Fifteen months after the well was capped, large oil sheens were
reported near the site. While BP officials and the Coast Guard deployed two
submersibles to investigate the site, they claimed that no oil had been released.
However, a sample of oil analyzed by Edward Overton, professor emeritus at
Louisiana State University’s environmental sciences department identified the oil as
nearly identical to that of the Macondo well (Jamail 2011). If reports of continued oil
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flowing from Macondo are accurate, they have not warranted much attention from
officials, the media, or the public.
Conclusions
The Deepwater Horizon explosion and the blowout of Macondo was the first
spill to ever be designated a Spill of National Significance. As predicted by multiple
training exercises, federal responders encountered numerous problems including
difficulty in coordination by DHS and other administration officials. Fearing another
federal debacle in the Gulf like the Bush administration’s response to Hurricane
Katrina, the Obama administration and DHS officials sought to impose top down
authority over spill operations, which created challenges for state and local officials
who were accustomed to leading disaster response initiatives. Furthermore, political
influence from the White House and the DHS also complicated the response by
instituting several layers of review and approval in an effort to craft a united “whole of
government” message. The expansive structure of Unified Command provided the
opportunity for the Obama administration to exert influence over response efforts, at
times beyond its jurisdiction.
As the responsible party under the OPA, BP played a key role as a “cocombatant” with the government in the fight against the spill. Although administration
officials struggled to give the impression that they were in charge, BP’s financial and
technical capabilities exceeded those of government regulators at the MMS. This
difference in expertise and funding created the opportunity for BP to assume
functional control over many aspects of response efforts. As BP’s attempts to plug the
well failed and the spill dragged on, the Obama administration was motivated by public
pressure to step up their oversight efforts and appoint “government science advisors”
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to review BP’s activities. Despite this, BP continued to remain a close partner in the
Unified Command throughout response efforts.
BP’s massive privately contracted army of oil spill response organizations
further gave the company even greater control over response operations. Under
federal law, the Coast Guard is responsible for overseeing cleanup operations, but it is
not required to provide the equipment or workforce necessary to deal with a spill.
Rather, privately contracted oil spill response organizations are extensively relied upon
by the offshore oil industry to provide cleanup services. In such a dangerous work
environment with long hours, scorching heat and hazardous materials, BP’s extensive
reliance on contractors and subcontractors to provide clean up workers made it
challenging to oversee worker health and safety. As a means of concealing cleanup
operations, workers were also required to sign documents that prohibited them from
speaking about their working environment. Under such hostile conditions, turnover
was high among cleanup workers. To solve this problem, BP and its contractors
utilized prison labor to clean the beaches. As an easily silenced population, use of
inmate labor to clean the beaches was an additional means of masking the extent of the
damage. Raising questions of environmental justice, the poor and racial minorities
were overrepresented in beach cleanup which is one of the most toxic jobs.
Furthermore, oil spill cleanup waste was disproportionately dumped into landfills
located in poor and minority communities, adding to the legacy of environmental
racism and injustice experienced by the Gulf region. Selecting poor and minority
communities to dispose of toxic waste from the cleanup is another means by which BP
was able to conceal its environmental crimes.
As Macondo gushed relentlessly, the consortium of private contractors and
subcontractors led by BP in conjunction with federal responders struggled to contain
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the well through an array of outdated, poorly planned methods: Cofferdam, top kill,
junk shot, top hat, capping stack and relief wells. Try as they might, even with the full
force of tens of thousands of federal and private responders, Macondo would not be
killed for nearly five months. Amidst the frantic attempts to control the well, one thing
was clear: both government and industry alike were utterly unprepared to deal with a
deepwater blowout.
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CHAPTER SIX: MANIPULATION OF SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE
At numerous points during the state-corporate response to the spill, both BP
and the federal government took steps to manipulate, obscure and dismiss scientific
evidence documenting the environmental effects of the oil from Macondo. Exerting a
disproportionate amount of influence over research on the damage caused by the spill,
BP took blatant steps to limit its liability by controlling scientific research through the
Gulf of Mexico Research Initiative. Working together to disseminate disinformation
about the environmental effects of chemical dispersants, the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration and BP conducted education outreach programs at Gulf
Coast public schools. All of these actions are part of a broader trend in public-private
educational partnerships between the oil industry and the academic community.
As the spill persisted, the Obama administration attempted to increase its
supervision by establishing a team of government science advisers to oversee BP’s
well control efforts. Throughout the response to the spill, government science advisors
in varying capacities downplayed, obscured and manipulated the findings of federal
and independent scientists alike. Moreover, in the quest to establish an account of the
amount of oil flowing from Macondo, the federal government consistently
underestimated the flow rate, despite more accurate and much higher calculations from
independent scientists.
To create an authoritative estimate of the spill, the Obama administration
established the Flow Rate Group (FRG) and the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute
team led by Secretary of Energy Steven Chu. The Flow Rate Group experienced great
pressure from the White House to downplay the size of their estimates. So severe was
stress from the administration that a NOAA senior scientist on the FRG
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misrepresented and distorted the group’s findings as a result, leading to public
discrediting of the team and their estimates. In the end the official flow rate of 4.9
million gallons of oil in total, was produced by the Woods Hole team led by Secretary
Chu, who has had close ties to BP through the Biosciences Institute at University of
California Berkley, the largest private-public university partnership. Finally, when the
Obama administration unveiled the official estimate in August 2010 before the well
had been declared dead, NOAA also released a report declaring that much of the oil in
the Gulf had “disappeared” as a result of response operations. Yet as academic
scientists were continuing to document, the oil had not disappeared but remained
below the surface in the form of large plumes. Although NOAA dismissed the findings
of scientists at first, as the peer reviewed evidence mounted the agency was forced to
begrudgingly admit that the oil was indeed lurking below the surface.
“Independent” Public-Private Research Partnerships
BP’s attempts to influence research findings through scientific misconduct in
the wake of the Deepwater Horizon incident should not come as a surprise. In fact, as
Washburn (2010) documents in Big Oil Goes to College: An Analysis of 10 Research
Collaboration Contracts Between Leading Energy Companies and Major U.S.
Universities, these efforts are part of a larger pattern of university-oil industry
relations. In the era of declining public and governmental sources of funding for
research, public universities increasingly rely on private funding to support their work.
The major findings of the report demonstrate that in these partnerships, in most cases
Big Oil disregarded the peer review process, assumed control of academic governing
bodies, managed research proposal selection and monopolized the results of academic
research. Thus, despite claims of neutrality and independence, funding from Big Oil
has jeopardized the integrity of the scientific process.
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Perhaps the best example of this trend is the Energy Bioscience Institute, the
largest university-industry partnership in history. Over much controversy, the Energy
Bioscience Institute was formed in 2007 when BP gave a ten year $500 million grant
to University of California Berkeley. The Institute, which develops alternative fuel
sources, funds nearly 70 projects and 350 researchers at UC Berkeley and its two
partner institutions, the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory and the University of
Illinois at Urbana Champaign. Moreover, BP was given significant oversight over
research projects. As Harkinson (2008) explains:
One last-minute change to the contract was particularly favorable to
BP. The institute's governing board, which approves broad policy, the
budget, and all research projects as a whole, was reconfigured from five
members, with BP given a minority vote, to eight members, with BP
given half the votes.
BP therefore retained significant authority over the content of research produced by
the Institute, thereby setting the tone and tenor of private-university partnerships to
come. Interestingly, Department of Energy Secretary, Dr. Steven Chu played a crucial
role in brokering the BP-UC Berkeley deal when he served as the director of the
Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory and founding member of the Energy
Bioscience Institute. Although the Department of Energy did not have jurisdiction
over the spill, Chu nonetheless played a principle role is determining the official
amount of oil flowing from the well. This close relationship led some to ask the
question, “Is Steven Chu too cozy with BP?” (Harkinson 2010b).
BP Funded Gulf of Mexico Research Initiative
After pressure from Congressman Edward Markey, on May 24, 2010 BP
pledged to establish the Gulf of Mexico Research Initiative, a ten year $500 million
“independent” research program. The managing board for the fund is comprised of
scientists from outside the Gulf region as well as scientists appointed by state

157
governors, whose salaries are all paid by BP (Schrope 2011). Although stressing the
importance of the peer review process and publishing the findings of funded research,
evidence suggests that BP at least discussed the possibility of manipulating the fund to
its benefit.
One email written by BP environmental officer based in Trinidad Karen
Ragoonanan-Jalim contains the minutes of a meeting in Houma, Louisiana, during
which officials discussed what kinds of studies might best serve the company’s
interests. She states:
Discussions around GRI and whether or not BP can influence this
Long-Term Research Program (US$500 million) to undertake the
studies we believe will be useful in terms of understanding the fate and
effects of the oil on the environment, eg can we steer the research in
support of Restoration Ecology? (Ragoonanan-Jalim 2010)
Acknowledging that it may not be feasible to definitively control the outcomes of
funded research, Ragoonanan-Jalim (2010) goes on to write, “It may be possible for us
to suggest the direction of the studies but without guarantee that they will be done.”
The email continues on to raise the question, “How do we determine what
biological/ecological studies we (BP) will need to do in order to satisfy specific
requirements (legislative/litigation, informing the response and remediation/restoration
strategies)” (Ragoonanan-Jalim 2010).
Another email from BP environmental expert Russell Putt to colleagues on
June 24, 2010 more explicitly asks “Can we ‘direct’ GRI [Gulf of Mexico Research
Initiative] funding to a specific study (as we now see the governor’s offices trying to
do)? What influence do we have over the vessels/equipment driving the studies vs the
questions?” (Putt 2010). Internal company discussions such as these reveal the
attempts of BP officials to manipulate the research funded by the Gulf of Mexico
Research Initiative.
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BP buying Gulf of Mexico university scientists
In July, 2010, BP was accused by the President of the American Association of
University Professors Cary Nelson, of trying to quiet scientists asserting that, “This is
really one huge corporation trying to buy faculty silence in a comprehensive way”
(Bresnahan 2010). BP acknowledged that it hired more than a dozen national and
local scientists “with expertise in the resources of the Gulf of Mexico,” offering a rate
of upwards of $250 an hour.
In one instance, the head of marine sciences at the University of South
Alabama Bob Shipp was approached by BP lawyers to work with his entire
department in developing a restoration plan for the spill. Shipp asserts that, “We laid
the ground rules - that any research we did, we would have to take total control of the
data, transparency and the freedom to make those data available to other scientists and
subject to peer review. They left and we never heard back from them” (Bresnahan
2010)
BP desired to retain significant oversight and control over the work performed
by the academic scientists it hired, made explicit in the contract. Under the services to
be performed, the “Retention Agreement” states:
With regard to any other services relating to the Incident that are not
specified in this Paragraph 1 above, you agree not to perform any such
services without obtaining the prior written approval of BP.
You agree to take your instructions from only me, from other lawyers
in my firm, from Brian Israel or other lawyers in the Arnold & Porter
law firm, and from Donna Ward or other in-house counsel at BP
(collectively “BP Attorneys”).
This Retention Agreement governs the terms of your engagement, but
it does not authorize the performance of any particular tasks. Particular
tasks will be authorized in writing by BP Attorneys. BP will not
compensate you for any services that are not performed pursuant to a
written authorization to perform a particular task. (Milner 2010:1)
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The contract requires that the researcher “maintain the strict confidentiality of such
non-public communications and information” and also prohibited publication of
research findings until after three years;
…you may publish and provide to the public written research papers,
presentations and similar documents concerning data relating to the BP
NRDA Services after the earlier of the two following dates: (1) three
years after the date of your execution of this Retention Agreements or
(2) the date that the NRDA Restoration Plan, is complete and approved
as final for the NRDA Restoration Implementation Phase. (Milner
2010:3)
In the event of termination of the Retention Agreement, the researcher must;
…agree to cooperate with the BP Attorneys in terminating or
transferring any task on which you may be working and delver to BP
Attorneys the entirety of your files related to this matter. In addition,
you agree to maintain the confidentiality of communications and
information as provided in Paragraph 6 above. (Milner 2010: 2)
Contractual control such as this ensured that scientists who might accidentally produce
research negatively implicating BP would be not only deterred, but legally barred from
bringing this evidence to public light.
According to testimony from Garret Graves, the chair of the Coastal
Protection and Restoration Authority of Louisiana and a key official in Governor
Bobby Jindal’s administration, BP exerted a disproportionate influence in assessing the
environmental damage caused by the spill. Stressing the need to reverse the roles
between the federal government and the responsible parties, he asserted that “From the
beginning of this spill and continuing today, we have witnessed the Responsible Parties
exercise excessive control over the response, assessment and recovery efforts” (Graves
2011). Although commending BP’s willingness to spend freely on response efforts,
Graves (2011) argues that the current statutory and regulatory structure permits the
responsible parties to direct the conditions of response efforts since they control the
purse strings. What results, he states, is a modern day “Stockholm Syndrome” in
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which responders come to sympathize with the responsible parties, while remaining
financially captive by them.
As stipulated under the Oil Spill Pollution Act of 1990, documenting the
impact of the spill and the extent of injuries occurs through the National Resource
Damage Assessment (NRDA) which includes BP, Louisiana and other Gulf states as
well as the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and U.S. Fish
and Wildlife Service. Such an assessment requires hundreds of millions of dollars and
could take more than a decade to complete. Under the assessment for the Deepwater
Horizon spill, funding is provided by an informal agreement between BP and the other
Trustees. Graves (2011:5) argues, “In effect, BP has to sign off on our assessment
activities before we can begin in order for those studies to be funded by BP.” This can
result in two problems according to Graves (2011:5-6):
First, BP can delay in their review and approval of work plans thereby
threatening the timely collection of ephemeral data. Second, BP can
refuse to concur in assessments that are contrary to their legal interests
or make funding contingent upon the elimination of assessment
activities that they view as damaging to their case.
His suggestion to the National Commission investigating the oil spill is to create an
independent science auditor to ensure that the NRDA process results in restoration
that that truly corresponds to the losses in the Gulf. Unfortunately, this suggestion
came too little too late, as BP had already been paying scientists to conceal their
results while in the process of litigation.
BP-NOAA Dispelling Oil Spill Myths in Schools
As if manipulating and censoring the findings of academic scientists was not
enough, both BP and the federal government engaged in a propaganda campaign in the
Gulf to convince students that the spill was being handled in an environmentally safe
manner. In an effort to dispel “myths” about dispersants and the subsurface oil,
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representatives from BP and NOAA conducted outreach programs at local schools in
the Gulf. Using a ten-gallon fish tank filled with water, cooking oil, and dishwashing
detergent, BP and NOAA attempted to simulate the properties of oil and the beneficial
effects of chemical dispersants on spill cleanup. As documented in a report by
ProPublica:
[NOAA science support coordinator Gary Ott] had the children try to
use eyedroppers to suck up the oil, simulating the inefficiency of
skimmers. He had them use paper towels to simulate absorbent booms.
And then he applied dishwashing detergent to the floating oil to break it
down — simulating dispersants. Though he acknowledged the
dispersed oil doesn’t disappear and could hurt some fish species, Ott
told the children that the chemicals were broken down within weeks by
microbes, the Courier reported. He also assured the children that Gulf
seafood was safe to eat. (Wang 2010a)
Moreover, in one demonstration students were asked questions about the oil spill by a
BP representative, who rewarded correct answers with pens and hats bearing the BP
logo. As explained by a spokesperson from BP:
“The primary purpose [of the demonstration] is to inform and educate
students on the methods used to clean up the oil in the Gulf and the
wetlands and marshes,” Janella Newsome, BP media liaison said in a
press release. “It's also to dispel myths about dispersants, subsurface oil
and seafood safety.” According to BP representatives, it won't be the
last demonstration. “This is the first session of many going on,” Charles
Gaiennie, a BP representative said at Oaklawn's library last week. “We
are starting here in Terrebonne Parish with eighth grade because they
are the first of school age kids that have a defined science class. We
wanted to reach out to schools that are near communities that have
been directly impacted by the oil spill, so Terrebonne was a good
choice. There's a lot of information that's out there isn't current or
accurate.” (as quoted in the Tri-Parish Times, cited in Wang 2010a)
Public outreach programs such as these are one of the many actions taken by BP in
coordination with the federal government, to disregard, downplay and hide the scope
of the environmental damage caused by the spill.
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In an era of vanishing federal funds for research and education, private
corporations have stepped in to fill the void by investing in private-public university
partnerships. Part of a broader trend of oil industry funding for university research, in
2007 the BP-UC Berkeley $500 million Biosciences Institute was created, paving the
way for increased corporate control over alternative fuel research. Learning from this
experience, after the Deepwater Horizon disaster BP established the Gulf of Mexico
Research Initiative and pledged $500 million towards research on damage assessment
and restoration. Seeking to maintain ultimate control and authority over the research
produced, BP approached academic scientists at universities in the Gulf region to
conduct assessments of the damage. Yet by accepting this funding scientists were
contractually obligated to receive review and approval from BP before their
assessments could proceed and restrictions were placed on what research could be
published. In this sense BP attempted to manipulate the findings of researchers and
buy silence from the academic community about the devastating effects of the spill.
Furthermore, BP in coordination with scientists from NOAA visited public schools
thought the Gulf region to give demonstrations dispelling the “myths” of chemical
dispersants and downplaying their environmental harm. All of the efforts taken
together suggest that BP in cooperation with government agencies, specifically NOAA
and the Obama administration, engaged in deliberate efforts to manipulate, suppress
and distort the effects of the spill, including a reliable estimation of the amount of oil.
Underestimation of the Flow Rate
The state-corporate battle to control scientific evidence surrounding the spill is
epitomized by efforts to establish an accurate estimate of the amount of oil flowing
from the Macondo well. BP’s attempts to discourage accurate estimations of the flow
rate are motivated by the fact that their liability is directly affected by the amount of oil
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and gas discharged. Under the 1972 Clean Water Act, companies can be held liable
for every barrel of oil and gas spilled and a fine of $1,000 for an accidental spill and up
to $4,300 for a spill resulting from “willful negligence” can be imposed. Thus, BP had
a clear interest in suppressing attempts to produce accurate estimations of the flow
rate from the Macondo well. As Juhasz (2011:58) argues, “For the entire length of the
disaster, BP stifled the public’s ability to measure the size of the monster it had
released in what appears to be a crass attempt to limit the size of its ultimate final
payout.”
Yet it was not solely BP who sought to discourage accurate estimates, Obama
administration officials in the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
(NOAA) as well as the Coast Guard, sought to stifle and discourage accurate
estimations of the flow rate. Moreover, the federal government released decidedly low
initial estimates which were not altered for nearly a month, despite evidence from
academic scientists that suggested the size of the spill was far greater than reported.
After announcing the final official estimations of the amount and fate of the oil,
the Obama administration eagerly claimed that the oil in the Gulf had “disappeared.”
However, as non-governmental scientists documented, the oil persisted in the form of
subsea oil plumes. NOAA officials initially denied and discredited the findings of
university researchers, though as peer-review evidence mounted from the academic
community, NOAA and the Coast Guard were forced to acknowledge that “ephemeral
clouds” of oil were in fact lingering in the Gulf of Mexico.
Worst Case Discharge Scenario
The OPA 1990 requires that all operators of oil exploration, development and
production facilities in the Outer Continental Shelf must have oil spill response plans
(OSRP) reviewed and approved by the MMS. Known as a “Worst Case Discharge
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(WCD) scenario,” the plan contains an estimation of the maximum flow rate of a
hypothetical uncontrolled blowout lasting up to thirty days and attempts to outline
what response assets would need to be mobilized to clean up the spill. Most deep
water operators, including BP, maintain contracts with private oil spill response
organizations that independently or collectively must be able to respond to the WCD
laid out in the response plan. Furthermore, the OSRP must be in accordance with the
National Contingency Plan and the Area Contingency Plans for the geographic region
(U.S. Coast Guard 2011:27). While the Coast Guard is responsible for overseeing the
oil spill response, it does not have the authority to approve OSRP, though it can
review and comment on any OSRP they desire to. However, there is no evidence that
the Coast Guard reviewed or commented on any OSRP in the recent past, including
BP’s Macondo plan. Furthermore, Coast Guard employees who occupied prominent
positions in the UAC or Incident Command during the incident admitted that they
were unfamiliar with the OSRP process and had not reviewed BP’s response plan
(U.S. Coast Guard 2011: 27-8)
As permitted by MMS regulations, the OSRP for Macondo (Mississippi
Canyon Block 252) was actually the response plan for another exploratory well
(Mississippi Canyon Block 462), which was determined to pose the greatest potential
threat of all BP’s facilities (U.S. Coast Guard 2011:28). Although none of the
variables in the calculation nor the methodology for the flow rate was included, “The
daily flow rate for the hypothetical well release, considering an unobstructed open
hole, predicted reservoir parameters, and other factors, was 250,000 barrels of oil per
day” (U.S. Coast Guard 2011:28). In order to respond to a spill of this magnitude,
BP’s OSRP contended that with the assistance of contracted oil spill response
organizations it was capable of cleaning up 492,000 barrels of oil per day (bbls/day).
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In addition to an OSRP, BP was also required to submit an exploration plan
(EP) which included details on well casing, cementing and other technical details, that
was reviewed and approved by MMS. Included within the exploration plan is a second
WCD scenario. As the Coast Guard’s (2011:28) review states:
BP indicated that if the Macondo well experienced an uncontrolled
blowout, it would have an estimated rate of 162,000 barrels of oil per
day, less than the WCD scenario covered by the BP OSRP. As such,
BP was not required to supplement or revise any part of their OSRP in
relation to the response strategy. Like the WCD scenario in the BP
OSRP, no additional information was provided that could support or
establish the predicted outflow, and the EP was approved without any
additional information being required.
The WCD estimate of 162,000 bbls/day put forth in the exploration plan was the
number provided to the Coast Guard early on in the response by MMS. The WCD
was also given to the White House, the Department of Homeland Security and the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. The public, however, was not
informed of the WCD, despite frequent reference to it by responders (U.S. Coast
Guard 2011:29). This raised questions as to what information the federal government
had, compared to what it was publicly releasing.
BP’s OSRP for the Macondo well, prepared by a Houston-based consulting
firm specializing in emergency response planning, contains numerous glaring errors
and omissions. As summarized by the National Commission (2011:133):
If BP’s response capacity was underwhelming, some aspects of its
response plan were embarrassing. In the plan, BP had named Peter
Lutz as a wildlife expert on whom it would rely; he had died several
years before BP submitted its plan. BP listed seals and walruses as two
species of concern in case of an oil spill in the Gulf; these species never
see Gulf waters. And a link in the plan that purported to go to the
Marine Spill Response Corporation website actually led to a Japanese
entertainment site.
The National Commission (2011:84) also noted:
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For instance, the BP plan identified three different worst-case scenarios
that ranged from 28,033 to 250,000 barrels of oil discharge and used
identical language to “analyze” the shoreline impacts under each
scenario. To the same effect, half of the “Resource Identification”
appendix (five pages) to the BP Oil Spill Response Plan was copied
from material on NOAA websites, without any discernible effort to
determine the applicability of that information to the Gulf of Mexico.
As a result, the BP Oil Spill Response Plan described biological
resources nonexistent in the Gulf—including sea lions, sea otters, and
walruses.
Due to the distance of the Macondo well from the shore, the response plan states that
oil wouldn’t reach the shoreline. Furthermore, the plan also makes the ridiculous claim
that an oil spill wouldn’t have any adverse impacts on birds, sea turtles, and other
endangered marine animals (Mohr, Pritchard and Lush 2010). Within a little more than
a week it became clear that BP’s response plan had drastically underestimated the
threat posed by a WCD.
Yet the National Commission’s report is quick to point out that the absurdities
found in BP’s OSRP are not unique. In fact, as the National Commission (2011:133)
asserts:
Congressional investigation revealed that the response plans submitted
to MMS by ExxonMobil, Chevron, ConocoPhillips, and Shell were
almost identical to BP’s—they too suggested impressive but unrealistic
response capacity and three included the embarrassing reference to
walruses.
The identical response plans for each of the different companies was prepared by the
same contractor who prepared BP’s OSRP for the Macondo well (2011:84). Without
any additional scrutiny from MMS or any other federal agency, BP’s OSRP, and all its
errors, was approved without incident.
Government Estimations
In the aftermath of the spill, numerous estimates of the amount of oil flowing
from the Macondo well were given by different government agencies that drastically
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underestimated the size of the spill. Coast Guard officials and other responders
consistently maintained that the low estimations did not hamper their efforts since the
response was based on a WCD scenario. However, the inaccurate spill estimations
fueled public fear and mistrust that the government did not fully understand the scope
of the disaster and was unprepared to handle it.
For the first month of the spill, government officials and responders issued and
adhered to low and inaccurate spill estimates. During this time, non-governmental
scientists were able to use the scant amount of publicly available data to generate far
more accurate estimates of the actual amount of oil. As the National Commission
(2010a:1) states:
By initially underestimating the amount of oil flow, and then, at the end
of the summer, appearing to underestimate the amount of oil remaining
the in Gulf, the federal government created the impression that it was
either not fully competent to handle the spill or not fully candid with the
American people about the scope of the problem.
Despite the initial contention that no oil was leaking from the well, early Coast
Guard logs reveal that the government was aware that they were dealing with a spill as
large as 8,000 bbls/day within hours of the explosion on April 21, 2010 (Solomon and
Mehta 2010). Furthermore, it appears that by April 23 the Coast Guard, along with
the White House, was aware that the spill was far larger. According to the National
Commission (2010a:8-9):
Soon after the spill began, frontline Coast Guard personnel requested
worst-case discharge information from the Minerals Management
Service and BP, both of which reported a figure of 162,000 bbls/day
(the worst-case estimate from BP’s original drilling permit). A high
level official, however, told us that the Coast Guard did not believe the
figure from the drilling plan was a credible worst-case estimate. On
April 23, 2010, the Coast Guard and NOAA received an updated
estimate of 64,000-110,000 bbls/day, which appeared in both an
internal Coast Guard Situation Report and on a dry-erase board in the
NOAA Seattle war room. By early May, BP had lowered its worst-case
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estimate to 60,000 bbls/day. BP officials disclosed a similar estimate to
Congress on May 4, 2010, stating during a briefing that the “maximum
estimated flow would be 60,000 barrels a day, with a mid-range
estimate of 40,000 barrels a day…”
Despite early awareness within the federal government that the spill was much larger,
this knowledge was hidden from the public. While Unified Command might have been
gearing its response efforts to numbers of this magnitude, the worst-case discharge
scenario numbers were never publicly disclosed.
Furthermore, it appears that there may have been conflict within the federal
government over whether and when to release the worst-case discharge figures. As
uncovered by the National Commission (2010a:10), orders to stem the flow of
information to the public may have come from the White House:
The decision to withhold worst-case discharge figures may have been
made above the operational level. It is the understanding of the
Commission staff that the possibility of releasing the worst-case
discharge figures was at least discussed at the Unified Command level.
The Commission staff has also been advised that, in late April or early
May 2010, NOAA wanted to make public some of its long-term,
worst-case discharge models for the Deepwater Horizon spill, and
requested approval to do so from the White House’s Office of
Management and Budget. Staff was told that the Office of Management
and Budget denied NOAA’s request.
It therefore seems that pressure was coming directly from the White House to limit
public knowledge of the size and scope of the spill.
The organization Public Employees for Environmental Responsibility (PEER)
also raised objection to a “gag order” on NOAA scientists forbidding them to speak
about the spill. A March 2007 Bush Commerce Department administrative order
governing public communications “…forbids scientists from disclosing information
that has not been approved by the chain-of-command, even if they prepare it and
deliver it on their own time as private citizens” (Public Employees 2010). This
replaced an “open science” policy previously held by NOAA and passed in 2006. In
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addition, NOAA further restricts academic researchers who receive its Sea Grants
from engaging in any “advocacy” activities (Public Employees 2010).
Government estimates- publicly disclosed
In an initial attempt to investigate if the well was indeed flowing oil and if so,
how much, BP employed remotely operated vehicles to investigate the immediate
wellhead area. On April 23, 2010, Coast Guard Rear Admiral Mary Landry (the
Federal On-Scene Coordinator, the ranking federal official on the response team at the
time) announced that there was no oil leaking from the well or the riser. Although at
that time, the riser had yet to be inspected and the leak in the riser was not discovered
until the next day. Following the discovery of two leaks in the riser, the Coast Guard
in collaboration with BP announced that up to 1,000 barrels of oil per day were
flowing from the two leaks. According to the National Commission (2010a:3),
“Neither the Coast Guard nor BP divulged the data or methodology behind this
estimate. Based on the information we have to date, it appears the figure came from
BP without supporting documentation.”
By the second week of the spill, Admiral Landry announced on April 28, 2010
that the estimate had increased to up to 5,000 bbls/day based on a document from a
scientist from NOAA. While not made public at the time, an internal NOAA email
indicated that “The scientist also verbally noted to the Scientific Support Coordinator
that the flow rate might be upwards of 10,000 bbls/day” (U.S. National Commission
2010a: 4, Footnote 14). This new figure was made using visual data including the
“Bonn Convention” method which relies on aerial data to estimate the scale of the
spill, and the color to estimate the thickness in order to calculate the volume.
Admittedly a “very rough estimate,” the updated NOAA approximation did not take
into account the oil that was leaking from the kink in the riser, thereby rendering it

170
imprecise. Nonetheless, the scientist’s “…stated intent in disseminating the estimate
was to warn government officials that the flow rate was multiple times greater than
1,000 bbls/day” (2010a:4). Even though it was acknowledged that the NOAA
estimates might be inaccurate and that other techniques were being used to attain more
accurate estimations, the government continued to maintain that official flow rate was
5,000 bbls/day until May 27, 2010 (2010a:4).
The Flow Rate Technical Group
As confusion and uncertainty over the flow rates dragged on, the public began
to increasingly doubt the federal government’s response efforts and their capability of
handling the spill. In an effort to assert its authority, the Unified Command was
prompted to create an interagency Flow Rate Technical Group (Flow Rate Group) on
May 19, 2010 to generate a preliminary flow rate as soon as possible, and a more
reliable final estimation within two months. Director of the U.S. Geological Survey Dr.
Marcia McNutt was appointed to lead the Flow Rate Group on May 23. While the
group from the USGS also relied upon the assistance of non-governmental scientists,
what came to be the official estimates were principally due to the efforts of
Department of Energy Secretary Dr. Steven Chu and a team from the Woods Hole
Oceanographic Institute. The Commission Staff take care to mention that, “It is worth
noting now, however, that the Flow Rate Group did not succeed in releasing an
accurate high-end estimate until mid-June and that Secretary Chu’s team, rather than
any of the Group’s teams, appears to have been responsible for the accuracy of that
June 15 estimate” (“Staff Working Paper No. 3” 2010:15).
In total, the Flow Rate Group issued three estimations, though an accurate one
was not produced until mid-June. Published on May 27, 2010 and clarified on June 2,
the first report estimated “a range of lower bounds” of 12,000 to 25,000 bbls/day but
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declined to speculate on a range of higher bounds due to “unknown unknowns” and
also failed to elaborate on how the numbers where reached. The reason for the lack of
explanation stems from a misleading press release that was based on a brief report, not
reviewed for scientific accuracy, and was not representative of FRG views (McNutt 529-2010). Although it was not reported at the time, there was conflict within the FRG
over whether to release higher estimates. According to Juhasz (2011:84), the National
Oil Spill Commission staff learned “…that the team members had produced maximum
estimates, several of which were in excess of 50,000 barrels of oil a day, but these
amounts were not made public. Further, the team’s original report revealed some
divergence of opinion, but these were omitted from the public version.” A revised
estimate was then released on June 10, which raised the number from 25,000 to
30,000 bbls/day, with a lower bound of 20,000 and an upper bound of 40,000 bbls/day
(“Staff Working Paper No. 3” 2010:12).
One explanation for the conflict over flow rate estimates is that members of the
Plume Team from the Flow Rate Group experienced pressure from the White House
which sought to downplay flow estimates. In an email on May 29, 2010 from USGS
Director and leader of the FRG Marcia McNutt to the Plume Team, she expresses
“what a nightmare its been” dealing with the White House, Department of Interior and
the National Incident Command in communicating an accurate flow rate estimate.
Let me give you a flavor of some of the “suggestions” I was getting
from the NIC and from the communications people at the White House
and DOI as recently as yesterday afternoon as to how to “simplify” our
bottom line:
From a NIC Admiral: How about just saying that the range of flow
rates is 12,000 to 25,000 barrels per day? (No, because the 25,000 is a
LOWER bound, not an UPPER bound....)
From a White House communications person: How about saying that
several lines of evidence suggest that the flow is 12,000 to 19,000
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barrels per day but that the rate could be as high as 25,000 barrels per
day? (No, because the 25,000 is a LOWER bound, not an UPPER
bound...). (McNutt 2010)
It seems as though administration officials were incapable of grasping the concept of a
“lower bound,” instead confusing it as an upper estimate of the flow rate. McNutt also
notes that the media did little to understand the differences in the numbers and the
ramifications of lower versus upper bounds (McNutt 2010).
There have also been allegations made by the Public Employees for
Environmental Responsibility (PEER) of scientific and research misconduct on behalf
of NOAA Senior Scientist Dr. William Lehr in his capacity as leader of the Plume
Analysis Team of the FRG.
Evidence uncovered by PEER shows that Dr. Lehr engaged in coercive
manipulation of the Plume Team’s scientific activities, fabricated and
falsified the scientific findings of the Plume Team, and prevented
members of the Plume Team with conflicting findings from
communicating their findings to key decision makers. (Public
Employees 2011).
As a result of Dr. Lehr’s actions, the Plume Team’s numbers were underestimated by
fifty percent and gave the public a misleading impression of the flow rate. Based on the
emails of Plume Team members complaining that their results had been suppressed,
manipulated and misrepresented, PEER concluded that Lehr’s actions were
undertaken to satisfy the demands of the White House and the National Incident
Command. As a result of Dr. Lehr’s efforts, any penalties and damages that BP could
be held liable for are cut in half by underestimating the flow rate by fifty percent
(Public Employees 2011).
Secretary Chu and the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute estimates
After placing a sensor on the well to measure the flow rate, on June 15, 2010,
Secretary of Interior Ken Salazar, a team of scientists from the Department of Energy
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led by Secretary Dr. Steven Chu, and the Flow Rate Group announced a new estimate
of 35,000 to 60,000 bbls/day. As the National Commission (2010a:14) explains:
On June 14, 2010, Secretary Chu and his team, Secretary Salazar, and
members of the Flow Rate Group hosted a conference call. On the call,
the teams decided that they would jointly announce a flow-rate range of
35,000-60,000 bbls/day. The Chu team’s estimate accounted for the
high end of the range, while the Flow Rate Group’s work provided the
low end.
By August 2, however, the high end of the estimation produced by Dr Chu’s team had
proved to be more accurate as the number was once again modified to 62,000 bbls/day
at the outset of the spill. It was also noted that the flow rate was reduced to 53,000
bbls/day by the time the well had been capped on July 14, 2010 (U.S. National
Commission 2010a:14).
Based on these numbers, Secretary Chu’s team and the Flow Rate Group
concluded that the total amount of oil discharged throughout the spill was 4,928,100
barrels (+ or – 10%), giving a range of 4,435,290 to 5,420,910 total barrels. These
final estimations were released to the public in a report titled Deepwater Horizon
MC252 Gulf Incident Oil Budget published by the NOAA and have remained the
official estimates of the total amount of oil (U.S. National Commission 2010a:15).
Independent Oil Spill Estimates
The first independent flow rate estimation was released on April 27, 2010 and
was being reported in the national press within days. Using publicly available satellite
imagery, founder of SkyTruth.org John Amos estimated the size of the leak to be
5,000 to 20,000 bbls/day. This estimate was assumed to be conservative since it did
not take into consideration oil that had been burned or collected by response crews,
had been evaporated or dispersed, or was below the surface. Shortly thereafter on
May 1, 2010, Florida State University oceanographer Dr. Ian MacDonald published a
new estimate based on a Coast Guard map that tracked the spills surface size and
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color. Using the Bonn Convention method, he estimated the flow rate to be 26,500
bbls/day. This too was a conservative estimate as it did not factor in oil that had been
cleaned up or that was not visible from the surface (U.S. National Commission
2010a:5).
On May 12, 2010, BP released the first thirty second video of oil bellowing
from the end of the riser which provided a valuable piece of data about the flow rate.
Congressman Markey pushed BP to make publicly available 24 hour footage of the
spill and on May 20, BP complied. As Juhasz (2011:83) describes the impact of the
video:
The effect of the spill cam of the public psyche was profound. Within
the first twenty-four hours of Congressman Markey’s posting the link,
hundreds of thousands of people visited the subcommittee’s Web site.
Perhaps because it just made such good television, the video footage
opened morning news programs and closed out the nightly news. The
public was riveted, and the demand for better information and action
grew accordingly.
Within 24 hours of the video being released, using various methodologies,
three independent scientists had developed new estimates on the total flux (the total
amount of oil and gas coming out of the well) being released from the riser that were
much greater than the government estimates. These estimates did not include the
amount flowing from the kink leak since no public data was available at the time. Dr.
Timothy Crone, a marine biologist at Columbia University’s Lamont Doherty Earth
Observatory, estimated the total flow to be 50,000 to 100,000 bbls/day based on a
technique called Optical Plume Velocimetry. An expert on orders of magnitude
estimation, Dr. Eugene Chiang, an astrophysicist at the University of California at
Berkeley estimated the amount to be 20,000 and 100,000 bbls/day. Specializing in
fluid mechanics, Dr. Steven Wereley, a mechanical engineer at Purdue University
estimated the flow to be 72,179 bbls/day using a method called Particle Image
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Velocimetry (U.S. National Commission 2010a:6). As the National Commission
(2010a:7-8) conclude, “The government appears to have taken an overly casual
approach to the calculation and release of the 5,000 bbls/day estimate- which, as the
only official estimate for most of May, took on great importance.”
NOAA Report: Oil has “Disappeared”
On June 11th the National Incident Commander requested that a tool be
developed to document the effectiveness of all skimming, burning, source capture and
dispersant application operations. This team of experts from NOAA, the National
Institute of Science and Technology, and the USGS was divided into two teams. The
first team led by Secretary Chu and USGS Director Marcia McNutt, attempted to
estimate the total flow rate from the well. The second team, led by the Department of
Interior and NOAA, created the Oil Budget Calculator to determine what happened to
the oil. Also playing a leading role in the Oil Budget Calculator is NOAA Senior
Scientist Dr. William Lehr who has been alleged of scientific misconduct for
underestimating the Flow Rate Group estimations.
The Oil Budget Team determined the official, total, and final flow rate was
determined to be 4.9 million barrels. “The Oil Budget provided to be the first public
estimate of the amount of oil discharged over the course of the spill (April 22 to July
14, 2010), a total of 4,928,100 barrels (+ or – 10%, which gives a range of 4,435,290
to 420,910 total barrels) (U.S. National Commission 2010a:18). According to the
U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (2010), by August much of
the BP oil had evaporated or disappeared:
In summary, it is estimated that burning, skimming and direct recovery
from the wellhead removed one quarter (25%) of the oil released from
the wellhead. One quarter (25%) of the total oil naturally evaporated or
dissolved, and just less than one quarter (24%) was dispersed (either
naturally or as a result of operations) as microscopic droplets into Gulf
waters. The residual amount — just over one quarter (26%) — is either
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on or just below the surface as light sheen and weathered tar balls, has
washed ashore or been collected from the shore, or is buried in sand
and sediments. Oil in the residual and dispersed categories is in the
process of being degraded.
Released to the public prematurely before proper scientific review, responders argued
that the initial findings were an estimate for operational purposes, not a definitive
account of what happened to the oil. Nonetheless, that is exactly how they were
interpreted as these estimations have become the permanent, final accounts of the
amount and fate of the oil.
The unveiling of the Oil Budget at a press conference on August 4, 2010
coincided with Admiral Allen’s announcement that the static kill efforts had succeeded
and was intended to be a high profile event attended by numerous Obama
administration officials including Jane Lubchenco (Administrator of NOAA), Carol
Browner (Director of the White House Office of Energy and Climate Change Policy),
and Robert Gibbs (White House Press Secretary). That morning Carol Browner
appeared on all the major news networks to proclaim the success of the government’s
response efforts. As the National Commission (2010a:20) recounts of the broadcasts:
Ms. Browner did not describe the Oil Budget as an operational tool
designed to assist responders. Instead, some of her statements
presented the budget as a scientific assessment of how much of the oil
was “gone”:
“I think it’s also important to note that our scientists have done an
initial assessment, and more than three-quarters of the oil is gone. The
vast majority of the oil is gone.”
“The scientists are telling us about 25 percent was not captured or
evaporated or taken care of by mother nature.”
Reports such as these appeared to be a premature assessment and scientists argued
that it gave a misleadingly optimistic impression about the fate of the oil. Nonetheless,
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the Oil Budget and the explanation for what happened to the oil continued to remain
the federal government’s official account of the spill.
Where did the Oil Go? Oil Plumes Discovered by Independent Scientists
An alternative answer to the question “where did all the oil go?” was soon
provided by the ocean sciences academic community. The initial discovery of giant oil
“plumes” floating beneath the surface of the Gulf was made by a team of scientists
from multiple universities aboard the NOAA supported Pelican research vessel on May
3. The team found multiple plumes, though one cloud of dispersed oil one as large as
10 miles long, 3 miles wide and 300 feet thick in certain areas (Gillis 2010).
According to Juhasz (2011:76):
During its two weeks at sea, the Pelican identified three of these
plumes; they were both deep and giant. They were found at roughly
2,200 feet, 3,280 feet, and 4,260 feet below the ocean’s surface. The
largest was 15 miles long, 5 miles wide, and 300 feet thick in spots.
That is 5,100 times the volume of the Superdome, or about half the
volume of Utah’s Great Salt Lake.
The crucial discoveries of the Pelican team were made public when one of the
scientists involved, Dr. Samantha Joye, contacted New York Times reporter Justin
Gillis in response to criticisms that NOAA and other scientists were not doing enough
to gather independent data. After running the story “Giant Plumes of Oil Found Under
Gulf” which stressed the findings were preliminary, the story exploded, reaching the
public and policymakers.
Initially, both BP and NOAA sought to deny and discredit the findings of the
Pelican and the existence of oil plumes, even before reviewing the data. Upon arriving
back to shore on May 16, 2010 the researchers on board were asked by NOAA to stop
talking to the press. “On May 17, NOAA administrator Jane Lubchenco issued the
following statement: ‘Media reports related to the research work conducted aboard
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the R/V Pelican included information that was misleading, premature and, in some
cases, inaccurate” (Juhasz 2011:80). On June 13, NOAA issued a statement stating
that the researchers did not comply with EPA guidelines, thereby invalidating the data.
Thus, the findings of the Pelican would not be used. Moreover, the scientists aboard
were lambasted and discredited by NOAA and the Coast Guard (Juhasz 2011:82). As
Juhasz (2011:82) cites Dr. Joye, who alerted the media to the Pelican’s findings:
“Everyone involved in the Pelican plume discovery got their hands
slapped and were asked to ‘stand down’ and not respond to media
requests,” she told me. She believes this is because NOAA, “wanted to
control the flow of information.” Some scientists-Dr. Joye is not saying
who- have even had their federal funding threatened, which is no small
matter, given that this is a main source of funding for oceanographic
research. “They told us, ‘We’re not trying to tell you what to
say…we’re just asking you to temper your statements, not to be
inflammatory.”
Following the Pelican, other researchers from the University of South Florida
in Saint Petersburg went aboard the Weatherbird II to study the spill twice in May
where they also identified low concentrations of oil from the Macondo well located in
deep underwater plumes. As cited by Schrope (2010:682):
But the Weatherbird II team had its own challenges with NOAA.
Representatives from the agency and from BP travelled with the
scientists on their first boat trip, and much of the work was carried out
as part of the government’s Natural Resource Damage Assessment
(NRDA) process for gathering evidence that might be used in future
spill liability cases. The NRDA process is a foreign one to many
scientists because there are restrictions on how samples and data are
handled.
Following the voyage, the samples were turned over to NOAA and the academic
researchers were unable to analyze most of the sample collected.
Similarly, University of South Florida marine sciences dean William Hogarth
was criticized by federal officials upon announcing his findings of a six mile wide oil
plume in the Gulf. He stated, “I got lambasted by the Coast Guard and NOAA when
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we said there was undersea oil.” After being pressured to retract his public
announcement, Hogarth compared it to being “beat up” by federal officials (Wang
2010b).
The findings of the Pelican were not isolated and were supported by the work
of other independent researchers. Led by Dr. Richard Camilli, a team from the Woods
Hole Oceanographic Institute also found oil plumes during their research mission
between June 19 and 28, 2010. They identified “…a continuous plume of highly
diffuse hydrocarbons 35 kilometers long, 200 meters high, and 2 kilometers deep, at a
depth of approximately 1,100 meters” (U.S. National Commission 2010a:24). In
addition to confirming that the oil was indeed from the Macondo well, the team also
indicated that the plume likely stretched longer than 35 kilometers, which was
restricted by the boundaries of the study. Furthermore, the researchers were unable to
find evidence of “systematic oxygen drawdown” which suggested that rapid
biodegradation might not be occurring as suggested by the NOAA Oil Budget.
Learning from the experience of the Pelican crew, the Camilli et al. team did
not go public with their findings until they were fist published in the peer-reviewed
journal Science on August 19, 2010 in an effort to gain legitimacy and avoid conflict
with the administration. It was not until the published findings of Camilli et al. (2010)
that NOAA publicly acknowledged the existence of they referred to as “ephemeral
clouds” of oil, estimating that as much as 42 million gallons of oil could lay beneath
the surface in this form.
In congruence with the findings of the Pelican, Weatherbird II, and Camilli et al
(2010), another research team led by Terry Hazen from Lawrence Berkeley National
Laboratory also found evidence of oil plumes floating in the Gulf and published their
findings in a peer-reviewed article on August 4, 2010 in Science Express. Diverging
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from the other studies, the Hazen et al. team identified slight oxygen drawdown and
concluded that the biodegradation rates for hydrocarbons was occurring more rapidly
than expected (U.S. National Commission 2010a:25). These findings led many to
believe that the missing oil in the Gulf was being quickly broken down by oil eating
microbes, including reports such as “Microbes ate BP oil deep-water plume: study”
(Zaberenko 2010). The study claimed that rather than being harmed by the massive
spill, the microbes were actually stimulated. So efficient were the microbes, Hazen et
al. (2010) claimed, that the deepwater oil plume was now undetectable. Perhaps one
reason for the overly rosy picture painted by Hazen et al. compared to the other
research teams can be found in the source of funding for its sponsor, the Lawrence
Berkeley National Laboratory which is provided by BP. While BP funding for the
Hazen et al. study is not explicit, the connection is at least one explanation for the
overly optimistic findings that oil eating microbes had devoured the oil plumes.
Months after the capping of the well and the release of the Oil Budget,
independent scientists continued to find evidence that the oil did not just disappear, but
rather sank to the bottom of the ocean. By September 14, 2010, Dr. Samantha Joye
and a research team from University of Georgia discovered nearly two inches thick of
oil on the Gulf floor, smothering dead shrimp, crab and other marine life. It was
confirmed that the oil originated from the Macondo well. Furthermore, their research
supported the findings of a team from the University of Florida led by Dr. David
Hollander who had found droplets of oil in marine sentiment in the DeSoto Canyon, an
underwear fissure running along the ocean floor in August (Burdeau and Borenstein
2010).
The findings of the academic research teams were essential in forcing the
government to publicly acknowledge the harsh realities of the environmental effects of
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the spill. As the National Commission (2010a:27) acknowledged:
Perhaps to some extent as a consequence of these early findings,
government officials have changed the tone of their public statements
on the fate of the oil. For example, on September 15, 2010,
Administrator Lubchenco acknowledged that oil is being found on the
seafloor and promised that the government “will continue to monitor,
sample and study the oil and [dispersants] from the near shore to the
open ocean, from the surface to the seafloor . . . mindful of the need to
understand how much oil remains, where it is and in what
concentrations and how rapidly it’s being naturally degraded.”
As the efforts of independent scientists made clear, BP’s oil did not simply disappear
as government scientists were swift to claim in NOAA’s Oil Budget. Since the oil was
no longer visible from the surface government officials attempted to persuade the
public that problem had been effectively resolved: Out of sight, out of mind.
It was not until November 23, 2010 that the government released a revised,
peer-reviewed document that explained that the Oil Budget was intended to be an
operational tool, not to assert the final fate of the oil. Yet this is exactly what the Oil
Budget achieved by providing fixed amounts, without leaving much room for
uncertainty. The Technical Document clarification stressed the uncertainty of the
numbers provided in August, but little to modify them. Perhaps the most significant
change was and increase in the amount of oil classified as “chemically dispersed” from
8% to 16%. Furthermore, the updated document dismissed the September reports
that thick oil was found on the surface of the sea floor (Ramseur 2010).
Conclusions
In the state-corporate response to the spill, one of the major goals of BP and
the Obama administration was to suppress and manipulate scientific evidence of the
environmental devastation unfolding in the Gulf of Mexico. As other analyses of
partnerships between the oil industry and universities have demonstrated, Big Oil has
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often disregarded the peer review process, assumed control of academic governing
bodies, managed research proposal selection and monopolized the results of academic
research. Similarly, BP also sought to dictate the terms of scientific evidence through
the Gulf of Mexico Research Initiative as a means of concealing their environmental
crimes. While many Gulf Coast scientists were reluctant to relinquish control of their
research to BP, those who accepted the funding were contractually obligated to
receive prior review and approval from BP and its lawyers before they could proceed
with their assessments or publicly release their findings. BP’s financial and legal
control over the fund ensured that any negative findings could be kept quite while the
company’s liability was still in question.
Not only was BP working to distort scientific evidence surrounding the spill,
but a major objective of the federal government was also to downplay and manipulate
scientific evidence surrounding the amount and fate of the oil. From the outset of the
spill, the Coast Guard and the Obama administration severely underestimated the size
of the oil spill to the public, despite information suggesting that they knew the size was
far greater. Even in the face of much higher estimates from independent scientists, the
federal government was reluctant to release more accurate measures. With increasing
federal oversight of response efforts, the Obama administration created the Flow Rate
Group as well as the Woods Hole research team led by Secretary of Energy Steven
Chu as a means of establishing an authoritative estimate. The Flow Rate Group
experienced pressure from officials at NOAA, the White House, the DHS and the
Unified Command to downplay the size of the spill. Moreover, acting on pressure
from the Obama administration to limit spill estimates, a senior scientist from NOAA
on the FRG went as far as to deliberately obscure the team’s findings thereby leading
to their public discrediting. Without critical speculation about his qualifications for the
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job or his past relationship with BP, Secretary Chu led the team which produced the
final, official flow rate from Macondo. Appointing Dr. Chu to lead the Woods Hole
team provided the Obama administration with the means to influence the determination
of the flow rate.
The announcement of the official flow rate in NOAA’s Oil Budget gave the
Obama administration the opportunity to declare that much of the oil had disappeared
from the Gulf due to the success of response efforts. At the same time, a growing
body of peer reviewed evidence identified massive oil plumes lurking below the
ocean’s surface, yet the Obama administration, NOAA and the Coast Guard tried to
ignore and discredit their findings. Ultimately, the independent scientists were
victorious in their battle for recognition as NOAA was forced to acknowledge the
large conglomerate masses of chemically dispersed oil lingering in the Gulf.
Even two years later, BP has continued to manipulate scientific evidence by
contesting the official flow rate as a means of limiting their financial liability for the
spill. Academic scientists from the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute Dr.
Christopher Reddy and Dr. Richard Camilli (2012) were forced to reluctantly give BP
access to over 3,000 private emails concerning the calculation of the flow rate. As a
result of a federal court case in which the scientists were not involved, BP has
subpoena all information surrounding the researchers’ calculations. In response, Reddy
and Camilli provided the company with 50,000 pages of documents, raw data, reports,
and algorithms used in their research yet BP further pushed for access to their private
communications.
Noting a lack of law and legal precedent to protect independent scientists,
Reddy and Camilli (2012) fear the erosion of the scientific deliberative process by
powerful corporations. Moreover, the researchers also express concern about
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intellectual property on cutting edge subsea surveillance technology (which is highly
desirable information within the offshore industry) being unveiled as a byproduct of
releasing their emails. In the end, Reddy and Camilli (2012) conclude that this federal
ruling sets a disturbing legal precedent for corporate power and scientific deliberation:
Ultimately this is not about BP. Our experience highlights that virtually
all of scientists’ deliberative communications, including e-mails and
attached documents, can be subject to legal proceedings without
limitation. Incomplete thoughts and half-finished documents attached to
e-mails can be taken out of context and impugned by people who have
a motive for discrediting the findings. In addition to obscuring true
scientific findings, this situation casts a chill over the scientific process.
Academic researchers beware: Scientific misconduct by corporations and governments
has become an increasing means of concealing environmental harm.
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CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCEALING THE DAMAGE
Limiting the visibility of the oil was a primary objective of the state-corporate
war against the Macondo well. Chemical dispersants applied at both the surface and
directly at the wellhead were the primary weapons to prevent the oil from reaching the
shore. As the amount of toxic dispersants reached unprecedented levels, the
Environmental Protection Agency unsuccessfully tried to force BP to reduce its use of
dispersants, but the Coast Guard allowed the company to continue unabated. In this
regard, both BP and the Coast Guard worked together to conceal the oil and the
extent of the environmental damage.
Government and industry alike had learned from the 1969 Santa Barbara and
1989 Exxon Valdez spills the power of images to incite public reaction. Once the oil
had made landfall, photographs of oil soaked brown pelicans tugged at the heart
strings of the American public. In response, BP and Unified Command worked to
censor images of the Gulf by instituting and policing a 65 foot zone around all cleanup
workers, equipment and animals. Closely coordinated with one another, BP hired
private security contractors which worked alongside the Coast Guard, Department of
Homeland Security and local law enforcement to enforce the media blockade. In
addition to censoring images, BP went as far as to deliberately alter official images of
the response to give the appearance that it was more active than it actually was.
Taken together, all of these actions suggest a coordinated campaign led by BP and
supported by the Obama administration to censor images and information surrounding
the 2010 Gulf of Mexico spill.
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Environmental Warfare: The Use of Chemical Dispersants
In an act of environmental warfare, chemical dispersants were used without
restraint to hide the amount of oil spewing from Macondo. Government and corporate
officials alike continuously drew analogies between efforts to contain the well and
warfare against the oil. Ultimately, the war on Macondo was fought through an
extensive, untested application of dispersants both to the surface and at the wellhead
itself. Designed to change the form though not the quantity, dispersants break oil into
small droplets which lingered in the form of oil plumes beneath the surface of the Gulf.
Despite less toxic and more effective dispersant options, BP insisted on deploying
Corexit made by Nalco, who maintained corporate ties with BP. Exemplifying the
power relations throughout the response, when the EPA and the Coast Guard
attempted to restrain BP, the company refused and persisted in its surface and subsea
application of dispersants. Achieving the intended effect, the use of dispersants limited
the amount of oil visible from the surface and postponed a realization of the true
extent of the damage done to the Gulf of Mexico.
Early on in the response, BP Group Chief Executive Tony Hayward declared
“We are attacking this spill on two fronts – at the wellhead and on the surface
offshore” (BP 2010). This type of language persisted and framed the response in
militaristic terms. For example, in his speech to the nation addressing the ongoing
catastrophe in the Gulf, President Obama also drew on the narrative of war:
Already, this oil spill is the worst environmental disaster America has
ever faced. And unlike an earthquake or a hurricane, it’s not a single
event that does its damage in a matter of minutes or days. The millions
of gallons of oil that have spilled into the Gulf of Mexico are more like
an epidemic, one that we will be fighting for months and even years.
But make no mistake: We will fight this spill with everything we’ve got
for as long as it takes. … Tonight I’d like to lay out for you what our
battle plan is going forward: what we're doing to clean up the oil, what
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we’re doing to help our neighbors in the Gulf, and what we’re doing to
make sure that a catastrophe like this never happens again. (White
House 2010, Emphasis added)
Obama even made connections between the war being fought by troops in Afghanistan
compared to the “battle we’re waging against an oil spill that is assaulting our shores
and our citizens” (White House 2010).
Once the well had finally been conquered on September 19, 2010, federal
responders were quick to declare victory: “The Macondo 252 well is effectively dead,”
retired Coast Guard Admiral Thad Allen, who has overseen the U.S. government's
response, said in a statement. “We can now state, definitively, that the Macondo well
poses no continuing threat to the Gulf of Mexico” (Hays 2010).
Analogies made by government and corporate officials stressed the urgency of
the fight against the Macondo well and the necessity of taking immediate and
unprecedented action against it. This rhetoric portrayed the Gulf of Mexico and it’s
multiplicities of ecosystems as an identifiable enemy rather than a potential victim of
response efforts. In a declaration of environmental warfare upon Macondo, BP and the
federal government proceeded to “carpet bomb the Gulf” with an unprecedented
amount of chemical dispersants.
In the fight against Macondo, BP and the federal government relied extensively
on chemical dispersants. While acknowledging that the decision to use dispersants was
the best option of two difficult choices, EPA Administrator Lisa P. Jackson clearly
identified the enemy in this war:
But in all of this it is critical to remember the Number One enemy is the
oil. Until we find a way to stem the flow of oil, we must continue to
take any responsible action that will mitigate the impact of the spill.
That is what we are doing. (Jackson 2010b)
As Federal On Scene Coordinator Admiral Landry told reporters:
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“We have one-third of the world’s dispersant resources on standby…
Our goal is to fight this oil spill as far away from the coastline as
possible.” Faced with what one Coast Guard captain called a “tradeoff
of bad choices” between spraying chemicals on the water or watching
more oil reach the shore, responders would wield dispersants in the
battle against oil for the next 12 weeks, using novel methods and
unprecedented volumes. (U.S. National Commission 2011:143)
Defending the Coast Guard’s continued approval of dispersant use despite
EPA’s attempts to restrict it, Admiral Allen acknowledged that at times “our leaders
have had to make decisions on scene…Sometimes there was no other way to attack
the oil than to use dispersants.” In a very poignant statement, Allen likened the
struggle in the Gulf to what he called “the equivalent of an environmental war.” The
application of chemical dispersants is perhaps best described by Congressman Edward
Markey: “BP carpet bombed the ocean with these chemicals, and the Coast Guard
allowed them to do it” (Ball 2010).
Dispersants are an established part of oil spill response operations that are
designed to break up oil into microscopic droplets that then sink to the bottom of the
ocean. By diluting the oil throughout the water column, dispersants only change the
form of the oil, not the quantity. The goal is to reduce the amount of oil that reaches
the shoreline in order to minimize the amount of harm to economically and
environmentally sensitive areas. While sparing the animal life onshore, marine life
living within the water column sustains greater harm due to dispersant use. Therefore,
the decision to use dispersants is often viewed as a tradeoff between the immediate
damage caused by concentrated oil washing ashore, versus the unknown long-term
effects of oil dispersed throughout the water column. Importantly, the deployment of
unprecedented volumes of chemical dispersants served the intended purpose of
concealing the amount of oil visible from the surface and on the shoreline, therefore
limiting BP’s liability.
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In the cleanup effort, an unprecedented amount of dispersants were used. Over
1.84 million gallons of chemical dispersants were sprayed by plane, dumped by boat
and injected directly at the wellhead. In comparison, the total amount of dispersants
used during the Exxon Valdez spill was 5,500 gallons which was viewed as
controversial at the time. Of the nearly two million gallons, 771,000 gallons were
applied at the wellhead 5,067 feet below the surface. This “novel” use of dispersants
had never been attempted, thus there was a lack of research on its potential hazards to
marine life.
EPA-Coast Guard Approval of Dispersants
The decision to use dispersants is based on the idea of “net environmental
benefit” which takes into consideration numerous factors including dispersant
application rates, meteorology, environmentally sensitive areas, and potential for
economic damage. However, government and corporate responders gave scant
attention to the potential for environmental harm. The attitude towards dispersant use
that prevailed among BP and the Coast Guard was best characterized by a statement
from CEO Tony Hayward, “The Gulf of Mexico is a very big ocean. The amount of
volume of oil and dispersant we are putting into it is tiny in relation to the total water
volume” (as cited by the U.S. National Commission 2011:144). Indeed, the
unleashing of an unprecedented amount of chemical dispersants created a giant science
experiment in the Gulf.
There exists no comprehensive overarching national policy to guide dispersant
use. At the time of the Macondo well blowout, the use of dispersants was determined
by the Regional Response Team (RRT) IV (which includes Mississippi, Alabama and
Florida) and RRT VI (Louisiana and Texas) had pre-authorized the use of dispersants
for their areas of responsibility in waters deeper than 10 meters and at least three miles
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away from shore without providing any limitations on the volume of dispersants used.
One difference in policy between the two, RRT IV was co-chaired by the EPA and
Coast Guard, whereas the FOSC was given authority for dispersant decisions in RRT
VI. Moreover, neither RRT considered the use of subsea application of dispersants,
only surface application by boat and by plane. Once the spill began, confusion arose
between the RRTs, the Coast Guard and the EPA over who had authority over
dispersant application.
Surface application of dispersants was undertaken by private contractors while
oversight of these operations was managed by the Federal On Scene Coordinator
(U.S. Coast Guard 2011:40-42). At the time, no federal agency had ever studied
subsea dispersant use and private studies were very limited (U.S. National Commission
2011:144). Furthermore, while surface application of dispersants was clearly
delegated to the RRT under the NCP, there was no clear jurisdiction on subsea
applications and it was uncertain whether approval was needed from the EPA or
NOAA. The confusion over what agency had regulatory jurisdiction concerning subsea
use of dispersants later came to a head as public concern over this novel use of
dispersants mounted.
The EPA maintains the National Product Schedule which authorizes
dispersants and other chemicals to be used in response to an oil spill. It is the EPA’s
responsibility under the National Contingency Plan to obtain toxicity data from
industry on each of the products before placing them on the list. Required toxicity
tests only examined two sensitive species in the Gulf of Mexico, invertebrate (mysid
shrimp) and fish (silverside), and are considered to be representative of many species
living in the Gulf. The research on the toxicity and effectiveness of dispersants is
sparse and inconsistent and the studies that do exist have been conducted by the

191
manufacturer, raising doubt about their accuracy. According to the National
Commission (2011:144):
Under the terms of the preauthorization, Corexit was a permissible
dispersant because EPA listed it on the National Contingency Plan
Product Schedule. EPA obtains toxicity data from the manufacturer
before placing a dispersant on that schedule. Some toxicologists have
questioned the reliability and comparability of the testing by
manufacturers. Moreover, the required testing is limited to acute
(short-term) toxicity studies on one fish species and one shrimp species;
it does not consider issues such as persistence in the environment and
long-term effects.
On the whole, there was a lack of consistent, independent toxicity tests for
Corexit and all other approved dispersants. Due in part to proprietary information, the
ingredients of dispersants available for oil spill cleanup are not easily accessible and
sometime unattainable. One report conducted a literature review of scientific research
on the 57 chemical ingredients that were found in dispersants at the time of Deepwater
Horizon. Of the 57 ingredients, five chemicals are associated with cancer; 33 chemicals
are associated with skin irritation ranging from rashes to burns; 33 chemicals are
linked to eye irritation; 11 chemicals are suspected of potential respiratory toxins or
irritants; and ten chemicals are suspected kidney toxins. Furthermore, there is also an
array of potential effects on the marine environment. For example, eight chemicals are
suspected or known to be toxic to aquatic organisms and five chemicals are suspected
to have a moderate toxicity to fish (Earth Justice 2011:3). Without definitive
knowledge about the effectiveness and toxicity of Corexit and the available
alternatives, both the EPA and BP were unable to make informed decisions about
surface and subsea dispersant application.
Nalco’s Corexit 9500 and 9527A
Out of the eighteen chemical dispersants approved by the EPA for use in oil
spill clean ups, BP chose one of the most toxic- Corexit 9500 and 9527A, produced by
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Nalco. According to the EPA’s data, Corexit is more toxic and less effective than the
other dispersants on the National Products Schedule (U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency 2010a, 2010b). Nalco was specifically selected by BP to produce the
dispersant and successfully mobilized one third of the world’s total supply of
dispersants to the Gulf of Mexico. Better known for its water treatment and
processing technologies, Nalco’s sale of chemical dispersants typically makes up less
than one percent of the company’s total profit. Nalco was formed in 1994 as joint
venture with Exxon Chemical under the name Nalco/Exxon Energy Chemical and
maintains strong connections with oil industry insiders through its board of directors,
including executive board members at BP and ExxonMobil (such as Rodney Frank
Chase, CEO at both Nalco and BP) (DuBois 2010).
Upon releasing the ingredients of Corexit to the EPA, Nalco attempted to
downplay the toxicity of some of the chemicals by citing the many common household
products they were also found in. For example, sorbitan, mono-(9Z)-9-octadecenoate
was identified as also in skin cream, body shampoo, emulsifier in juice. Other
chemicals noted were also found in baby bath, mouth wash, face lotion, tanning,
cosmetic products, and household cleaning products (Nalco 2010). Despite the
seemingly benign portrait of Corexit painted by Nalco, the dispersant has been banned
for use in the United Kingdom due to its harmful effects.
During the battle over dispersant use, the EPA faced pressure from lawmakers
and public health advocates who were concerned about the ingredients in Corexit kept
secret from the public by Nalco. As the National Commission (2011:144) states:
Faced with high-volume dispersant use, Gulf residents became
concerned that the chemicals were just as bad as the spilled oil itself.
Some workers reported nausea and headaches after coming into
contact with dispersants. However, OSHA found no evidence of unsafe
dispersant exposure among responders. Environmental groups
pressured Nalco, the company that manufactures Corexit, to disclose
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its formula. Although it had given the formula to EPA during the prelisting process, Nalco declined to make the formula public, citing
intellectual property concerns. This decision did not reassure the
citizens of the Gulf.
In a renegade move, the EPA publicly revealed the toxic dispersants contents on its
website on June 9, without forewarning Nalco (Schor 2010b).
According to the statement from Nalco (2010) released by the EPA:
COREXIT 9500 is the sole product we have been making for Gulf
responders since the spill began. Limited quantities of COREXIT 9527
may have been drawn from existing dispersant stockpiles from around
the world. COREXIT 9500 does not include the ingredient 2-butoxy
ethanol, an ingredient in COREXIT 9527.
The Corexit concoction contains propylene glycol and light petroleum distillates
(refined from crude oil), and dioctyl sodium sulfosuccinate (a detergent and common
ingredient in laxatives). Moreover, the 9527 formula contains 2-butoxyethanol in
addition to propylene glycol (a commonly used solvent) and has been identified as a
cause of persistent health problems of clean up workers following the Exxon Valdez.
Despite the documented toxicity of Corexit, the EPA allowed it to remain on the
National Product Schedule as an approved dispersant. In the wake of public pressure
over the health effects of the dispersants the EPA released the ingredients, but the
agency was ultimately unable to inhibit BP’s unrestrained application of them.
Surface and subsea application of dispersants
Concerns over dispersant toxicity notwithstanding, BP and its contractors
began applying dispersants to the surface on April 22, 2010. By April 26, 14,654
gallons of Corexit had been used. Dispersant use increased from April 27 to May 3,
with responders applying 141,358 gallons to the surface. The following week, 168,988
gallons were applied. During the week of May 11 to May 17, the amount of surface
dispersants reached 255,000 gallons (U.S. National Commission 2011:144).
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Prior to the Deepwater Horizon disaster, dispersants had only been applied to
the surface of an oil spill, never directly to the wellhead itself. At the suggestion of BP,
responders began considering the “novel” use of subsea dispersants to break up the oil
rather than waiting for it to rise to the surface. On May 1, 2010, Admiral Thad Allen
announced that crews were testing dispersants directly at the wellhead using remote
operated robots and that nearly 3,000 gallons of dispersants had been applied subsea
(U.S. National Commission 2010b:7). By May 17, the cumulative totals were 580,000
gallons on the surface and 45,000 gallons subsea.
As time went on and the amount of dispersants being applied to the surface and
the wellhead grew to unprecedented proportions, the public and the federal
government became concerned about the amount being used. According to the Coast
Guard (2011:42):
Even though pre-authorization of dispersant use was approved by RRT
VI and implemented by the FOSC, over time, several concerns
developed. These concerns involved the increasing volume of
dispersants being used, the extended duration of dispersant application,
the novel use of subsea injection of dispersants at the wellhead, and the
potential toxicity of both the dispersants and the dispersed oil. These
concerns caused the EPA to question the continued use of dispersants.
Within one week of subsea application, the EPA and the Coast Guard issued a
directive which instructed BP to halt the subsea use of dispersants pending further
testing.
Here, as the issue of dispersant application became more and more
prominent in the media and for the public, the decisions to apply both
surface and subsea dispersants were taken out of hands of the Regional
Response Teams. Admiral Allen and Administrator Jackson to a large
extent bypassed the National and Regional Response Team structures
and instead issued decisions regarding dispersant policy through joint
directives. Though this reflected the high level at which the issues were
being evaluated, it was outside of the process that responders were
supposed to implement. (U.S. National Commission 2010b:15-6)
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A May 19, 2010 letter to Obama signed by the leaders of numerous
environmental organizations including Audubon, the Clean Water Action, Earth
Justice, National Wildlife Federation, Natural Resource Defense Council and Sierra
club among others, urged the president to exercise more direct oversight of spill
response efforts, especially regarding the testing and monitoring of chemical
dispersants. Furthermore, the letter also urged NOAA to be more transparent in its
conducting of the Natural Resource Damage Assessment (“Letter to President
Obama” 2010). Testifying to Congress about the need for government oversight in
testing and applying dispersants, National Wildlife Federation President and CEO
Larry Schweiger asserted:
“The statement yesterday from BP CEO Hayward that the
environmental damage will be ‘very modest’ lacks common sense and
common decency,” said Larry Schweiger. “The Gulf of Mexico is a
crime scene and the perpetrator cannot be left in charge of assessing
the damage. The government needs to make sure that the right testing
is done and that all data is disclosed to the public.” (Grant 2010,
Emphasis added)
As concern over the environmental effects of dispersants mounted, the EPA and the
Coast Guard were forced to take action, though their response was far from united.
EPA- Coast Guard Conflict over Dispersant Ban
Responding to public and political pressure, the Coast Guard and the EPA
issued a joint directive on May 20, 2010 which instructed BP to identify a less toxic
option than Corexit 9500 within 24 hours, and to begin using the alternative within 72
hours. If unable to identify a less toxic alternative, then BP was required to provide a
detailed explanation of what was investigated and why it did not meet the standards.
BP promptly responded the same day with a memo arguing that only five of
the dispersants on the NCP Product Schedule met the qualifications in the directive,
but that one posed even greater risks as an endocrine disruptor. Due to constraints on
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proprietary information of chemical dispersants and the limited testing of their toxicity,
BP claimed that it was unable to effectively test the alternatives.
In short, BP concluded, Corexit appears to have fewer long term
effects than the other dispersants evaluated. BP also made clear that the
company did not, in any event, then have a sufficient stockpile of any
dispersants other than Corexit and Sea Brat #4, and that the Sea Brat
#4 supply might not be sufficient for both surface and subsea use.
Corexit 9500 was the only dispersant used during the remainder of the
spill. (U.S. National Commission 2010b:9)
BP simply refused to find another alternative. Expressing dissatisfaction of BP’s
efforts, EPA administrator Lisa Jackson urged for a reduction in the use of dispersants
and ordered EPA testing to find another option. In a May 26 memo to BP’s Vice
President of Gulf of Mexico Exploration David Rainey, Jackson (2010a) wrote:
…I want to reiterate what Admiral Landry and I stated on a press
conference call yesterday: The EPA and the Coast Guard believe your
response to the directive was insufficient. We believe the response
lacked sufficient analysis and focused more on defending your initial
decisions than on analyzing possible better options. Because we believe
your analysis of potential alternative dispersants was insufficient, the
EPA is performing its own scientific verification of the data BP
presented. In addition, the EPA will perform testing to determine
whether there is indeed a less toxic, more effective dispersant available
in the volumes necessary for a crisis of this magnitude.
Coinciding with the letter, on May 26 the EPA issued another directive which
instructed BP to eliminate the use of surface dispersants with the goal of reducing
numbers 75 percent. Furthermore, subsurface dispersants would be permitted to
continue, but would be capped at 15,000 gallons per calendar day. Only in “rare cases”
would exemption be permitted, and BP was required to make a formal request in
writing justifying the need to apply dispersants to the Coast Guard FOSC.
Despite this directive, dispersant use persisted. According to the National
Commission (2010b:11):
The effort to scale back use of dispersants had some effect. During the
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week of May 18, 2010, BP applied 190,000 gallons total. The
following week, it applied roughly two-thirds as much (135,000
gallons). Surface use fell from 120,000 gallons the week of May 18,
2010, to 40,000 gallons the week of May 25, 2010, although it then
rose again and remained steady for several weeks at 80-90,000 gallons
per week. By the end of May, BP had used a total of 950,000 gallons
of dispersants, of which 740,000 were applied on the surface and
210,000 subsea.
Over the course of the last three weeks (June 22-July 12), the amount of subsea
dispersant use grew to outweigh the use of surface dispersants. However, as
Congressman Markey pointed out in memos to both the EPA and the Coast Guard,
BP had exceeded the 15,000 gallon limit on four different occasions (May 28, May 30,
June 6, and June 20) (Markey 2010).
Far from granting exemptions in “rare cases,” the Coast Guard offered little
resistance and granted nearly every request to apply more dispersants.
On July 12, 2010, Admiral Allen’s Chief of Staff informed Rep.
Edward Markey that dispersants were used - only when absolutely
necessary to preserve the health and safety of workers at the well site
and to minimize shoreline impacts. On July 30, 2010, Rep. Markey sent
a letter to Admiral Allen pointing to more than 74 BP exemption
requests in 48 days, of which all but ten were fully approved by the
Coast Guard. Rep. Markey alleged - these applications appear to be
rubber stamped by the Coast Guard. (U.S. National Commission
2010b:12)
In some cases, the Coast Guard even preapproved dispersant use for a week. Without
the Coast Guard to oversee and enforce the mandate, BP was permitted to continue
applying the toxic dispersants in spite of the EPA’s opposition.
While the EPA repeatedly requested more information on why BP sought so
many exemptions, the Coast Guard viewed frequent dispersant approval as a strategic
tool to prevent damage to the coastline. As described by the National Commission
(2011:160):
These different perspectives on dispersants led to conflicts between
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EPA and the Coast Guard. For example, on June 7, BP requested
permission to spray dispersants on several large slicks. Despite FederalOn Scene Coordinator Rear Admiral James Watson’s statement that he
had “determined aerial dispersant the best and only way to mitigate the
pending landfall effect of the oil spotted,” EPA would not approve the
exemption. The Coast Guard captain leading the majority of front-line
operations was furious. “It would be a travesty,” he wrote, “if the oil
hits the beach because we did not use the tools available to fight this
offshore. This responsibility needs to be placed squarely in EPA’s court
if it does hit the shoreline.” Later that day, without having received
responses to its requests for additional data, EPA threatened to issue a
directive “to stop the use of all dispersants.”
In this sense, Coast Guard officials felt that the EPA was hindering response efforts
and ran the risk of causing even greater environmental damage as a result. Although
they attempted to appear unified in their response, disagreements between the EPA
and Coast Guard over dispersant approval continued. The National Commission
(2011:161) asserts:
But disagreements came to a boil again in mid-July. By this point, EPA
had finally installed a senior official, Assistant Administrator for Solid
Waste and Emergency Response Mathy Stanislaus, on the ground at
Unified Area Command. On July 13, BP’s head of dispersant
operations made a request to apply 10,000 gallons to slicks. The
request ultimately went to Stanislaus, who denied it, noting that
skimming in particular had been extremely effective over the past few
days. The Federal On-Scene Coordinator (by this time Rear Admiral
Paul Zukunft) replied that he could not “take the dispersant tool out of
my kit when” oil threatened to hit environmentally sensitive areas in
Louisiana…The back-and-forth continued, with BP ultimately
prohibited from using dispersants on July 14. The capping of the well
the next day tabled the conflict.
According to the EPA, since the well was capped on June 15, only 200 gallons of
dispersant had been applied to the Gulf.
Despite the heated disputes between the EPA and the Coast Guard, in
retrospect, both Admiral Allen and Administer Jackson have stated that they were
satisfied with the amount of dispersants used. However, as the National Commission
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(2010b:19) highlights the lack of government information necessary to make an
informed response:
Perhaps more than anything, the Deepwater Horizon experience with
dispersants reveals the paucity of the kind of information that
government officials need to make intelligent decisions about dispersant
use in response to an oil spill. Although the absence of such information
was well known before April 20, 2010, its practical effect had not been
so glaringly realized.
While claiming success in the dispersant battle, the Coast Guard’s review of the
incident reached similar conclusions about the lack of information available to
policymakers and industry insiders alike.
There were no operational protocols or scientific information available
to assist decision makers in using this response option. Despite many
years of experience in the use of dispersants, the lack of current science
regarding the fate and effect of dispersed oil and its toxicity hindered
the ability of responders and agency officials to adequately address
these public concerns. (U.S. Coast Guard 2011: 43)
Similarly, there is little scientific information on what will happen to the dispersed oil
and the effects it might have on marine life in the Gulf.
The battle over dispersant use highlights the conflict within and between
responding government agencies and the responsible party. In response to public
concern over the toxicity of dispersants, the EPA capitalized on the uncertainty in
jurisdiction over subsea application and attempted to unsuccessfully assert authority.
When ordered to find a less toxic alternative than Corexit, BP refused without
suffering any ramifications. Moreover, while the Coast Guard appeared publicly in
support of the directive, they functionally negated the EPA’s efforts by permitting BP
to continuing using dispersants thereby facilitating the company’s deviance.
Above all, the unrestrained, unprecedented use of dispersants in the Gulf
allowed BP to conceal the amount of oil unleashed by Macondo. Once broken down
into tiny droplets, the oil lingered in the form of plumes that were no longer visible
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from the surface. While reducing the amount of oil causing damage to the shoreline,
dispersants present an unknown danger to the marine life in the Gulf, the severity of
which scientists are only beginning to understand.
Chemical dispersants were undoubtedly effective in preventing some of the oil
from reaching the surface of the ocean and reaching land. But once large amounts of
oil did inevitably begin to wash ashore, BP and the Coast Guard began to implement a
coordinated plan of action to prevent the media and the public from viewing the extent
of the environmental damage reeked by the Deepwater Horizon disaster.
Preventing Visibility: The Media Blackout
As the oil made landfall, the powerful images of dead and dying wildlife
doused in oil quickly surfaced in the media and provided the public with a stark
realization of just how bad the spill really was. In coordination with federal, state, and
local law enforcement, BP acted quickly to block coverage of cleanup operations by
prohibiting media contact with workers, limiting access to the coastline and airspace
over the Gulf and harassing photographers and journalists. Beyond censoring media,
on more than one occasion BP was caught altering official images of the response to
make the company appear more active in operations than they actually were.
Furthermore, BP also attempted to positively shape their public image by purchasing
Google advertisements that would redirect internet traffic searching for information on
the “Gulf of Mexico Spill” to BP sponsored sites. Collectively, this evidence suggests
a coordinated effort by BP to control the images flowing from the Gulf, facilitated by
the support of federal, local and private law enforcement.
The Brown Pelican: The Spill Mascot
As Louisiana’s state bird, the brown pelican has a special significance in the
Gulf. Fighting for its existence, in the 1950s and 1960s the brown pelican was nearly

201
made extinct by pesticide poisoning, leading to its placement on the national
Endangered Species Act. In an effort to rescue their state mascot, Louisiana imported
the birds from Florida to establish a breeding population. So successful was the
program that brown pelicans were removed from the list the year prior to the spill.
The initial reports of oil soaked birds began to surface on April 30 and “From then on,
crude-covered animals were a fixture in the media coverage and public perceptions of
the disaster” (U.S. National Commission 2011:141).
As a senior official of the US Fish and Wildlife Service, the agency that
oversaw the animal response and rehabilitation efforts, James Harris stated:
“I think it's possible that they might come to symbolise the whole
disaster,” he said. “For the people of Louisiana, the brown pelican is
just as much a symbol of the state as the American eagle is for the
nation as a whole, and to see the state emblem being threatened again
and despoiled – people are very upset and angry about that.”
(McCarthy 2010)
“They’re definitely everlasting at this point,’ said Denis Paquin, the deputy director of
photography at The Associated Press. ‘That is the power of still photos. This is the
start of it, in a sense. They have become that iconic yet horrible vision of what people
had expected to see” (Dunlap 2010). When confronted with the devastating effects of
the spill on wildlife, a collective interspecies empathy was invoked in the public:
“You will remember a bird completely covered in oil,” Mr. Paquin said.
“In the eyes, you can see there’s something wrong. And you can study
it. The eyes always tell a story.” It is important, too, that most of the
birds pictured by Mr. Riedel [an Associated Press photographer] and
Mr. McNamee [a photographer for Getty Images] were alive. To the
extent that anthropomorphic empathy kicks in, it comes much more
easily looking at an individual, sentient creature and wondering, “What
would that even feel like?” (Dunlap 2010)
Some people claim that BP acted deliberately to hide the impact the spill was
having on wildlife. Moreover, reports also surfaced that BP was barring cleanup
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workers from taking photos of dead animals that had washed ashore (Sheppard 2010).
One BP contractor working on cleanup operations stated that, “There is a lot of
coverup for BP. They specifically informed us that they don't want these pictures of
the dead animals. They know the ocean will wipe away most of the evidence. It's
important to me that people know the truth about what's going on here,” the
contractor said” (Lysiak 2010).
Hiding the bodies
On a June 14, 2010 MSNBC interview with Keith Olbermann on
“Countdown,” marine toxicologist Riki Ott described BP’s efforts to contain their
crimes in the Gulf both by hiding the carcasses of wildlife and preventing cleanup
workers from photographing the evidence.
“Turtle watch volunteers who walk the beaches consistently every
morning at 6:00 a.m., they’re saying the carcasses are disappearing,”
Ott told host Keith Olbermann. “People who walk the beaches at night,
they’ve seen little baby dolphins wash up dead, flashlights, people
descend out of nowhere, carcass gone in 15 minutes. There’s reports
from offshore of massive kills on the barrier islands from fishermen
who have been working on the spill response… BP’s response has been
to use metal detectors to keep and prevent the people from even taking
cell phones out to photograph this.” (Edwards 2010)
“I’ve been able to get some pictures of BP raking up bird carcasses,
separating heads from bodies,” Ott said later in the interview.
“Supposedly, NOAA is saying, oh, these carcasses are all going to be
autopsied so we can determine cause of death. You’re not going to
autopsy a carcass where the head is removed from the body. So, in my
opinion, there’s a very strong attempt, not only to control and minimize
how much oil was spilling, but now, to control the evidence of the
damage, the appearance of carcasses.” (Edwards 2010)
The ability of images to speak truth to power cannot be underestimated: Seeing is
believing. Learning lessons from the 1969 Santa Barbara as well as the Exxon Valdez
spills in which images of oiled shorelines, dead whales, turtles and seals helped fuel the
American environmental movement, congressional leaders warned that environmental
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damage from Deepwater Horizon could similarly incite the public (Soraghan 2010).
Once the oil began to wash ashore after May 20, suppressing these images from public
view became a primary object of the response that required a massive coordination of
federal, state and local law enforcement in cooperation with private security.
Coast Guard: “This is BP’s Rules, Not Ours”
In the wake of the spill, the Gulf region was bombarded by journalists and
citizens seeking to document its effects. Beginning in May, numerous accounts began
to surface of journalists being turned away by BP contractors, private security, the
Coast Guard, and other law enforcement officials. According to Philips (2010):
Photographers who have traveled to the Gulf commonly say they
believe that BP has exerted more control over coverage of the spill with
the cooperation of the federal government and local law enforcement.
“It’s a running joke among the journalists covering the story that the
words ‘Coast Guard’ affixed to any vehicle, vessel, or plane should be
prefixed with ‘BP,’” says Charlie Varley, a Louisiana-based
photographer. “It would be funny if it were not so serious.”
An initial report of censorship on May 20 occurred when a crew from CBS News
attempting to document the spill was threatened with arrest if they did not turn their
boat around. The Coast Guard official reportedly explained, “this is BP’s rules, not
ours” (Evans 2010).
Mac McClelland, a journalist for Mother Jones, also was confronted by police
when trying to document the spill. On May 22, 2010, McClelland was refused access
to Elmer’s Island by a Jefferson Parish sheriff deputy who claims he is just “doing
what they told me to do.” While trying to gain access to the island, McClelland
(2010c) recounts her exchange with BP representative Barbara Martin:
We tell her that deputies were just yelling at us, and she seems truly
upset. For one, she's married to a Jefferson Parish sheriff's deputy. For
another, “We don't need more of a black eye than we already have.”
“But it wasn't BP that was yelling at us, it was the sheriff's office,” we
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say.
“Yeah, I know, but we have…a very strong relationship.”
“What do you mean? You have a lot of sway over the sheriff's office?”
“Oh yeah.”
“How much?”
“A lot.”
When I tell Barbara I am a reporter, she stalks off and says she's not
talking to me, then comes back and hugs me and says she was just
playing. I tell her I don't understand why I can't see Elmer's Island
unless I'm escorted by BP. She tells me BP's in charge because “it’s
BP’s oil.”
Interestingly, even a year after the spill in March 2011, McClelland again tried to gain
access to Elmer’s Island and was once again denied, this time by BP private security.
The guard informed McClelland that she would have to get permission from central
command. Upon obtaining permission and under close watch of a security guard,
McClelland was allowed access to the wide open beach, which one year later
continued to be tarnished by tar balls from the Macondo spill (McClelland 2011a).
In the instances that press were granted access, it was done with strict
oversight from BP and the Coast Guard. Photographers were escorted by BP officials
on boats and aircraft contracted by BP, thereby granting BP control over what could
be seen. As Philips (2010) documents:
One of those instances occurred early last week, when Herbert
accompanied local officials from Plaquemines Parish in a police boat on
a trip to Breton Island, a national wildlife refuge off the barrier islands
of Louisiana. With them was Jean-Michel Cousteau, son of Jacques,
who wanted to study the impact of the oil below the surface of the
water. Upon approaching the island, a Coast Guard boat stopped them.
“The first question was, ‘Is there any press with you?’ says Herbert.
They answered yes, and the Coast Guard said they couldn’t be there.
Even members of Congress and state legislatures were denied access to the Gulf if
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they had photographers and reporters as part of their entourage.
Last week, Senator Bill Nelson, Democrat of Florida, tried to bring a
small group of journalists with him on a trip he was taking through the
gulf on a Coast Guard vessel. Mr. Nelson’s office said the Coast Guard
agreed to accommodate the reporters and camera operators. But at
about 10 p.m. on the evening before the trip, someone from the
Department of Homeland Security’s legislative affairs office called the
senator’s office to tell them that no journalists would be allowed. “They
said it was the Department of Homeland Security’s response-wide
policy not to allow elected officials and media on the same ‘federal
asset,’ ” said Bryan Gulley, a spokesman for the senator. “No further
elaboration” was given, Mr. Gulley added.” (Peters 2010)
While it appears that DHS was involved in imposing the ban on media coverage of the
oil spill, it is not entirely clear whether media coverage restrictions came from the
White House, Coast Guard, or BP.
Coast Guard 65 foot “Safety Zone”
Though the policy had been informal since response operations began, on July
1, 2010 Admiral Allen officially announced a ban on civilians and media within 65 feet
of cleanup equipment, workers and animals. Penalties for violating the “safety zone”
included a Class D felony violation, a $40,000 fine and possible jail time. Shortly
thereafter on July 6, a spokesperson for the Admiral Allen released a statement
elaborating that the zone was implemented due to concerns over vandalism:
Last week Coast Guard Captains of the Port in the region put in place
limited, small waterside safety zones around protective boom and those
vessels actively responding to this spill. This was required due to recent
instances of protective boom being vandalized or broken by nonresponse vessels getting too close. These 20-meter zones are only
slightly longer than the distance from a baseball pitcher's mound to
home plate. This distance is insignificant when gathering images. In
fact, these zones, which do not target the press, can and have been
opened for reporters as required. (Wang 2010c)
Furthermore, the enforced zones were not a complete ban on media access as the
Coast Guard would consider applications for permission to enter the safety zones,
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though they would be decided on a case-by-case basis.
Federal Aviation Administration Flight Restrictions
Flight restrictions were expanded on May 11, 2010 to require private aircraft
to obtain permission from BP’s command center in order to fly over large sections of
the Gulf encompassing most of the Louisiana coastline. In the event that a request was
denied, the aircraft was then required to stay 3,000 feet above the restricted area.
From this vantage point, the visibility of operations and the effects of the oil were
extremely limited. One encounter with the flight restrictions:
The latest instance of denied press access comes from Belle Chasse,
La.-based Southern Seaplane Inc., which was scheduled to take a New
Orleans Times-Picayune photographer for a flyover on Tuesday
afternoon, and says it was denied permission once BP officials learned
that a member of the press would be on board. “We are not at liberty to
fly media, journalists, photographers, or scientists,” the company said in
a letter it sent on Tuesday to Sen. David Vitter (R-La.). “We strongly
feel that the reason for this massive [temporary flight restriction] is that
BP wants to control their exposure to the press.” (Philips 2010)
In response to the media blackout, numerous organizations responded. For
example, the National Press Photographers Association (2010) asked President Obama
to rescind the ban on members of the media from talking with cleanup workers and to
institute a more reasonable safety zone for journalist covering the spill.
Vessels of Opportunity Program
Similarly, charter boat captains and local fisherman were also coerced by BP
not to talk to the press about cleanup operations (Philips 2010). Even though BP
continued to maintain that it was not blocking media access to the response, the
contracts of those participating in the Vessels of Opportunity (VOO) program that
went into effect May 2, 2010 prohibit unauthorized media contact. The VOO program
employed people in the fishing industry at risk of losing their jobs due to the spill in the
cleanup efforts (Frohne and Dearing 2010).
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The contract included a clause prohibiting them and their deckhands
from making “news releases, marketing presentation, or any other
public statements” while working on the clean-up. It also included an
additional section titled “Agreement Regarding Proprietary and
Confidential Information,” which states that workers cannot disclose
“Data” gathered while on the job, including “plans,” “reports,”
“information” and “etc.” (Frohne and Dearing 2010)
For those dependent on the Gulf for survival left without an income because of the
spill, speaking to the press about their experiences with the cleanup efforts could cost
them what little remained of their livelihood. Frohne and Dearing (2010) conclude that
“Ultimately, BP is not directly limiting media contact, but the contract added more
uncertainty on top of what the fishermen are already experiencing.”
Policing the Media Blockade
The media blockade of the oil spill was enforced by a complex web of federal,
state, and local law enforcement as well as private security guards hired by BP.
Beyond media reports, there is little information about the structure and functioning of
law enforcement agencies and private security organizations during the response
operations. Based on numerous accounts from photographers and journalists from
mainstream and alternative news organizations alike, it appears clear that there was a
coordinated effort to block media and citizen access to the Gulf shoreline.
Reacting to mounting reports of Sherriff’s Departments obstructing public
access to the spill, on June 28, 2010 the American Civil Liberties Union of Louisiana
authored a letter to parish sheriffs in the Gulf to remind them of the First Amendment
rights of journalists and citizens. The letter documents multiple instances of law
enforcement blocking media access was reported to the ACLU. According to the
ACLU’s letter:
Several reporters have been told not to film at spill sites in Louisiana.
Incidents include attempts to film on a beach in Grand Isle and near
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Venice. Reporters are told that they are not allowed to record because
BP doesn’t want filming there.
Elmer’s Island Wildlife Refuge, off of Grand Isle, is blocked by
Jefferson Parish deputies. Deputies told one photographer not to
photograph them blocking the road.
At least one person was told by a Terrebonne Parish sheriff’s deputy
working private security detail for BP that he wasn’t allowed to film
outside of the BP building in Houma from a private, non-BP-owned
field across the street. The deputy admitted that the guy wasn’t
breaking any laws but tired to intimidate him into stopping filming and
leaving anyway.
We have reason to believe that deputies in other coastal parishes may
also be working with BP to impede or prevent access to public lands
and to interfere with members of the public and the media. (Esman
2010)
Louisiana Sheriff’s Deputies
One citizen, Drew Wheelan, the conservation coordinator for the American
Birding Association, had been stopped by BP private security while filming the BP
building/Deepwater Horizon command center in Houma Louisiana from across the
street in a field, on property not owned by BP. He was then approached by a Louisiana
Sheriff’s deputy who asked for his identification. According to McClelland (2010b):
Here’s the key exchange:
Wheelan: “Am I violating any laws or anything like that?”
Officer: “Um...not particularly. BP doesn’t want people filming.”
Wheelan: “Well, I'm not on their property so BP doesn’t have anything
to say about what I do right now.”
Officer: “Let me explain: BP doesn’t want any filming. So all I can
really do is strongly suggest that you not film anything right now. If
that makes any sense.”
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After being allowed to leave, Wheelan was then pulled over and questioned by BP
Chief of Security as the officer stood by. Once they did finally let him go, McClelland
(2010b) states:
“Then two unmarked security cars followed me,” Wheelan told me.
“Maybe I'm paranoid, but I was specifically trying to figure out if they
were following me, and every time I pulled over, they pulled over.”
This went on for 20 miles. Which does little to mitigate my own
developing paranoia about reporting from what can feel like a
corporate-police state.
In some instances, photographers were even stopped and questioned at BP
facilities nowhere near the coast. While photographing a sign on a public roadway near
BP’s Texas City refinery plant in preparation for a story with PBS Frontline,
ProPublica photographer Lance Rosenfeld was detained by a BP security guard, a
local police officer and a man who identified himself as from the Department of
Homeland Security. After reviewing Rosenfeld’s photographs and determining them
not to be a threat, they took down his name, date of birth, social security number and
other personal information before letting him go (Engelberg 2010). Before the
encounter had ended, the BP security guard requested Rosenfeld’s personal
information, which he had given to the local officer. When Rosenfeld refused, the BP
guard asked the local officer who relinquished the information to him. According to
the officer, the information was necessary so BP could file a Homeland Security threat
report, though he had already been deemed not to be a threat (Rosenfeld 2010). In
response to the encounter, a BP spokesman claimed that the security guard was
following the industry practice of reviewing potential terrorist threats and referring
them to the Joint Terrorism Task Force as required by federal law (Engelberg 2010).
Private Security Contractors
As documented by Scahill (2010), Wackenhut was hired to do perimeter
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security for the Deepwater Horizon Unified Command jointly run by BP and multiple
federal agencies including the Coast Guard, DHS and DOD. The decision to hire
Wackenhut to provide security for the Command Center was poorly timed since it had
recently been revealed that a division of Wackenhut assigned to guard the U.S.
embassy in Afghanistan was involved in a hazing scandal that took place amidst an
environment akin to “Lord of the Flies.” After being denied access by Wackenhut
personnel to interview Unified Command officials at the Center, Naomi Klein, who
spent time in the Gulf following Hurricane Katrina documenting profiteering and
privatization, commented:
“The whole Gulf Coast is a corporate oil state,” she told me. “It's like
BP broke it, so now they own the entire Gulf Coast.” She added: “We
might accept the premise that BP is best positioned to know how to fix
the blow up at 5,000 feet, but that also seems to mean they think they
should control media access and the entire clean up of a massive
national emergency. BP is in charge of everything. We were on the
water in open seas the day before the Wackenhut incident and a boat
pulled up next to us and asked if we worked for BP and we said, ‘No,’
and they said, ‘You can't be here.’ It is completely sci-fi. It's a
corporate state.” (Scahill 2010)
BP also hired private security company Talon Security to prevent citizen and
journalist access to beaches and cleanup operations. Reporter Scott Walker from New
Orleans 6WDSU was confronted by representatives from Talon Security who
attempted to block him from interviewing cleanup workers on a local beach. Finding
additional information about the contracts between BP and Talon Security, however,
is challenging (Rawnsley 2010).
St. Bernhard Perish Sheriff Scandal
There were also reports of corruption and cronyism in private security
contracts involving St. Bernhard Parish Sheriff deputies. During the spill response, a
company owned by the cousin and business partner of St. Bernard Parish Sheriff Jack
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Stephens oversaw private security work by deputies. The contract, which lasted nearly
five months and totaled nearly $900,000, was quite lucrative and required very
minimal oversight. Deputies from the St. Bernhard Parish Sheriff’s Department, both
on duty and off, provided all of the security detail for the parish, yet no documentation
was kept of the details of off-duty hours worked performed by department deputies
for Tony Fernandez Jr.’s (the cousin of Sheriff Stephens) company.
Unlike other departments which require greater transparency in the private
contract work of their officers, St. Bernhard Parish department decided to outsource
the jobs as separate private contracts between the deputies and their employers. “In
the case of the BP spill, the private details during the summer were not arranged by the
Sheriff's Office. Instead, Parish Oilfield Services LLC, a company owned by
Fernandez, collected money from BP and distributed it to the deputies working the
off-duty shifts” (Kirkham 2010). Fernandez’s company continued to provide private
security for BP in the parish until August at which time Professional Network
Consulting Services was contracted by BP to manage security (Kirkham 2010).
While it cannot be known for certain if the St. Bernhard Parish Sherriff’s
Department scandal is indicative of other private-public law enforcement relationships
following Deepwater Horizon, BP’s use of private contractors deterred supervision of
their activities. As the media’s encounters with public-private law enforcement
highlight, at times it was nearly impossible to decipher the difference between the two.
And in most cases it was not clear whose laws they were enforcing: BP’s rules or the
government’s.
Altering Images
Photoshopping Official Images of Response
On more than one occasion in mid-July, BP took efforts to deliberately alter
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official images of the spill response using Adobe Photoshop. The alterations give the
impression that BP officials were engaged in more sensational action then the original
photographs document. In the first instance, a photo of the Command Center in
Houston shows workers monitoring a wall of ten giant video screens displaying
underwater images of the leak. The manipulations were made public when a blogger
for the website “Americablog” wrote about the editing that had taken place (Aravosis
2011). A spokesperson for BP admitted that two of the screens had actually been
blank in the original picture and three remote-operated vehicle images had been added
with photo-editing software. Furthermore, the spokesperson commented that BP had
ordered its workers to only use Photoshop for corrections such as color, cropping and
removing glare. BP claimed that the photographer was “just showing off his
Photoshop skills and there was no ill intent” (Hutchinson 2010). In further
clarification, “BP spokesperson Scott Dean told Surge Desk that the photo was altered
in post-production by the photographer and a team of editors, to make the scene
“more panoramic,” but that it was a mistake and that the company has not and will not
be doing any similar adjustments” (Franzen 2010).
The very next day, BP was once again caught doctoring images on their official
website. The second photo, titled “View of the MC 252 site from the cockpit of a PHI
S-92 helicopter 26 June 2010” was taken from the inside of a helicopter and appears
to show it flying over the Gulf in response to the Deepwater Horizon rig. However, a
number of objects in the picture contradict the appearance that it is flying. “Among the
problems identified included part of a control tower appearing in the top of the top left
of the picture, different shades of colours, its pilot holding a pre-flight checklist and its
control gauges showing the helicopter’s door and ramp open and its parking brake
engaged” (Hough 2010). For those familiar with the program Photoshop, these glaring
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mistakes gave the impression that whoever made the alterations did so deliberately to
make a point, or was totally inept at their job.
In response to the fumbled alterations, Wired magazine asked readers to “Help
BP Learn How to Use Photoshop” by demonstrating true Photoshop proficiency and
submitting their own alterations of BP’s photos:
BP claims these truly pathetic Photoshop jobs are the work of a
contract photographer. It’s hard to know what to believe about this,
but if there really is a photographer who took it upon himself to mess
with these images, then this individual should be ashamed. We just
can’t decide which is more shameful, the complete lack of ethics or the
complete lack of Photoshop skill. So let’s lend poor, embattled BP a
hand and show them what people who actually know how to use
Photoshop can do. (Mason 2010b)
Their response was one of caustic wit, using the photos to aim poignant humor at
BP’s utter failures in the Gulf. One example is the image of the pilots in the helicopter
from the second doctored photo, parked in front of a McDonald’s drive thru menu;
titled by the artist, “BP Pilots Take a Lunch Break; Sure, we’ll fix the leak, right after
our hot apple pie” (Mason 2010a).
Redirecting Internet Searches
In yet another attempt to shape their public image, BP also sought to redirect
the flow of internet traffic by purchasing Google AdWords for terms such as “gulf oil
spill.” Funding such advertisements elevates the website link, and thus the message
sponsored by BP, to the top of the list of search results. As Burkart (2010) astutely
comments:
Is it really a big deal? Yes and no. If buying a top-level Google
AdWord is a sin, it is certainly at the bottom of a very long list. But
when you click on the official BP website link and see the lovely,
perfectly white beaches on the home page, it’s hard not to get mad. I
marvel at the haunting parallel between BP's handling of oil and their
handling of public communications...

214
Burkart’s remark drives home the point that it is not merely an instance of photo
alteration, sponsoring, or deception that indicts BP for its misdeeds during the spill.
What is more significant is the deliberately orchestrated campaign between state and
corporate officials to conceal from the public the environmental damage caused by
BP’s oil.
As the oil from Macondo washed ashore, the federal government in
cooperation with BP established a media blackout throughout the Gulf of Mexico
region that was enforced by federal, state, and local law enforcement alongside BP’s
private security forces. One element of the blockade the Coast Guard’s 65 foot
“safety zone” around all cleanup operations which prohibited both journalists and
citizens alike from viewing the effects of the spill and the state-corporate response.
The Federal Aviation Administration followed suit by implementing flight restrictions
over the Gulf which prohibited media flights below 3,000 feet making it virtually
impossible to document the extent of the damage from the air. Furthermore, BP took
efforts to restrict private responders using their own boats in the cleanup effort
through the Vessels of Opportunity program which contractually prohibited
participants from making public statements or talking to the media about response
operations.
Enforcing the restrictions on access to cleanup operations along the Gulf of
Mexico was a complicated network of law enforcement from the Department of
Homeland Security, the Coast Guard, and the Louisiana County Sheriff’s officers in
cooperation with BP private security from Wackenhut and Talon Security, among
others. As the accounts of multiple journalists, scientists and citizens makes clear, at
times it was nearly impossible to determine exactly who was enforcing the blockade on
the Gulf. By some reports, the Coast Guard was taking orders from BP, whose
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private security forces worked as coequals alongside the Sheriff and DHS. Regardless
of who was calling the shots, law enforcement and private security nonetheless
enforced the rules, barring the public from viewing the devastating effects of the spill.
When the effects of the spill could not be concealed by dispersants, nor hidden
from public view through a media blackout, BP went as far as to deliberately alter
official images of the response efforts. Twice in two days BP was caught by internet
bloggers who identified, unveiled, and then mocked the amateur Photoshopping skills
used to make the company appear more active in photographs of response efforts then
they actually were. Moreover, BP also bought advertisements from Google AdWords
that redirected web searches for information about the Gulf of Mexico spill to the
company’s website. Combined with efforts to restrict access to the cleanup operations,
BP’s manipulation of official images and directing the flow of internet traffic suggests
a coordinated campaign to suppress and distort images and information about the
effects of the spill.
Conclusions
In the response to the spill, the federal government and BP worked as cocombatants with the shared goal of limiting the visibility of the damage caused by the
oil by using unprecedented amounts of toxic dispersants, prohibiting access to cleanup
operations, and manipulating official images and information of the response. The
Coast Guard especially played an active role in helping to facilitate concealment of the
environmental effects. Spurred to action by public pressure, the EPA tried
unsuccessfully to exert control over dispersant use. Despite the joint directive to
inhibit the use of dispersants and the requirement that BP seek Coast Guard approval,
the agency’s allegiance became evident as they provided the opportunity for
unrestrained application of the toxic chemicals while the EPA struggled to force
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compliance with the mandate. Ultimately, BP never complied with the directive and
the conflict between the EPA and the Coast Guard was downplayed by the Obama
administration.
The oil that could not be concealed by chemical dispersants washed ashore in
early May and as it did, BP and the federal government coordinated a blockade on
media access to all cleanup operations which was enforced by private security, in
coordination with federal, state, and local law enforcement. Violation of the Coast
Guard’s 65 foot safety zone threatened steep fines and jail time for citizens and
journalists that breached its boundaries. Similarly, the FAA issued flight restrictions
which prevented media flights from capturing the extent of the damage from the air.
Furthermore, the admittedly close relationship between BP and the Coast Guard as
“co-combatants” in the war against Macondo was well documented by journalists.
Although at times it appeared that the Coast Guard was following BP’s rules, not the
other way around. The BP-government restrictions on access to response operations
created the opportunity for the environmental damage to be hidden from public view.
The complex matrix of public and private law enforcement that imposed the
blockade operated in coordination, but alluded responsibility. Multiple accounts
suggest that the DHS, Louisiana Sheriff and BP private security worked in unison to
enforce the ban, but it was never clear what organization was in charge. The
distinction between public and private law enforcement in some regards is
meaningless, since many in the Louisiana Sheriff’s office also worked during their off
hours for private contractors hired by BP. Nevertheless, close coordination by BP and
law enforcement at all levels made it possible to suppress images of environmental
devastation reeking havoc on the Gulf from reaching the public.
BP took deliberate and identifiable efforts to control the images and

217
information available to the public about the response to the spill. As if hiding the
evidence of the spill’s effects was not enough, BP went even further to alter official
images of its response operations to make the company appear more active than it
actually was. Moreover, BP also purchased advertisements from Google in an attempt
to control the accessibility of public information about the spill by rerouting the flow
of internet traffic to the company’s official site. In combination, unrestrained
dispersant use, blackout of cleanup operations, close coordination between private
security and law enforcement, and manipulation of information were all attempts by
BP to evade negative public criticism and media scrutiny of the environmental effects
of the spill.
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SECTION IV: CONCLUSIONS
CHAPTER EIGHT: SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
The 2010 Gulf of Mexico Spill: State-Corporate Environmental Crime
As this dissertation has documented, the causes of the Deepwater Horizon
explosion and the response to the blowout of the Macondo well can be classified as an
instance of state-corporate environmental crime. Driven by the pursuit of profit from
deepwater exploration and development in the Gulf of Mexico, the federal government
and the offshore industry have pioneered an inherently environmentally harmful
activity. While the potential to minimize harm to human life through workplace safety
is a debatable topic, environmental harm is an implicit part of offshore industry
operations since oil spills, discharges of drilling mud and other forms of pollution are
routine. In this regard, the very structure of government-oil industry relations
facilitates and ensures continued environmental degradation.
The explosion of the Deepwater Horizon rig and the blowout of the Macondo
well damaged humans, animals and ecological systems. The most apparent and
immediate human harm came from the initial explosion of the rig which killed eleven
people, injured sixteen, and caused great emotional trauma for the surviving crew
members. Moreover, residents of the Gulf coast states also suffered as the oil
destroyed their economic livelihood, leading to increased psychological stress for
many. The environmental harm done to the ecological systems of the Gulf of Mexico
by the uncontrolled flow of oil was devastating. The untested and unprecedented
application of millions of gallons of toxic chemical dispersants further injured wildlife.
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In the two years since the spill, it has become evident that the oil has had lasting
effects for Gulf of Mexico’s ecosystems. For instance, dolphin deaths in the Gulf have
been more than twice the normal rate, leading NOAA to declare an “Unusual
Mortality Event,” although neglecting to draw connections to the spill. Furthermore,
the government was quick to reopen fishing areas in the region immediately following
the spill without seriously considering the effects of the oil on the food chain. Research
on the environmental effects of the spill is ongoing and continues to be a matter of
scientific debate.
Ultimately, the true extent of the environmental harm caused by the disaster
may never be known due to the success of state-corporate efforts to suppress scientific
evidence and information about the spill. The response to the spill by BP and the
federal government illustrates the means by which powerful organizations are able to
hide their environmental crimes from public view. As this study has argued, the
intersection of the federal government and BP working together to conceal widespread
harm to the ecological and biological systems of the Gulf can and must be classified as
a state-corporate environmental crime.
Integrated Theoretical Analysis of the 2010 Gulf of Mexico Spill
Returning to Michalowski and Kramer’s (2006) Integrated Theoretical Model
of State-Corporate Crime, the motivation, opportunity structure and operationality of
social controls at the institutional, industrial, organizational and interactional levels can
be applied to the 2010 Deepwater Horizon explosion and the response to the blowout
of Macondo. As this analysis has demonstrated, the movement of the oil industry into
deeper waters was encouraged by federal policy and coincided with decreasing
regulation of offshore activities in the Gulf of Mexico. By the time the spill had
occurred, the normalization of deviant practices had pervaded the organizational
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cultures of the Minerals Management Service, BP, Transocean and Halliburton. In
response to the spill, the federal government in coordination with BP and private
contractors manipulated scientific evidence surrounding the size spill and suppressed
images and information about the environmental effects. This evidence suggests that a
major goal of the state-corporate response was to cover-up the effects of the blowout
of Macondo through a variety of means.
Causes of the Blowout of Macondo
The causes of the explosion of the Deepwater Horizon rig are rooted in radical
changes to the nature of federal and corporate relations that structure the offshore oil
industry. As the second largest source of federal revenues next to income taxes,
royalties from offshore leases provided a strong motivation for government to expand
deepwater development despite the environmental risks posed. Creating the means for
corporate exploration of the deepwater horizon, legislation passed since the 1980s has
dramatically increased industry choice and access to offshore lands, even at the
expense of greater revenues from leases. Throughout the 1990s, the Gulf of Mexico
was championed as the next big frontier in offshore exploration, but these reserves are
quickly disappearing and discoveries have not lived up to initial promises. Nonetheless,
offshore development in the Gulf of Mexico has expanded immensely in the past
decades as a direct result of federal legislation encouraging deepwater exploration.
The outsourcing of essential services to specialized private contractors is a
dominant trend that began the 1980s and 1990s and has become a normalized practice
throughout the offshore industry today. On the Deepwater Horizon rig, the use of
private contractors to monitor, drill, test and cement the rig was extensive. The
increased use of private contractors fundamentally altered the nature of the offshore
industry, and served as an obstacle to federal oversight. The interdependence between
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lease owners and privately contracted companies to perform vital services contributed
to task segregation and further complicated regulatory efforts. As noted by several
other studies of state-corporate crime, this increasing privatization is not unique to the
oil industry, but is part of a much larger shift in political-economic relations more
broadly. Thus, the changing institutional environment was an enabling factor in the
Gulf of Mexico spill.
The federal government helped shape the opportunity for the Deepwater
Horizon explosion and the blowout of Macondo in a number of ways. Incentivized by
royalties from leasing the outercontinental shelf of the Gulf of Mexico, the federal
government provided the opportunity for expansive offshore development by granting
the oil industry greater access with fewer royalties and less oversight. Implicit in its
conflicting founding missions, corruption at the MMS was rooted in its dual mandates
of regulating the offshore industry while also collecting royalties from the leasing
process. The incompatible functions of the U.S. Geological Survey and the Bureau of
Land Management came to exist within the same agency when Department of Interior
Secretary James Watts created the MMS in 1982 amidst increasing government
deregulation. From that point forward, the operative goal of royalty collection began
to take precedence over regulation of the industry. In the years leading up to the
Deepwater Horizon disaster, relations between the MMS and the oil industry had
become so close that at times it was impossible to tell them apart.
Normalization of deviance at the MMS
The normalization of deviance had infected the organizational culture at the
MMS. Prohibited by federal ethics guidelines, employees at the MMS were having sex,
doing drugs and accepting gifts from oil industry representatives. So normalized was
this behavior that MMS employees involved in collecting royalties even went as far as
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to discuss altering the federal guidelines to legally accommodate their close knit
relationship with the industry. As funding for the MMS declined, the number of
inspectors in the Gulf of Mexico was unable to keep pace with the expansion of
offshore development in the 1990s and 2000s. This expansion placed increased
emphasis on ensuring royalty collection at the agency and employees found it
necessary to undertake illegal means to accomplish their jobs. Lacking funds, staff and
technological expertise, the MMS had relegated the duty of regulation to the industry
itself, thereby relinquishing any control. By the time the MMS Royalty-in-Kind
scandal became public in 2008 the corrupt relationship between the oil industry and
the federal government was already deeply engrained.
Normalization of deviance at BP
Within the organizational culture at BP, deviance had long been an
institutionalized practice not only in its offshore operations in the Gulf of Mexico, but
at it’s facilitates across the US and abroad. As the disasters at Texas City in 2005 and
Prudhoe Bay, Alaska in 2006 attest to, the normalization of deviance had become a
systemic problem across the company. Even though prior investigations had identified
aggressive cost cutting and declining oversight from BP management as causal factors
in these other accidents, the fines imposed did little to impede the company’s reckless
pursuit of profit at the expense of safety. Rather, the disintegration of infrastructure
and management at the company continued to compound without consideration of the
safety and environmental risks posed.
Upon becoming CEO of BP, John Browne implemented a number of changes
that radically altered the organizational structure of the company and provided the
opportunity for the disaster to occur. Enduring recurrent mergers and acquisitions of
other major oil companies, BP went from a second tier player to an industry leader
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overnight. Alongside this rapid growth, Browne enacted policies that functionally
decentralized the company and diminished management oversight, thereby providing
the opportunity for deviant practices to develop. Furthermore, he also ordered
aggressive cost cutting policies which generated pressure across the company to turn
to illegal means to achieve stringent goals. By linking bonuses to short term, variable
cost cutting targets, Browne’s policies encouraged managers at BP to ignore sorely
needed safety upgrades that would show up in the bottom line. Over time, these
incremental increases in the acceptability of risk made a catastrophic outcome
inevitable.
BP was not the only company involved in the Deepwater Horizon explosion to
experience growing normalization of deviance within their organizational culture. A
cursory review of the recent pasts of Transocean and Halliburton also reveals a pattern
of widespread environmental degradation, corruption and illegal behavior. United in a
common pursuit, BP, Transocean and Halliburton were collectively involved in
completing the Macondo well. A pervasive pattern of mismanagement therefore went
beyond the internal workings within each company and existed between these three
companies drilling the Macondo well. Therefore, decisions to quickly finish the well
were made without any internal or external organizational mechanisms for social
control on the Deepwater Horizon rig.
As completion of the well fell behind deadline the emphasis on goal attainment
mounted from BP, and all of the corporations involved were pressured to take
questionable means to finish the job. Motivated by efforts to save time and money, BP
made a number of identifiable decisions concerning the design and cementing of the
well that placed constraints on the actions of Transocean and Halliburton. These last
minute changes were hastily reviewed and approved by the MMS, therefore escaping
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any significant oversight. Insufficient maintenance of the blowout preventer on the
Deepwater Horizon and dismissed forewarnings by management at Transocean and BP
provided the opportunity for the spill to occur. Similarly, the decision by BP to use
fewer centralizers, lighter weight cement and less drilling mud influenced Halliburton’s
cementing operations. Yet this cannot excuse Halliburton’s decision to ignore the
results of failed tests indicating the cement slurry was unstable. Under the leadership of
BP, all of these companies in coordination with each other disregarded environmental
and workplace safety regulations which became increasingly acceptable as the
Macondo well was rushed to completion. With normalized deviance plaguing the
entire Deepwater Horizon team, there was little self regulation by BP, Transocean or
Halliburton. Without any internal or external oversight at the institutional, industrial
and organizational levels, there were no controls to prevent the 2010 Gulf of Mexico
spill.
State-Corporate Cover Up: The Response to the Spill
Once the Macondo well had been unleashed, the primary goal of statecorporate response efforts was to conceal from public view the environmental damage
caused by the spill. There were numerous motivations for federal and private
responders alike to minimize the extent of the oil both through the manipulation of
scientific evidence and the suppression of images. Fearing another federal debacle in
the Gulf like the Bush administration’s 2005 response to Hurricane Katrina, the
Obama administration was concerned with asserting the government’s authority over
response operations. Firmly implicating the executive branch in the state-corporate
cover up, the White House in coordination with the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) had a pivotal influence on response operations through specific agencies within
the Unified Command. Cabinet level agencies within the Department of Interior and
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the DHS including the Coast Guard, the Department of Energy, and the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration undertook efforts to downplay and obscure
the environmental effects of the spill. The calculation of the official flow rate was a
particularly politicized issue in which the Obama administration pressured other
agencies to underestimate the size of the spill and downplay its effects. Similarly, the
White House and the DHS controlled the flow of information concerning response
operations by reviewing and approving all public communications released by Unified
Command and the Coast Guard. Tight control over public communications
surrounding the response gave the Obama administration the ability to shape the
public’s perception of the spill and the state-corporate response.
Underestimation of the flow of oil from the Macondo well was another means
by which BP and the federal government sought to obscure the size and extent of the
spill. During the response the Coast Guard consistently asserted that they were gearing
their efforts towards a worst case discharge scenario, but this information was not
publicly released at the time. Although worst case discharge scenarios cited the
potential for a hypothetical flow from Macondo as large as 250,000 barrels of oil per
day, for the first month of response operations the federal government provided low
estimations of the size of the spill, even when presented with much higher calculations
from independent scientists. The decision to withhold information about size of the
spill including the worst case discharge scenario seems to have come directly from the
White House. Early on in the response, some scientists at NOAA wanted to make
public the worst case discharge scenario, but were denied permission to do so by the
White House Office of Management and Budget. This reluctance to release an
accurate spill rate led many to question what information the federal government had
about the spill and what it was concealing from the public.

226
As public outrage escalated, the federal government was forced to take a more
explicit role in downplaying the scientific evidence of the spills environmental effects.
To establish an estimation of the flow rate the Obama administration appointed two
groups, the Flow Rate Technical Group led by Director of the U.S. Geological Survey
Dr. Marcia McNutt and a team from the Woods Oceanographic Hole Institute led by
Secretary of Energy Dr. Steven Chu. The efforts of the Flow Rate Group to produce
an accurate estimate were thwarted by a senior NOAA scientist on the team who
prematurely released only the lower bounds of the range before it could be peer
reviewed. As an investigation by Public Employees for Environmental Responsibility
has shown, the NOAA scientist was acting in response to pressure from the White
House to underestimate the size of the spill. Moreover, Director McNutt also
expressed frustration in dealing with administration officials at the DOI, DHS, and
Unified Command who persisted in confusing the concept of a lower-bound estimate
with a precise calculation of the flow rate. In the end the team led by Secretary of
Energy Chu produced what came to be seen as the “official” flow rate of 62,000
barrels per day at the peak of the spill, or 4.9 million barrels in total. In these ways, the
Obama administration influenced government science advisors to obscure the size of
the spill.
Scientific propaganda
Alongside the release of the official flow rate was a report from NOAA that
evaluated the fate of the oil and the effectiveness of response efforts. Released in
August 2010 with great fanfare from the White House, NOAA’s Oil Budget
proclaimed that much of the oil in the Gulf had disappeared, even before the drilling of
the relief wells had been completed in mid-September. The release of the official flow
rate and the Oil Budget were both means by which the federal government sought to
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mislead the public about the environmental damage caused by the spill. Questioning
the government’s official account of the fate of the oil, independent scientists had
already identified massive plumes lurking beneath the ocean comprised of dispersed
oil, yet officials within the Coast Guard and NOAA initially sought to discredit and
disregard their findings. As peer reviewed evidence of the oil plumes continued to
grow, NOAA was forced to admit the existence of large “ephemeral clouds” of oil. As
recently as August 2011, there were continued reports that oil may still be seeping
from the Macondo well, yet both the Coast Guard and BP have denied such claims.
Finally, in the months of the spill NOAA in collaboration with BP created a
propaganda campaign throughout Gulf coast public schools in an attempt to dispel
“myths” about the harmful environmental effects of chemical dispersants. All of this
evidence suggests a coordinated effort led by the Obama administration to facilitate a
cover-up of the environmental effects of the oil.
The federal government was not alone in its attempts to manipulate scientific
evidence surrounding the spill. Part of a growing trend, Big Oil has increasingly
invested in research initiatives with public universities. Brokered by Dr. Steven Chu in
2008, BP’s $500 million Biosciences Institute at UC Berkeley forged the largest ever
private-public research partnership. Following the blowout of Macondo, BP similarly
established the Gulf of Mexico Research Initiative (GMRI) to fund “independent”
research on the environmental effects of the spill. Funding through the GMRI granted
BP a means to influence scientific evidence surrounding the extent of the
environmental damage. University scientists throughout the Gulf region were
approached by BP to conduct contracted research, leading the president of the
American Association of University Professors to accuse BP of attempting to silence
researchers from sharing their findings with the public. Furthermore, the use of
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contracts by both BP and Transocean to quiet not only researchers, but clean up
workers and survivors of the explosion as well, was a recurring means of concealing
corporate criminality.
Concealing the damage
Driven by the overarching goal of preventing the oil from reaching the
shoreline, the application of unprecedented amounts of hazardous chemical dispersants
both at the wellhead and to the surface was another means by which BP and the
federal government hid the amount of oil. Under the Oil Spill Pollution Act, BP’s
financial liability was directly linked to the amount of oil flowing from Macondo and
the measurable environmental impacts of the spill; thus the company was clearly
motivated to use dispersants to hide the amount of oil visible from the surface. The
motivations of the federal government were to contain the financial impact of the spill
to the region’s tourism and fishing industries, not to mention the continued
development of offshore oil leasing in the Gulf of Mexico. Approved by the EPA for
use in oil spill cleanup, BP chose to use Corexit 9500 and 9527 manufactured by
Nalco, one of the most toxic and least effective dispersant options. One motivating
factor for the selection of such an inefficient option had to do with BP’s shared board
of directors with Nalco. As the spill dragged on, public concern over the
environmental and human health effects of Corexit forced the EPA to take action.
Even though the EPA and the Coast Guard issued a joint directive that BP select a less
toxic and more efficient option, the EPA was unable to force BP to comply.
Furthermore, rather than regulate BP’s use of dispersants as specified by the directive,
the Coast Guard facilitated the company’s continued application of the hazardous
Corexit. Viewing themselves as “co-combatants” alongside BP in the fight against the
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spill, the Coast Guard worked hand-in-hand with the company to hide the effects of
the oil from public view.
Censoring images
Immediately following the explosion of Deepwater Horizon, controlling
information and images surrounding the spill became a primary goal of state-corporate
response efforts. In the early hours of the fire, Transocean with support from the
Coast Guard issued a blackout of telephone and internet communications for rigs
throughout the Gulf of Mexico. Also prohibited from contacting their family members,
the traumatized survivors of the explosion were interrogated, drug tested and coerced
into signing waivers by representatives from the MMS, the Coast Guard, and lawyers
from Transocean. Delayed on board for hours before being reunited with their loved
ones, some survivors felt that government and corporate officials were trying to get
their story straight before going public with the information. Once initial images of the
Deepwater Horizon engulfed in flames finally reached the public, they had been
carefully provided by the Coast Guard. In this regard, the isolated location of the
blowout allowed for careful coordination of information and images by state and
corporate officials in the immediate aftermath of the incident.
When the oil from Macondo inevitably reached the coastline despite the
application of chemical dispersants, the federal government implemented a regional
blackout of media communications in various capacities. Access to cleanup operations,
beaches and airspace was blocked through restrictions issued by the Coast Guard and
the Federal Aviation Administration, thereby limiting public visibility of the spill.
Journalists and citizens alike were prohibited from viewing and documenting not only
the devastating effects of the spill, but state-corporate response efforts as well. The
ban on access to cleanup operations helped cover up the environmental effects of the
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spill and contained public outrage. Additionally, the overrepresentation of vulnerable
populations such as unemployed persons, racial minorities and inmate labor in the most
hazardous cleanup jobs outsourced through a web of private contractors and
subcontractors further contributed to BP’s ability to censor its operations. The
enactment and enforcement of a media blackout provided the opportunity for
widespread state and corporate deviance in response to the spill, including
concealment of the extent of the environmental devastation caused not only by the
spill, but by the application of dispersants.
The blackout on media access was made possible through an intricate matrix of
federal and local law enforcement, in addition to private security contracted by BP.
As documented by journalists, agencies including the DHS, the Coast Guard,
Louisiana Sheriff Deputies, and private security companies including Wackenhut and
Talon Security, were working to suppress media coverage of the oil spill. In most
cases, it seemed nearly impossible to tell exactly who was issuing orders. However,
journalists covering the spill stressed the consistency in which the Coast Guard
appeared to be following rules issued by BP rather than their own guidelines.
Within the Coast Guard however, pressure from above had prohibited the
agency’s release of public information that had not first been reviewed and approved
by the White House and DHS. The restrictions on media access to the Gulf of Mexico
and response operations thus appear to have come directly from the Obama
administration itself. Overall, the state-corporate police blockade functioned to
discourage social control of deviance by media and citizens. Suppression of images
and information helped to contain public outrage while allowing BP and the federal
government to undertake extremely dangerous response measures. All of this evidence
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suggests that the response to the spill was a state-facilitated corporate cover up of the
environmental damage caused by the oil.
From 1969 Santa Barbara to the Gulf of Mexico 2010: What has changed?
As Molotch (1970) documented in the aftermath of the Santa Barbara spill, the
national government continuously defended and supported the oil industry despite
public pressure. A brief comparison of the commonalities and differences between the
two spills in terms of the response by government and industry will provide insight into
the durability of state-corporate power arrangements over time. In his analysis,
Molotch (1970) identified a close relationship between the Department of Interior and
the oil industry whose joint interests superseded those of the public. The response to
the blowout of Macondo similarly revealed the powerful and enduring arrangements
between the federal government and the offshore oil industry, although through
different executive branch agencies and with greater reliance on private contractors.
Drawing connections to government and corporate actors, Molotch (1970)
noted the crucial role played by the “knowledge production industry” comprised of
university scientists and media organizations. During the course of the Santa Barbara
spill, the oil industry sought to influence university researchers, especially within the
local area. Similarly, BP attempted to buy and silence Gulf coast researchers by
funding the Gulf of Mexico Research Initiative. Just as Dr. DuBridge and his Panel
had close ties to Union Oil through Cal Tech, DOE Secretary Dr. Chu had
questionable ties to BP via the UC Berkeley Energy Biosciences Institute. Despite
their obvious conflicts of interest, both of these presidentially appointed positions
placed unqualified government officials in roles that oversaw critical technical
decisions about well control efforts. In this regard, the selection of both Dr. DuBridge
and Dr. Chu to key roles in the responses was clearly in service of oil industry
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interests. Therefore, it seems that scientific misconduct by the federal government is
not limited to the present day, but instead has long been an established part of
government-oil industry relations.
An important difference between the response to the Santa Barbara and the
Deepwater Horizon spills is a concerted state-corporate effort to deny media access to
the spill and especially the significant role of public and private law enforcement in
enforcing the ban. Images and information about the 1969 spill helped to galvanize the
public in support of the environmental movement, which resulted in significant
legislative reforms to the dismay of the oil industry. Due to the proliferation of
technology and the accessibility of information via the internet, photographs and news
are more widely available than ever before. Therefore, a major aim of the statecorporate response to the Macondo blowout was geared towards concealing the
visibility of oil and its environmental effects through dispersants and control of images
and information. Because of these technological changes to the knowledge production
industry, the media blockade and an elaborate state-corporate police apparatus to
enforce it became necessary in response to the most recent spill. Finally, a silent yet
recurring player that symbolizes a far different era of national power than that of the
Santa Barbara spill, the DHS had a central role in both information control and law
enforcement activities during the response to Deepwater Horizon. With its mission to
secure the nation from all the threats it faces, the more recently established DHS above
all other agencies was capable of overseeing the response of law enforcement at all
levels. The expanded scope and reach of federal power through the DHS signifies an
important difference between the 1969 and 2010 response efforts.
Reflecting on the two spills in a 2010 interview with Scientific American,
Molotch notes that there are a number of other significant regional, racial and class
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differences that influenced the response to the spill. First, since oil drilling off the
California coast is so close to land and Santa Barbara resides on the top of a hill
overlooking the ocean, the visibility of the spill was immediately obvious to residents.
In contrast, the location of the Macondo well 50 miles away from land provided an
easily concealable crime scene. Moreover, Gulf coast residents are far more dependent
on the oil industry for their livelihood compared to the wealthy citizens of Santa
Barbara whose economy is based more on tourism and higher education. The wealth
of the Santa Barbara citizens along with their cultural and political connections
allowed the city’s residents to organize more effectively against oil industry interests in
1969. With their livelihoods destroyed by the spill, the poor and minority residents of
the Gulf region were forced to rely on employment from BP and their private
contractors in the cleanup effort (Greenmeier 2010). Thus the location of the
Deepwater Horizon disaster, as well as the race and class characteristics of the Gulf
region helped to facilitate elements of the state-corporate cover up.
In closing, Molotch predicts that the Macondo spill will not give rise to the
same kind of widespread public support for the environmental movement like occurred
following the 1969 spill, despite the exponential difference in the size. In contrast to
what he describes as “a religious awakening” towards environmental protectionism
following the Santa Barbara spill, Molotch correctly concluded that the 2010 Gulf of
Mexico spill will not similarly mobilize the public: “Something like that could only
happen once” (Greenmeier 2010). Indeed, the federal government-oil industry interests
made sure that such public sentiment for environmental harm would never rise again.
It therefore appears that the state-corporate response to the 2010 spill was successful
in concealing the environmental damage and as a result public reaction was contained.
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Oil in the Gulf and State-Corporate Power in America
The 2010 Gulf of Mexico oil spill was an unprecedented catastrophe that
provided insight into the contemporary nature of state and corporate power
arrangements in America. The causes of the Deepwater Horizon explosion were the
result of increased risk-taking by both the federal government and the oil industry in
pursuit of profit from deepwater development. While the federal government shied
away from its regulatory role over the years, it nevertheless persisted in advancing
deepwater oil exploration in the Gulf of Mexico by offering industry greater access
through leases with fewer royalty payments. Since the Santa Barbara spill in 1969,
federal connections to the oil industry appear to have only become more pervasive.
The similarities of the federal response to the Deepwater Horizon disaster in
comparison to Molotch’s (1970) detailing of power in America in the wake of the
Santa Barbara spill attest to the persistent durability of these state-industry power
arrangements.
Although these federal-industry power arrangements are not new, their form
has nonetheless changed since the Santa Barbara spill. The politicization of scientific
evidence and the control of images and information are increasingly common means by
which governments and corporations seek to conceal their crimes. Far from a thing of
the past, the response to the Gulf spill demonstrates that state-corporate censorship
and propaganda has taken on a more insidious role in the modern era. Furthermore, in
the aftermath of the disaster the entwinement of federal and local law enforcement
with private security forces to enforce restrictions on public access to the Gulf coast,
suggests a blurring of the lines between state and corporate police power. The DHS,
Coast Guard, Louisiana Sheriffs and BP private security appeared alongside one
another and acted in coordination without any clear lines of authority. This trend
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which has also been documented by other state-corporate crime research (Welch 2009;
Whyte 2003) raises many critical questions about the accountability of law
enforcement in an era of expansive corporate power.
Supporting the current state-corporate power arrangement is the essential role
of oil in fueling our industrialized capitalist economy. Nearly everything we consume is
either comprised of oil (such as plastics), or made possible by it (such as our global
food system). Fundamentally, our entire societal structure since World War II has been
predicated on oil. This widespread total and utter dependence on this resource
upholds the corrupt relationship between government and the oil industry. As the
global supply of oil continues its descent, the number of wars waged for control of this
precious resource will only persist. Indeed, as other research has demonstrated
(Kramer and Michalowski 2005; Whyte 2007), the U.S. led 2003 illegal occupation
and invasion of Iraq and the crimes flowing from it show the extent of state-corporate
violence waged in pursuit of oil. Despite the growing potential of social movements
willing to criticize the corruption of politics by corporations, our dependence on oil
runs to the core of our modern existence. With so much of our material reality made
possible by oil-based products, it is difficult to imagine how the state-oil industry
power relations will ever wither away while this reliance remains. Until this addiction
is broken through a radical overthrow of the industrial capitalist economy and the
government that supports it, power in America will continue to be dominated by stateoil industry interests.
Criminogenic Industry Structures
As this analysis has shown, the environmental disasters caused by the operation
of the offshore oil industry are not isolated incidents, but are instead evidence of a
broader criminogenic relationship between the federal government and the oil industry.
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With the rise of private contractors and sub-contractors not only in the oil industry but
across the economy more broadly, it is even more important to consider the myriad of
corporations operating in common industrial environments. In this sense it becomes
essential to focus on the industry as a level of analysis since examination on the
organizational level is insufficient for understating the decentralized state-corporate
relations of the contemporary era.
Studying the relations of government and corporations at the level of industry
further substantiates the utility of the concept of state-corporate crime and the
Integrated Theoretical Model by drawing attention to interactions within and between
these organizations. Government policy configures industry relations by facilitating
and constraining the economic activities of corporations involved in a common means
of production. The organizational behavior of corporations within an industry is
therefore collectively shaped by government policy such that an industrial culture
develops. When corruption and environmental degradation have become the status
quo within the culture of an industry, deviance has moved beyond normalization to the
point of institutionalization. As a comparison of the federal-oil industry relations in the
aftermath of the Santa Barbara and Gulf of Mexico spills shows, there are historically
enduring dimensions of these power arrangements that continue to result in significant
social, physical and environmental harm. Due to this, the state-corporate arrangements
of the oil industry must fundamentally be viewed as a criminogenic industry structure.
Limitations and Directions for Future Research
One primary limitation to this research is that it is not a comprehensive analysis
of the state-corporate interactions that comprise the oil industry, nor does it claim to
be. Instead, the aim of this project has been to provide an examination of the statecorporate relations that contributed to the explosion of Deepwater Horizon and the
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response to the spill. Based on this case study, the secondary objective of this project
has been to draw out the implications of these federal-industry relations unveiled by
the disaster for understanding the persistent and widespread criminogenic nature of the
offshore oil industry. In order to further substantiate this concept, more research is
necessary on the structure, function and variety of criminogenic industry structures
beyond the offshore oil industry.
As the findings suggest, the federal government in coordination with BP and an
array of private contractors worked to conceal the size of the spill and the devastating
environmental effects of the oil by manipulating scientific evidence and enforcing a
blackout of information and images throughout the Gulf region. Other studies should
consider if these state-corporate techniques of censorship are unique to the response
to Deepwater Horizon, or are part of a larger trend within the oil industry. As recent
research into the politicization of climate change by Lynch, Burns and Stretesky
(2011) suggests, the federal role in distorting scientific evidence is not an anomaly.
Similarly, as research by Kramer and Michalowski (2012) demonstrates, the fossil fuel
industry has funded and organized climate change denial movements. Censorship and
propaganda, it seems, are increasingly common means of hiding the crimes of the
powerful. Thus, future research should systematically examine the role of science in
legitimating and concealing state-corporate crime.
It is also the task of future research to carry out additional case studies which
document the nexus between government and the oil industry. In a recently presented
paper at the 2012 North Central Sociological Association meetings, I tested the
applicability of this model to other sectors within the oil industry through a case study
of the hydraulic fracturing industry, particularly the ecological threat posed to the state
of Michigan. Hydraulic fracturing, otherwise known as “fracking,” is a process used
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to extract natural gas by pressurizing underground wells with water, sand, and a slur
of undisclosed toxic chemicals to break- up shale formations thereby releasing the
trapped oil. Expanding the concepts of environmental state-corporate crime and
criminogenic industry structures, an examination of the environmental, human, and
social harm caused by hydraulic fracking can provide support for criminogenic nature
of the oil industry on the whole. As with offshore oil drilling, the federal government
has extensively facilitated the harm caused by the fracking industry. One example is
the “Halliburton Loophole” to the Energy Policy Act of 2005, which provides an
exemption for oil and gas drilling and extraction from requirements under the Safe
Water Drinking Act, the Clean Air Act and the Clean Water Act. By examining the
current legislative debates over fracking in Michigan, the role of the state government
in controlling, constraining and preventing the environmental and human harm caused
by hydraulic fracking can be evaluated.
Additionally, a comparative analysis of the operation of the offshore oil
industry in different countries would help to provide insight into the varying role of the
state in structuring industrial activities. For instance, many of the international oil
companies such as BP operate in numerous state territories in which they are subjected
to varying government regulations. Comparing different structures of government
regulation within an industry can help to discern the factors which support or prevent
against environmental and human harm.
Furthermore, as other case studies of state-corporate crime have suggested,
additional industries might also be plagued by criminogenic state-corporate
interactions. As the recent domestic and international financial meltdowns have
illustrated, criminogenic state-corporate relations might not be exclusive to the oil
industry, but might be a normal feature of other industries as well. Examining these
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dynamics within, across and between industries can further test the usefulness of the
concept of criminogenic industry structures.
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